



**FOREIGN  
BROADCAST  
INFORMATION  
SERVICE**

---

# ***JPRS Report***

# **Near East & South Asia**

---

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

# Near East & South Asia

JPRS-NEA-94-053

## CONTENTS

12 October 1994

### NEAR EAST

#### PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

- Palestinians Express Concern for PA's Future [Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI 2 Sep] ..... 1
- Emphasis on Traditional Role of Women Described [HA'ARETZ 5 Jun] ..... 3

#### EGYPT

- Weakness of Opposition Parties Described [AL-MUSAWWAR 19 Aug] ..... 8

#### ISRAEL

- Egyptian Campaign To Denuclearize Israel Assessed [HA'ARETZ 12 Sep] ..... 13
- Peres' Middle East Economic Model, Casablanca [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 9 Sep] ..... 14
- Palestinian 'Shin Bet' Interrogation Methods [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 9 Sep] ..... 16
- Interreligious Conflict Over Jerusalem Analyzed [HATZOFE 5 Sep] ..... 20
- Plans To Fortify Against Withdrawal From Golan [HA'ARETZ 12 Sep] ..... 22
- Jewish Settlement Said To Unify Jerusalem [HATZOFE 5 Sep] ..... 24

#### TUNISIA

- Population Census Statistics Reported [CONJONCTURE Aug] ..... 28

### SOUTH ASIA

#### AFGHANISTAN

- Interview With Sebghatollah Mojaddedi Presented [Cairo AL-AHRAM 16 Aug] ..... 32

#### INDIA

- Signing of GATT Seen Unconstitutional [AJ 2 Sep] ..... 34
- Hindu Nationalist Movement Direction, Vigor Analyzed [BARTAMAN 8 Sep] ..... 35
- Mulayam Singh Said Making U.P. 'Another Bihar' [JANSATTA 8 Sep] ..... 37
- Readers Continue Comments on Taslima Nasreen [ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA 2 Sep] ..... 38
- Newspapers Seen One of Nation's Healthy Industries [PUNJAB KESARI 2 Sep] ..... 40

#### IRAN

- Judicial Power Appointments Announced [JAHAN-E ESLAM 5 Sep] ..... 41
- Four New Governors Named [JAHAN-E ESLAM 4 Sep] ..... 42
- Incomplete Economic Projects, Implications Discussed [KEYHAN 9, 10, 11, 13, 14 Aug] ..... 42
- Nation's Largest Oil Tank Built by Domestic Experts [JAHAN-E ESLAM 3 Sep] ..... 51
- Darabad Laser Therapy Unit Begins Operations [JAHAN-E ESLAM 3 Sep] ..... 52
- New Sistan va Baluchestan Communications Centers Open [JAHAN-E ESLAM 31 Aug] ..... 52
- Kordestan Province Budget Detailed [JAHAN-E ESLAM 4 Sep] ..... 52
- Bushehr Provincial Credits Increase 30 Percent [JAHAN-E ESLAM 3 Sep] ..... 53

#### PAKISTAN

- Failure To Obtain F-16s Seen Final [AMN 11 Aug] ..... 53
- UN Claimed Biased Against Islam [MASHRIQ 18 Aug] ..... 53
- UN Said Spreading Satanic Plot of Sexual Deviance [TAKBEER 28 Aug] ..... 54
- Conspiracy To Assassinate Altaf Hussain Uncovered [AMN 16 Aug] ..... 56
- Formation of New Provinces Supported [TAKBEER 25 Aug] ..... 56
- Documents Reveal Impact of Narcotics on Economy [MASHRIQ 10 Aug] ..... 57

## PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

### Palestinians Express Concern for PA's Future

94AA0121A Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic  
2 Sep 94 pp 24-25

[Article by Mufid 'Abd-al-Rahim from Washington: "The West Bank: Has the Surrender to the Jordanian Option Begun?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] More than three months after the Palestinian National Authority [PNA; Palestinian Authority, PA] took over its limited powers in the Gaza Strip and Jericho, and more than five weeks after Mr. Yasir 'Arafat's arrival in the Gaza Strip to reside there permanently, chances for the success of the Palestinian-Israeli accord on the ground appear far weaker than at the time the accord was signed. Feelings of doubt and skepticism over the accord are mounting with every passing day, even among the ordinary Palestinians who had been enthusiastic about the accord.

After the mass euphoria that filled the Palestinian territories following the entry of Palestinian police forces into the Palestinian autonomous areas, a widespread belief began to take hold in the minds of Palestinian officials close to Chairman Yasir 'Arafat in the autonomous Palestinian areas in Gaza and Jericho and the Palestinian citizens throughout the occupied Palestinian territories—the belief that Israel, with the help of the United States and the rest of the Western aid-donor countries, had abandoned the agreement it signed with the PLO last September, and was beginning to prepare the Palestinian masses gradually in the occupied territories and the international community for another option, thought to be the "Jordanian alternative."

This belief may seem more credible after the signing of the Declaration of Principles between Jordan and Israel at the White House on the 25th of last month, and in light both of Israel's slowness to honor its commitments to the PLO under the Washington and Cairo agreements, and the slowness of donor countries to provide the cash and material aid they promised to the PNA in the donor countries' meeting held in Washington under U.S. sponsorship in October last year.

The present writer conducted interviews in a tour through the occupied Arab lands and the Palestinian autonomous areas of Gaza and Jericho over the last four weeks. They, along with Palestinian officials, Western diplomats, and Palestinian politicians, businessmen, and journalists, and others in Israel, say that PLO chief Yasir 'Arafat "feels that Israel has begun to mount a siege against him, and that the donor countries are dragging their feet in providing aid to the PNA in coordination with the Arab country that had asked those countries' representatives, especially the United States, to delay the delivery of aid for no less than six months, until matters relating to them became clear—with regard to whether or not they would have to continue doing business with the PLO."

### The Goal: To Prove 'Arafat's Failure

Palestinian officials say that "these two tracks, which we feel are coordinated, are parallel to a large extent, and aimed at producing a single result: humiliating Yasir 'Arafat in the eyes of the Palestinian masses, to whom he promised that the accord he had reached with Israel would be able to solve most of their problems, and to prove to the international community that Yasir 'Arafat's experiment had failed. Thus a search for an alternative was called for."

They say that if these moves—whose coordination is not hard to detect—should continue, then "the Palestinian chairman will be afraid that the United States and Israel, at the end of course, or at the end of the three-year maximum transitional autonomy period, will ask Jordan to resume the role it had assumed in the occupied territories before the 1967 defeat." They explain that "the state of starvation intended for the Palestinian masses, and the humiliation planned for the Palestinian leadership at both Israel's hands and those of the international community, will not continue for long. What will happen is that the ordinary citizens of the West Bank and Gaza will reach a point where they long for the days of Israeli occupation. If ordinary Palestinian citizens reach that point, and they are offered the Jordanian option, then of course they will find it more acceptable than the National Authority whose failure will have been demonstrated according to plan, and by the odious Israeli occupation from which they suffered for 27 years."

The Palestinian officials and Western diplomats whom the present writer interviewed cited many examples of "the hegemonistic practices that Israel intends to engage with the Palestinian leadership." One of these is the poor treatment of prominent Palestinian officials in and outside the autonomous areas as they go to and from Gaza and Jericho—despite the existence of clear provisions stipulating the good treatment of these people at those exits and crossing points. Others include delays in opening the secure corridor between Gaza and Jericho stipulated by the Washington and Cairo accords; not keeping its promises to free the Palestinian prisoners whose liberation, coming rapidly and in great numbers, was to be seen as a popular gain for the Palestinian chairman, as a significant achievement for him and the PLO leadership; insisting on accelerating the transfer of the sectors (education, health, tourism) which require the assumption of heavy expenditures by the Palestinian authority, while being fully aware that it lacks the required material resources to manage them; failure to commit to economic agreements between the PNA and Israel, relating to increasing the volume of Palestinian workers in Israel, with the intention of keeping the unemployment rate at current high levels in the autonomous areas; and diligently keeping the Palestinian leadership surrounded on all sides. For example, more than three months after the PNA assumed control over the Gaza Strip and Jericho, the people of those two areas do

not feel that "their present circumstances are beginning to improve, with Palestinian officials in Gaza admitting that general unemployment still stands at 45 percent—the same rate Gaza experienced under the [Israeli] occupation."

#### The Fear of Interpreting Resolution 242

These people go on to say that Chairman 'Arafat is now afraid that "Israel intends—at the right moment, and together with the international community, led by the strongest country, the United States of America—to interpret an important point in the Palestinian-Israeli agreement that stipulates that the solution for the occupied territories' final status be according to Security Council Resolution 242; and that Israel's acceptance of that point was considered a Palestinian victory at the time the Palestinian-Israeli accord was signed." Because of this, the fear on the part of the Palestinian chairman, as his aides now say, is that Jordan will say, on the basis of international law, according to Resolution 242, which stipulates "Israel's withdrawal from the territories it occupied in 1967, that it—not the PLO—is the party internationally acknowledged as capable of demanding the return of the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Israel."

It is worth mentioning that the Jordanian king legally and administratively disengaged his country from those territories, (though not with the holy sites and the office of [religious] endowments that has managed those sites in East Jerusalem since the onset of the Israeli occupation, almost without interruption) in the summer of 1988, after a sharp rise in the violence of the Palestinian intifadah against the Israeli occupation.

These persons say that the PLO agreed, in its accord with Israel, to wait three years before beginning to study—among other topics—the final status of the occupied territories. These officials add that "the lack of clarity of the result of these negotiations so far is due to Israel's refusal to commit to anything that relates to the final status of these territories. This is on top of its slowness in acknowledging the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. This has increased Palestinian officials' fear that Washington and Tel Aviv have, from the beginning, wanted the PLO merely to play a limited role in the transitional autonomy period, and that they will allow only Jordan to gain control of any area Israel is prepared to evacuate following the end of the transitional period."

Many Palestinians, officials and ordinary citizens—in fact, even some of those living in Israel and holding Israeli citizenship—actually feel that the PLO has "gotten itself into a trap by accepting autonomy. It is, basically, experimental rule granted them by Israel in order to give itself a longer period of time in which to decide what is an appropriate future for the occupied territories, or in which to find a better alternative to the PLO for ruling the occupied territories the way Israel

wants." They go on to say that the Palestinian leadership "has begun to perceive the danger of that trap, given the lack of sufficient funds, and the absence of the PNA's legal sovereignty over the territories in which it is exercising its limited authority, in light of the current agreement over the course of the next three years." Some Palestinian loyalists feel, and some Western observers agree with them, that "this trap might be the last one the PLO falls into, because its chances of getting out of it are so very slim, in truth, given the Arab and international political complications, the collapse of traditional alliances in the Arab world, and the beginning of accelerated Arab openness to Israel."

They add that Mr. 'Arafat has succeeded, over the past quarter century, in remaining chief of the PLO, and hence a major player in Arab and international political affairs, through his experience in feeling his way through the at times lethal labyrinths of Arab politics. He has always been able to recover from his stumbles, even after falling into near-fatal errors, thanks to his ability to play off one Arab country against another.

But they say that the Palestinian leader "is now facing Jordanian ruler King Husayn on one side and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin on the other, and these are two leaders that share a common objective as regards Mr. 'Arafat: guaranteeing that the present or future Palestinian entity does not pose any economic or security danger to either of their countries." The diplomats add that Chairman 'Arafat—who believes that King Husayn and Israeli Prime Minister Rabin are determined to prevent the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the territories that separate Jordan from Israel—knows that it would be difficult to create a conflict between these two leaders, or to find an Arab partner capable of balancing their combined weight."

#### Rabin's Theory and Peres's Theory

Western diplomats in Israel say—and Palestinian officials concur—that there are clearly two schools of thought at the top rungs of the Israeli Government, as relates to the accord with the PLO. The first is led by Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres, who is considered the legitimate father of this accord, and who still believes that the PLO is the sole party with which to talk and deal, if a long-range solution to the Palestinian problem is to be found. The second is led by Prime Minister and Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin himself; he does not conceal from anyone the fact that he was dragged forcibly into signing the accord, after his senior aides convinced him of the soundness of the foreign minister's theory of dealing with the Palestinians. They explain that it appears the Israeli prime minister's theory appears to be triumphing over his traditional rival in the Labor Party, Foreign Minister Peres, especially after the signing of the Jordanian-Israeli Declaration of Principles in Washington last month, which was followed by a series of accords between Tel Aviv and Amman.



Western diplomats say Israeli Prime Minister Rabin "does not hide his lack of enthusiasm for the PLO, and misses no opportunity, in internal Labor Party meetings, to accuse his foreign minister of short-sightedness regarding the agreement with the PLO, and to say that Peres' bet on the PLO is like a bet on a losing horse."

On the other hand, they say, "Rabin makes no secret of his mounting enthusiasm over the agreement with Jordan and King Husayn. He is intent upon cementing Israel's ties with Jordan and solving all its problems with Jordan before the end of the Palestinian transitional autonomous period." They say that if the course of Israeli and Jordanian affairs should run this way over the next three years, and if matters limp along in the autonomous areas, then "there will be nothing to prevent Rabin from abandoning his agreement with the PLO in any way he wants, in order to prepare things for a peaceful handover to Jordanian authority in the occupied areas."

They disagree over whether Rabin is trying to persuade Foreign Minister Peres that Chairman 'Arafat's role "has led to a breakthrough in the establishment of peace between the Arabs and Israel, and has opened the door, through his secret agreement with Israel, for all the other Arab countries each to establish its own peace with Israel; that now ['Arafat] may prepare to leave the stage." These diplomats say that Rabin has never been convinced that the PLO is capable, "either administratively or in security terms, of running the West Bank and Gaza in a way acceptable to Israel in the strategic term."

They say that the Israeli prime minister views the armed operations of Palestinian groups opposed to the accord with Israel, especially Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement] and the Islamic Jihad, as extremely grave, and that he "will not give 'Arafat much time before proceeding with some military action in Gaza and Jericho on the pretext of rooting out those two organizations once the PLO has shown its inability to stop them."

Palestinian officials do not deny that they "are being put to the test" and that Israel and the international community are watching every move the PNA is making in the two autonomous areas. But they say that at the same time "we are trying to control things so as to strengthen the trend in support of the accord inside the occupied territories. Of course we will make mistakes, which the international community might view as violations of civil rights and democratic principles, and freedom of opinion and thought." The officials specifically cite the case of the closure of the pro-Jordanian AL-NAHAR newspaper, published in East Jerusalem. The Palestinian officials add that mistakes were made in the AL-NAHAR case, but that it was actually a start to the regulation of printing, publishing, and distribution processes in the Palestinian territories, and only a start to the regulation of the leaflets printed by opponents of the accord, in which they propagandize against the PNA and accuse it of failure, and so on."

They say that "the West" and movements inside Israel have exploited this case and "used it as a pretext for the continued siege against the Palestinian leadership, to make it appear dictatorial and incapable of pursuing democracy; to weaken those Western parties trying in good faith to help us out."

These officials also condemned what they called "the American/Western policy of a double standard relating to the manner in which the National Authority deals with the Islamists in the autonomous areas." They said that "while the United States takes no action against many Arab countries that repress Islamists by all possible means, day and night, covertly and in the open, they and other parties in the West turn the world upside down if the Palestinian police detain a small number of leaders of the Islamic Movement only to have a dialogue with them after a series of military operations against the Israelis for which Islamic organizations claimed responsibility in the past few weeks."

One Palestinian official, recalling a meeting between him and a foreign diplomat in Jerusalem two weeks before, after the PNA had arrested a number of Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders, said that the foreign diplomat had asked him, jokingly of course, if he wanted to "hit them," in his own words: "Is the next step for you to deport the Hamas leaders to Marj al-Zuhur?"

#### **Emphasis on Traditional Role of Women Described**

94AA0115A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 5 Jun 94  
pp 45-46, 48

[Article by Suha 'Araf; first paragraph is HA'ARETZ introduction; quotation marks as published]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt]

#### **Stepdaughters**

Forced marriages of young girls have become a common phenomenon in the territories, and the autonomy in Gaza and Jericho will bring them no redemption. The general retrogression in the status of Palestinian women, of which this is one of the most outstanding expressions, has become possible because of the obsessive preoccupation with "family honor": every deviation from the conservative code of behavior is seen as collaboration with the authorities.

Mirfat al-Dali of Khan Yunus is a 13-year-old girl, and already married. "I got married six months ago," she says. "The truth is, I didn't really want to very much, and my parents didn't really want me to very much, but we had to do it because our economic situation was so hard. Our house has only two rooms. My father has a shoe store and supports 13 people on what he makes there, and my mother is busy with housework. I am sorry for my parents: we reached the point where we had nothing to eat. I left school when I was 10 to help my mother with the housework. I dreamed of going to the college in Gaza

and becoming a teacher, but I guess I am just not lucky—our situation is very hard, and there is no other choice. My two older brothers belong to the Fatah Hawks, and they are wanted men: the army used to come to our house every day, wreck the furniture and doors, hit us, and ask questions about them. We have nothing left, not even a bed in one piece. So I thought to myself: 'If I get married, I will take a little of the economic burden off my parents.' I did not know my husband beforehand, but we get along fine, thank God. There are no problems.

This is not an exceptional case. The drop in the marriage age for girls and boys is one of the negative influences of the intifadah that spokesmen for the Palestinian national organizations have chosen not to publicize. They, along with the Israeli and international press, prefer to present the positive side of the intifadah: under its influence, Palestinian women and girls have come out of the house, confronted the army, been beaten, arrested, even killed. That their active participation in the struggle has raised their status in society, and aroused among men feelings of respect and recognition of their rights. But this picture accurately reflects only the first stage of the intifadah.

In the first year of the intifadah, women made up 10 percent of all Palestinians killed by the Israel Defense Forces. They also made up a relatively high proportion of those arrested. But the picture changed rather quickly. When the intifadah moved from the popular, mass stage, which was also extremely democratic, to the second stage, when the organized groups subordinate to the PLO gained control in the street, the women were returned home. But outwardly, the Palestinians' good public relations succeeded in clouding over the facts, and the praise of the women active in the intifadah continued undiminished.

The clouding over also necessitated the silencing of unpleasant facts. A year and a half ago, several Palestinian women prisoners and detainees confined in the Sharon prison carried out an internal survey with the aim of clarifying what motivated each one to take the action that led to her arrest. The findings were smuggled out in tiny writing on a piece of rolled up paper, but have not been published since. The statistics published here for the first time, make the reasons clear.

Of approximately 40 Palestinian female security prisoners and detainees, many of whom were captured after they had knifed, or tried to knife, soldiers, more than 30 did it not only, or even mainly, from national-political motives; but also most of the knife-wielders said that they took action in order to escape from their families: several tried in this way to avoid plans to marry them off against their will; others were suspected or accused of "shaming family honor," and saw the knife attacks as an honorable way to escape, even if it meant a period in prison, from the threat of death facing them at home from every male member of their families. And there are also among them more than a few women who had been

accused, often with no basis or justification, of collaborating with the Israeli authorities, and had gone out and stabbed a soldier in order to clear their names and also, through this opportunity, to win honor as fighters.

After the first, popular, stage of the intifadah had passed, its activists began to be more and more involved in internal struggles: the press received mainly reports of the punishment of collaborators, or people suspected of collaboration; but the intifadah activists also took upon themselves the function of police, and even more, appointed themselves a sort of "morals police": they punished every deviation from the conservative moral code that had set, which included prohibition of property violations, the trade in and use of drugs, and prostitution. Criminal offenders were automatically under suspicion of collaboration, if not actual, then potential: every one of them was likely to be caught by the police and receive an offer he or she could not refuse—cooperation in place of prison. But while such suspicion against a man affected only him or his close family, suspicions against women caused harm to the status of Palestinian women as a whole.

#### Religious Coercion

The obsessive preoccupation of Palestinian society with "family honor" led to women being suspected of collaboration even if they did not practice prostitution or take drugs. Every woman who deviated even slightly from traditional custom ran the risk of being accused of prostitution. A woman who has sexual relations outside of marriage, meets a man without a family member along, travels to the city alone, goes out of the house without a "good" reason—all are liable to be suspected. In the suspicious-in-any-case atmosphere that developed during the intifadah, suspicion also fell upon women who inadvertently found themselves in positions where their families could not oversee their activities: women who worked in Israel or elsewhere outside the place they lived, women whose husbands had been arrested and who traveled alone to find them lawyers, etc., etc. One good illustration is the bitter fate of the young woman from Kafr Kibya who used to travel to Ramallah to get away from the closed atmosphere of her village for a bit. She would leave the village dressed in a Palestinian embroidered dress, and in Ramallah would change to modern clothes. Someone recognized her there, and suspicion fell upon her immediately that she was hiding her identity this way to make it easier for her to work for the Shin Bet. She was murdered by Fatah shock troops.

The danger of death facing women suspected of blemishing "family honor" does indeed make it easier for the authorities to extort cooperation out of women, under the threat that their secrets will be revealed, or that false rumors will be circulated about them. It is precisely this relative freedom that women won in the first stage of the intifadah that has become their nemesis now: every independent woman was liable to arouse suspicion against herself. In order to avert this, many women

returned home, and began to wear traditional clothing and cover their heads. In many other cases, this happened under pressure from parents and relatives. It is possible that certain circles even used the spreading of rumors about women in order to achieve precisely this goal.

This process also had negative consequences for young girls. To prevent them from having unsupervised contact with boys, whether in class or at demonstrations outside of school hours, parents began taking their daughters out of school to prevent them from participating in demonstrations and having contact with boys in the joint struggle, and, to be as sure as possible, married them off as early as they could.

The drop in the average marriage age was one of the worst blows the intifadah made on the status of Palestinian women. According to the statistics of the shari'ah courts, the average marriage age for women before the intifadah was 18. This meant that many young women managed to finish school, and sometimes even attend university and work a few years before they got married. During the intifadah, the average marriage age for women dropped to 16; in villages and refugee camps, especially on the Gaza Strip, it is possible to find girls who have been forced to marry at age 13, or even 12, in numbers that turn this into a phenomenon. The Ma'zuns, who have the religious authority to perform weddings, estimate that we are speaking here of hundreds of girls each year.

Ma'azun Nahd Hilmi al-Saka', one of the 17 Ma'zuns active in the city of Khan Yunus, says that his function is limited to formulating the marriage contract, which has already been approved by a qadi in one of the Gaza Strip's five shari'ah law courts. As to the age of the bride, he explains: I cannot decide anything, even if the person before me is a nine-year-old girl. The qadi is the one who rules on whether she is permitted to marry or not. He does it with the help of a Shari'ya doctor who examines her and rules on whether she can function sexually or not. According to the Muslim shari'ah, girls are permitted to marry from the age of nine."

According to the Jordanian family law followed on the West Bank, the permissible age for marriage is 15, and this is also true for the Gaza Strip. But under pressure from the families, some qadis and Ma'zuns turn a blind eye and go according to the more severe shari'ah. "In 1989," says Ma'zun al-Saka', "the number of weddings rose. I myself was marrying at least three couples a day." Of late, there has been a sharp drop in the number of couples getting married. People have begun to feel that the intifadah is over, and that in a little while, there will be a solution to the Palestinian problem, and so, they have begun to demand more bride-price, an apartment, furniture, etc. Today, I marry only six couples a month. In most of the marriages I have performed, the girls were from 12 to 16 years old, and the boys 20 to 24."

Sabr al-Fara', qadi of the shari'ah court in Khan Yunus, explains the Muslim traditional law: "The shari'ah laws

are set according to the Islamic shari'ah and therefore, the age for marriage is set at nine. That is the age when the girl reaches puberty: the criterion of the Shari'ah is the body, not the mind, and the ability of the girl to function as a mother and wife."

According to the statistics reported by Qadi al-Fara', 100 to 140 marriage contracts a month are drawn up on the Gaza Strip now, many fewer than during the intifadah years: then, they would have drawn up about that number of contracts in Khan Yunus alone. "In the summer, we would reach as many as 250 marriage contracts a month," he says. "Most of the brides are married at 13 to 17 years old, and the grooms at 20 to 22. The laws in effect on the Gaza Strip are Turkish laws that go back to 1333; these laws have not changed, and will not change, because they get their validity from the religion, and the laws of the religion are eternal."

The qadi knows that a Palestinian shari'ah council in the Gaza Strip determined the family law in 1965, and that according to it, the permissible marriage age for women is 15. "But if a young woman of 12 comes to us and wants to get married, the qadi, with the assistance of a shari'ah doctor, can rule in her favor. The Islamic shari'ah is our source, and we cannot deny this young woman the rights the religion has given her."

#### Blackmail

"Isqat," an Arabic word which means "hakhshala" ["leading astray," "corrupting"] took on an especially threatening implication during the intifadah. Already before the intifadah, stories were circulating in the territories about General Security Service (Shin Bet) agents forcing women and girls to undress or to have sex, photographing them in the act, and later threatening to circulate the photos if they did not cooperate. The first book about the phenomenon, *Al-Dahiyah Ta'taraf (The Victim Confesses)*, by an unknown author, was distributed in the territories in the early 1980's. It was meant to warn Palestinians of the blackmail phenomenon, the isqat, and described in detail the various ways of carrying out isqat.

Among other things, the book includes the personal story of collaborator Mazin al-Fahmawi of the Jenin region, who was captured by one of the Palestinian organizations, interrogated, confessed, and was executed. al-Fahmawi told his interrogators how he was recruited into the Israeli security services in the 1970's, and how he recruited young men and women for them by using isqat. Since then, his name has been a symbol of collaboration with the occupation authorities.

No official Israeli source has ever confirmed that the Shin Bet carries out sexual blackmail against women in order to force them to collaborate. But even if the Shin Bet (or its collaborating representatives/agents) have really used isqat to recruit agents, the true dimensions of the phenomenon are much smaller than those they are



given by the Palestinian political culture in the territories. Every organization has printed at least one pamphlet about the phenomenon, not to speak of the many flyers circulated in the territories with information on the danger and a demand that the residents take care and be wary of it. The organizations also published public announcements listing the names of men and women accused of doing *isqat* and describing them as collaborators. The accusations frequently appeared on walls, along with the names of the men and women accused.

According to the Betzelem [organization's] statistics, 107 women were killed during the intifadah for collaborating. There is no way of knowing in which cases the accusations were founded, and in which cases, after women were murdered for deviating from the conservative code of behavior, their killers told the outside world that the crime they had been punished for was collaboration. Several of the women who were killed had been married to collaborators, and in these cases, too, it is hard to know for sure whether they really were active partners in their husbands' actions or not. The most astonishing statistic is that approximately 70 of the 107 women were executed for doing *isqa't* to men or to women; and other women were killed because they were victims of *isqa't*.

Najwa Lutfi, a feminist from the Khan Yunus refugee camp, believes that the Shin Bet has used the exaggeration of the *isqat* psychosis as a kind of psychological warfare: "The Shin Bet agents had an important role in spreading rumors about girls having loose morals, or even collaborating with the Israeli authorities. They knew the weakness of Palestinian society where the subject of 'family honor' was involved, and used it very well. As a result of the backwardness and suspiciousness of Palestinian society, especially during the intifadah period, they succeeded in spreading rumors about young women, businesses, and schools, and as a result of the general confusion, people believed the rumors and rushed to get their daughters married off at an early age."

The many rumors about the activities of collaborators who carry out *isqa't* have had a deep impact on Palestinian society. Because, according to the rumors, the collaborators carry out their *isqa't* in schools, businesses, factories, beauty parlors, clothing stores, and restaurants, social pressure has developed to remove women and girls from "suspicious" surroundings. The ice cream factory in Khan Yunus was closed and set aflame after collaborators were interrogated by the shock troops and confessed that they had drugged young women and photographed them nude on the factory premises. Many womens' clothing stores have been closed, and beauty shops and salons have been set aflame. Many women who owned their own shops or beauty parlors have been executed for carrying out *isqat*.

The beauty parlor belonging to Rabab Abu-al-Khayr, a 35-year-old single woman from Khan Yunus, was burned down in 1991 in broad daylight. [Abu-al-Khayr]

was the sole support of her 10-member family. At noon, four masked Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement] members arrived at al-Bahr Street in downtown Khan Yunus, and went up to the fourth floor of the building, where the beauty parlor operated. Two of them took Rabab Abu-al-Khayr outside, and while their two comrades burned the beauty parlor down, they hit her with a club and an iron bar. After they left her, she was taken to Nasir hospital in the city. The next day, slogans were written on the walls of mosques and houses, accusing Abu-al-Khayr of doing *isqat* to many young women. When she was released from the hospital, she immediately fled to her sister in Saudi Arabia, out of fear for her life.

Muhammad Qullab, a journalist and lecturer at al-Azhar University in Gaza, lives in the building where Rabab Abu-al-Khayr's beauty shop operated. "I was Rabab's neighbor for two years, on the same floor," he says. "Her beauty shop was right there across the hall. That girl was a victim of unfounded rumors. Rabab is a pathetic girl, a cripple who supports a large family, and we did not see that she did anything wrong. A great injustice was done that girl. It is a terrible shame. She did the wise thing when she fled from here; if she had stayed, they surely would have liquidated her."

#### Dropping Out of School

Wafa' Shirab, now 19 years old, was the victim of false rumors, in the wake of which her parents rushed to marry her off. It happened four years ago. "I was a pupil at the high school in Khan Yunus. One day, three masked men came to the school, entered my classroom in the middle of the lesson, and demanded that I come with them outside the school grounds. I went into the courtyard with them, and asked them there, 'What do you want from me? I do not want to go outside with you. What do you want?' One of them said to me, 'Do not be afraid. We just want to talk to you.' I answered them, 'Then talk to me here.'

"One of them got irritated, and answered me, 'We will decide where we want to talk with you. Do not be smart with us. Yalla! [Hurry up!], come on and do not make any problems. That way it will be better for you and for us.' I screamed, 'I am not coming with you. You do not know who my father is, and who my brothers are.' One of them answered me mockingly, 'We know everything about you, and we know that your brothers are leaders in the intifadah, but it does not matter to us. Yalla! Come on!' I told them, 'I am not going with you and if you try to come any closer to me, I will scream and you will be sorry.'

"They left me and ran off. That same evening, two wanted men, whom I know well because they are our neighbors, and grew up with my brothers, came to our house. They asked to speak to me, came into the room, and closed the door. They told me there was a rumor going around about me and three other girls from school,



that collaborators had done isqa't to us, taken nude photos of us and threatened to circulate them, and that for that reason, we were now involved in selling drugs. I denied everything and they believed me, because they know me well, and know my family and the education I received. They told me: 'Do not be afraid. We will find out who the masked men who came to the school were, and we will resolve the problem.'

"My parents did not believe the rumors either, but they were afraid that something would happen to me, that my name would be completely ruined and no one would want to marry me. So they kept me away from school. After about a week, the two wanted men came to our house again, and sat down with me, and my father and two older brothers. They had investigated the incident, they said, and discovered that the masked men who visited me at the school were collaborators. They also said that I had acted wisely in refusing to go with them, because they could have liquidated me, and then everyone would have believed that the accusation was founded and I really had been a collaborator. They promised me they would put out a flyer explaining that I was innocent and that the masked men had circulated the rumors in order to destroy my name and the name of my family."

But Wafa'a Shur'av's parents were not satisfied with that. "They rushed to marry me off, and within two weeks I was married to a boy I did not know at all, just a year-older than I was. I lived together with him and his parents, and we had endless problems. I returned home to my parents several times, but they sent me back to him. According to them, I should appreciate the fact that he agreed to marry me despite the bad rumors that had been circulated about me."

Her family problems diminished the moment they moved into their own apartment. "We got used to each other," she says. "We have two children now, though I cannot say that I am happy. This is life. I have to get used to it. Several times I wanted a divorce, but my parents pressured me, and even told me that if I did, they would not let me return to them."

The main factor behind the drop in the marriage age was the deterioration of the economic situation during the intifadah. Workers employed in Israel were dismissed; others had trouble crossing the green line because of heightened security; the strikes, the periods of curfew and closure, the days of mourning—all these damaged the average family income, and, of course, also on the ability of the family to afford the bride-price payments that the groom was expected to pay the father of the bride. In the beginning, the intifadah had a positive influence in this realm too: in the first year, the minimum bride-price went down from 2,000 Jordanian dinars [JD] to JD800 or even less. There was also social pressure to keep the celebrations modest, and weddings lost their showy side: the parties, the [tables] overflowing

with food, the bands. The ceremonies became family celebrations: just sharing a lunch together, without music or slaughtering of lambs.

Under these circumstances, bachelors who formerly would have had to work years to save enough money for the bride-price, were able to marry at an early age. Many wanted to take advantage of the opportunity before the economic situation improved and things went back to the way they were. On the parents' side, there was an additional motive for marrying their sons off quickly. The parents hoped that the burden of supporting a family would keep their sons from joining, or continuing in, the underground activities that were liable to lead to their imprisonment, or even their deaths.

As the age of the young men available for marriage went down, the age of the girls available for marriage to them also dropped accordingly. The result expressed itself clearly in the large number of pupils dropping out of school. Before the intifadah, 1.1 to 1.2 percent of the pupils dropped out each year. A study carried out by Huda 'Abd-al-Hadi in the schools run by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in Nabulus, where 17,000 pupils study, revealed that in the first year of the intifadah, the 1988-89 school year, the dropout rate for girls rose to 3 percent.

The dropout phenomenon has been growing ever since. According to the statistics of the UNRWA education division, in 1992-93, 6.5 percent of the female pupils in the secondary schools dropped out. The dropout rate for boys was also high, 3.7 percent, but still much lower than that of girls. The dropout rate, the early marriages, and the "intifadah culture," which closed women up in the house, also had an influence on the number of women studying in the universities. Before the intifadah, women made up 37 percent of the student body at Bi'r Zayt University. Today, they make up only 21 percent.

### The Divorce

M. led me home as though we were hiding in the underground: for fear that the neighbors would see me and know that she had dared to meet with a journalist and tell about her life, she instructed me to walk at a distance of several meters behind her. At the corner of every alleyway, she stopped for a moment to check the open space ahead, and with hand signs signaled me to come ahead, or to wait. When she reached home, she went in, leaving me outside, and after about three minutes came out and signaled me to come inside.

All our efforts were in vain: one of the neighbor women looked out the window and saw us at the moment I came up to the door. M. hurried to explain, without the neighbor having asked: "This lady is from the Red Cross. She has come to visit me to see my economic situation. Maybe they will help me." But we were both afraid that the neighbor was not convinced.

"I was married at 15 to a man I did not know," she told me later. "I thought to myself that this way I could

escape from my home and family and the injustice done me there. I never succeeded in loving my husband. They all claimed that love would come after the marriage, but it never did. There was friction all the time. I wanted a divorce, but my parents' pressure kept me from getting one. I told them, 'I have been with him two years now, and I still hate him.' Then they convinced me to have children—perhaps the children would bring us closer. I had four children; the oldest is a boy of 15 now. We stayed together for 10 years. I returned to my parents' house more than a hundred times during that time, but they always forced me to return to him. My hatred for him grew stronger and stronger as time passed."

She began to cry, her voice breaking, and then blurted out the excuse that she was going to prepare coffee. After a quarter of an hour she returned, with her eyes swollen from weeping. "I was a battered woman. He beat me at every opportunity and almost every day. The neighbors would hear my cries, but would not interfere." M. lifted her dress and showed me the mark of a burn from a hot iron. "I do not understand my parents! I would return to them at night, crying, frightened, beaten, and many times bleeding and with marks of violence, and they would throw me out and let me return home alone and unaccompanied. I even remember how I came to them once with an open wound in my head and told them I wanted a divorce from him. My big brother hit me and said, 'Go back to your husband. I understand him, and even identify with him. How can he stand you? How can he look at your ugly face? Don't you ever look at yourself in the mirror?'"

"One day I heard that he wanted to marry a second wife. This time, I insisted on a divorce. I was even ready to give up all my rights, I just wanted to get away, and that was that. My parents did not agree that my children should come with me to live with them and this was their condition: they said, 'Is it not enough that we have to support you? Do you expect us to support your children, too? Not in your wildest dreams.' I agreed against my will. My children remained with him and his wife. My parents even kept me from seeing them."

Meanwhile, the intifadah had begun. "I lived for two years with my parents, and worked as a cleaning lady in one of the schools in the camp. In 1989, my parents received a marriage offer from a blind man who already had one wife and wanted to marry me, too. My parents agreed immediately, and I also agreed and was even happy: at home, I was everybody's servant. They would take my wages and not leave me a penny. They barely even gave me food. They did not ask a bride-price; they just wanted to marry me off and get rid of me.

"I went to live with him, with his first wife and his parents, all of us in the same house. They made my life hell: they would follow me; they were always suspicious of me. Within a month, I got a divorce and returned to my parents, but this time they were even more cruel: they beat me endlessly, kept me from ever leaving the house,

kept me locked me up in a room, and made me feel that I was abnormal and worthless, that nobody wanted me—even this blind man had driven me out after a month. It was pure and simple character assassination. I wanted to die during that time: what did I have left in life? Nothing. They had even taken my children away from me."

She was locked up in the house for a year and a half. "Once my brother caught me standing in the entrance of the house, and as punishment, he pounded me with blows. My parents began negotiating with my first husband for him to take me back; they promised him I would not make any trouble. Later, they tried to convince me to return to him. I did not want to. I told them that I hated him; how could I go near him after all had done to me? They pressured me and beat me until I was left with no choice.

"Last year I returned to him, and to my children. So far, he has been working on the West Bank, and coming back to me only once a week. I live with my children in a separate house. [passage omitted]

## EGYPT

### Weakness of Opposition Parties Described

94LD0083A Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic  
19 Aug 94 pp 14-17

[Article by Majdi al-Daqqaq: "Marginal Parties: A Comprehensive Survey of Egyptian Parties"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Egypt today has 12 approved, legitimate political parties operating under the Constitution within the laws that govern political activity. These parties are the National Democratic Party [NDP], New Wafd Party, National Progressive Unionist Grouping [NPUG], Socialist Labor, Liberal Party, Democratic Nasserist Party, Ummah Party, Democratic Unionist Party [DUP], Green Party, Arab Egypt, Justice, and the People's Democratic Party.

All the parties are accused of having failed over the 18 years of their existence to extricate the silent majority from political passivity into the field of public action, because this majority is lethargic and finds no point in being involved. It is therefore the view of many that the political movement in Egypt lacks direction, to quote Dr. Nabilah 'Abd-al-Halim Kamil, professor of law at Cairo University.

One cannot overlook the fact that parties such as the NDP, the Wafd, NPUG, Labor, and Nasserist do have followers and supporters. However, the remaining seven parties—Liberals, Ummah, DUP, the Green, Arab Egypt, Justice, and the People's Democratic—are accused of being minor parties with no influence. They are described by some as marginal or as parties on paper

only. As a matter of fact, some people mock all our parties by quipping that they are "newspapers that issue parties."

This situation has led many to wonder how long these parties will continue to exist under the law when in reality they are absent if judged by the scope of their activity. Would it be possible to set a party standard that would define party role, size, and political influence—even the potential for continued existence?

All countries of the world have mechanisms and controls that govern party activity. The history of countries that acknowledge political plurality is replete with instances where parties have withered away or merged with each other, thereby revitalizing political life. Thus circumstances, practice—and perhaps the law in some cases—create the context to measure the strength of parties within any society.

Egypt, by contrast, embraces parties that have never succeeded throughout their history in winning a single seat in parliament. Some of our parties cannot even claim a thousand members and have never entered an election or held a convention. And yet, we all insist on calling them parties and they, in return, insist on existing and on keeping their licenses and titles!

A party license is easier to get than some of us imagine despite reputed restrictions on the formation of parties in Egypt. All it takes is a "smart lawyer" such as attorney Abu-al-Fadl al-Jizawi, also known as the "Party Maker," a petition with 250 names, a person holding their powers of attorney, a new party name, and a platform for the conquest of the desert or outer space. All these prerequisites must be submitted to the Party Affairs Committee. By law, this committee is headed by the chairman of the Consultative Council and is composed of the ministers of Interior, Justice, and People's Assembly Affairs as well as three advisors.

The Party Affairs Committee usually rejects new party applications either because of similarity in names or because of other reasons, and the matter is then referred to the Supreme Administrative Court, which rules on the prospective party's right to exist—and there is of course no appeal against such a judicial decision. The end result is that most of our parties, even the major ones, have been born of the courts rather than of the political activists in the streets, in their natural role among the people and their problems. This further muddles the climate for political plurality, already dominated by passivity and lack of grass roots participation, while merely adding to the plethora of signboards bearing the names of existing parties.

#### Quiet Reading

Some established and confirmed figures must be restated at this point to express the gravity of the crisis in which all our parties are mired.

Egypt has a population in excess of 60 million, of which more than 12 million are entitled to vote in public elections. But less than a million usually exercise that right, according to impartial statistics.

The membership of the 12 parties is optimistically put at more than 3 million; that is, if we believe that membership in the NDP has indeed reached 2 million and that the Ummah has the million members its leader claims! If these figures were true (that is why we added an exclamation mark) they would have changed the faces of political and partisan lives in Egypt. Let us quickly review all the parties, each in turn.

#### Parties and Parties

No Egyptian party leader has ever questioned why the populace has forsaken the parties, even though the country's experiment with political plurality is almost 18 years old, and even though Egypt has a legacy of plurality in pre-1952 years. Do any of the country's parties have the ability to marshal its followers and supporters or mobilize public opinion around a certain cause? Why have the parties—all of them—been truant in standing up to terrorism and in sharing the people's anguish after the earthquake?

That aside, has any party thought of doing something about the country's rampant illiteracy?

The National Democratic majority party, whose records claim more than 2 million members, relies on being the government's party, and it sees its function as providing the government with political support. It is difficult sometimes to think of that party as an independent entity because of its closely interwoven relationship with the agencies of government. The Party's sixth general congress could perhaps be a good starting point from which to rejuvenate its structure and to abandon its 11-year-old tradition of appointing its leaders in favor of electing all of them, from the bottom to the top.

The Party has endeavored through its general congress to define its ideology and to formulate its national action platform by focusing on the issues of comprehensive development and of social justice as a general framework.

#### The Wafd Shock

There was a sense of optimism when Wafd returned to the Egyptian political arena as a democratic party with a long-standing legacy of patriotism. It had a vision of liberalism in a sea of others with the word "socialist" in their names. But the party that could have played an important role in motivating the grass roots shocked everybody by abandoning a traditional pillar of its legacy when it allied itself with the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood in 1988, prompting the exodus of many of its outstanding intellectuals.

Subsequent actions by the party caused its further isolation. It insisted in many instances on boycotting the



elections and boycotting the National Dialogue even though that position constituted passive rather than constructive action.

It also insisted with traditional tenacity on giving its utmost priority to what it called political and constitutional reform.

Wafd, driven by hostility to the National Party, also got involved in defending terrorist elements in the name of human rights. It has pulled back in recent years, however, having recognized the threat terrorism and violence pose to all of us.

At any rate, it can never be said that Wafd is one of the marginal parties in Egypt. Even though it boycotted People's Assembly and Consultative Council elections, it did compete for local councils, winning 60 of the 170 lists it put up for a vote.

#### **The National Progressive Unionist Grouping [NPUG]**

The NPUG is one of the parties with a clear political and social ideology. Despite the failure of the socialist experiment in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the party was able to develop its thinking and political vision to fit developments—which led to some ideological disruption within the party.

No exact figures are available on NPUG's membership, especially since the party destroyed its membership records when subjected to intensifying assaults by the government of former President Anwar al-Sadat. Party sources put its membership at 150,000, but that figure may be too small in view of the traditional rift between leftist and Marxist groups that sought to establish independent organizations and in view of the departure of the Nasserists from the NPUG after the Nasserist Party was founded.

The party's third convention in 1992 was a milestone in its history as it embarked on a realistic course of action, adopted a sensible platform, and exhibited obvious political moderation that prompted a minority of its members to charge that their party and its leaders have veered to the right, that its opposition has been tamed, and that its newspaper, AL-AHALI, has become an organ of the National Party that speaks for it just like MAYU!

And yet, the NPUG was the only opposition party to compete in People's Assembly elections in 1990, and it was able to win eight Assembly seats to form, for the first time in Egypt's parliamentary history, a leftist block representing the opposition.

That accomplishment boosted that party's self-confidence as it clearly changed positions on major societal issues such as terrorism, unemployment, and economic reform. The party participated effectively in parliamentary debate, even gave a new dimension to parliamentary opposition, and contributed constructively to the National Dialogue.

#### **Political Suicide**

The leadership of the new Labor Party declines to divulge its membership. The Party has played no explicit political role, with the exception of the experiment of the 1987 elections, Labor, considered an extension of the Misr-al-Fatah [Young Egypt] movement and of the Socialist Party, exposed its ideology and its legacy to political suicide when it allied itself in 1987 with the Brotherhood and with the Liberals. This fundamental change in the Party's character prompted the resignation of a broad band of its members in 1990. The Party, despite that alliance with the Brotherhood, won seats on only four councils in al-Minya and Suhaj. It boycotted the recent People's Assembly elections, and even though it took part in the National Dialogue, its actions were limited to a media campaign featuring inflammatory speeches. Worse, the focus of those speeches was to openly support violent and extremist groups and to stoke religious fanaticism. The posture of the Party and of its chairman Ibrahim Shukri, and their support of Saddam Husayn's invasion of Kuwait, dealt a fatal blow to whatever credibility it had left.

Some parties are accused of extolling their recent past, but none in the manner of the Labor Party after it turned Islamic. It frequently talks of the ancient past—at least a thousand years older than the events glorified by the Wafd, the NPUG, and the Nasserist Parties.

#### **Crying Over the Ruins**

The courts ruled in April 1992 to authorize the Arab Democratic Nasserist Party, which now claims 70,000 members even though its true membership may not exceed 22,000. Despite its young age, and even though it boycotted the 1990 elections, this party managed to send five deputies to the Assembly, including its secretary general Dia' al-Din Dawud.

There is no denying that this party has supporters and sympathizers by virtue of its links to the late leader Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir but it has been clearly scarred by the internal struggle that preceded its formation and by personal and political conflicts among its factions.

The party is criticized for being dominated by "backward-looking leaders," to quote members of the Nasserist Youth Movement who wish to remain anonymous. All those leaders without exception persist in playing the tunes of the past.

The NDP, the Wafd, the NPUG, Labor, and the Nasserist parties, for all their faults, cannot be described as insignificant or without supporters. The problem lies with the remaining parties in the political arena, because they are minor, limited, and without followers despite the protestations of their leaders.

#### **Marginal Parties**

Five party leaders expressed different viewpoints on the status of parties in Egypt, especially of the Liberals, the



Ummah, the Green, the Democratic Alliance, Justice, the Arab Party of Egypt, and the People's Democratic—the marginal parties, in other words.

Liberal Party Chairman Mustafa Kamil Murad asserts that his party has been active in the field of democratic action and has dutifully discharged its opposition role through constructive criticism, has pointed out the weak points in many matters, and has maintained contact with its populist base through its publications and its conventions and seminars.

Murad rejects the allegation that his party is marginal, claiming that it has been active since its inception in 1975. He said that the Party won 23 seats in the 1976 elections and was the bulwark of the opposition until 1978. The Party, he added, had five seats in the People's Assembly but "did not achieve the 8-percent limit in the 1984 elections. We won 10 seats in the 1987 elections but boycotted the 1990 elections. How can our party be called marginal when it has 60,000 members, has competed in parliamentary elections five times, has led the opposition in the People's Assembly, and publishes 18 newspapers?

"A party's strength is to be gauged by the number of its members, by its participation and accomplishments in the electoral process, and by communicating with its rank and file through the newspapers it publishes and the meetings and conventions it holds."

#### Arab Party of Egypt

The Arab Party of Egypt Chairman Jamal Rabi' said that this tune has been popular in recent months. "We don't know what people mean when they talk of large and small parties and of major and marginal parties. Perhaps they even want to classify parties as vertical and horizontal!"

He observes that a political party is basically a particular idea shaped into a definite program and presented for scrutiny by the Party Affairs Committee or by the courts. That platform would have had to meet Party Law stipulations on differentiation among parties—a condition any party must meet to be recognized. Those accusations are therefore without merit. Some older parties have gotten flabby and no longer carry weight in the political street or have influence with the masses. Some others have existed for dozens of years without developing or gaining in popularity.

Jamal Rabi' said that his party has 6,816 registered members, but that, as he sees it, a party gains significance not by the number of members but by the caliber of its friends and supporters.

He added that his party will be the surprise of the next elections. "We consider ourselves the party of the silent majority." He pointed out that the small parties will continue to be so because of flaws in the political system that will not allow political parties to move among the

populace. A party, for instance, cannot hold a convention without a prior decree. You cannot judge a party and properly gauge its strength and the role it plays when its activities are constrained by government restrictions.

#### The Environment is Part of the People's Conscious

Kamal Kirat, chairman of the Green Party, believes that a party's strength is determined by the degree to which the masses rally around it as well as by its platform that differentiates it from other parties.

He said: "Our party is only four years old but its membership already exceeds 15,000. We believe that our interest in environmental issues in a society that is increasingly concerned with them brings us closer than any other party to the interests of the people. We were able to force environmental issues on all the parties during the National Dialogue.

"We have not participated in previous elections because of our party's tender age, but we will compete in upcoming elections with a lucid platform articulated on the basis of the party's ideology. We are convinced that our ideas will find popular acceptance and will find root in the conscious of the people, because concern with the environment is a mark of civilization. We believe that the Egyptian people have begun to recognize the importance of the environment and of environmental protection as a function of civilization."

Ibrahim Turk, chairman of the Democratic Alliance Party, said that his party has 4,500 members and that it entered the 1993 elections but won no seats. Still, he rejected the notion that his party is marginal, saying: "This party is composed of a number of industrialists who represent a major segment of society and who have certain views on political and economic reforms that they wish to be clearly presented in the National Dialogue." He emphasized that political reform is but a step toward providing a climate conducive to development and to economic reform.

The Alliance chairman believes that it is impossible to gauge party role and strength in Egypt because of political passivity at the grass root level as only 3 million of a population of more than 60 million turned out for the elections.

#### The Party of 1 Million

The Ummah, charged with being the most marginal of parties, was founded 11 years ago. Its leader Ahmad al-Subahi claims that the party's membership has reached 1 million and that it has 15 branches in the governorates. He said: "Those who accuse the Ummah of being a marginal party or a party on paper only understand nothing and have no concept of the party's strength."

Al-Subahi also blamed "corrupt elections" for his party's inability over its 11 years of existence to win representation in any legislative body!!

As to Consultative Council subsidies to the Party, al-Subahi said that it receives amounts ranging from 10,000 to 20,000 pounds. Candidates are entitled to 500 pounds at election time even though their expenses may be as high as 50,000 pounds each. Al-Subahi explained, however, that his party received 100,000 pounds during the most recent parliamentary session for its newspaper publishing efforts. When asked what periodical he published, he responded: "I am a man with a message. I do not want to descend to the level of the masses. Rather, I want to lift the masses up to the level of the party!"

### Privileges are the Culprit

Let us leave party leaders for the moment to seek the views of an expert on partisan and political affairs in Egypt.

Dr. Wahid 'Abd al-Majid, publisher of a major academic newsletter on partisan affairs, said:

"Elections and the polls are the ultimate measure of political parties. No one has a right to determine whether a party should go or stay. Elections are the sole gauge. In theory, a party that does not echo the grass roots in general, and the electorate in particular, should realize that it cannot continue with business as usual and that it should either fade out, merge with another party, or review its policies and procedures in order to gain supporters. This, however, is not the case in Egypt.

"There are many reasons for this. Our partisan system is flawed in that our parties are granted surprising privileges in contrast with any other partisan system in the world. Consequently, any group that forms a party and receives a license will tenaciously hold onto that party under all conditions, even if it can't muster but a few dozen members. The facilities we grant parties have turned partisan activity into a quasi-trade and a means for gain through methods that are sometimes legitimate and sometimes not. One such partisan privilege is the absolute right to publish newspapers and magazines—a right that is denied the rest of the population. It is no wonder, then, that certain party leaders rent out many newspapers, through their parties, as a means of making a living; or rent out their parties to other groups and exploit for private gain the pilgrimages granted their parties. That is shameful. Other party facilities include privileges on pilgrimage missions, financial subsidies, and office space.

"All of this is unjustified. It distorts the course of political action and turns into a commercial endeavor.

"I believe that this is the factor that prevents the natural law for the birth, growth, and demise of parties from working for us in Egypt."

### Bolstering Democracy

And finally, how does the ruling National Democratic Party of the majority view this issue?

Kamal al-Shadhili, minister of state for People's Assembly and Consultative Council Affairs, who is also the party's secretary general for organization and a member of the Party Affairs Committee, sees a different scenario that reflects enlightened understanding of the nature of the democratic experiment in Egypt. He said:

"The first and foremost duty of the National Party, in view of its responsibilities as the ruling majority party, is to foster democracy and political action in the country and to create a climate in which all parties can play effective roles.

"I believe that the primary gauge for a party is the outcome of general elections and the votes it garners. This will in turn determine the number of seats to be won by that party either in parliament or in local councils.

"A fundamental fact to be emphasized here is that no individual and no party, no matter how big, can judge or evaluate another party. No one stands guardian over the rest of the parties. Naturally, this also applies to our National Democratic Party, which I believe has responsibility for nurturing democracy in the country by virtue of its parliamentary majority."

He added: "General elections and the votes of the electorate are the major criteria for evaluating party platforms, regardless of the election process. The important thing is to allow each voter an opportunity to vote in complete freedom with absolutely no pressure."

Parties, in the view of Kamal al-Shadhili, start small with limited memberships as they begin to present their platforms to the people who are likely to favor one platform over another because they are convinced of and have faith in the programs it proposes. Citizens, each according to his or her orientation, will in the end join that party that they endorse.

There is nothing wrong with state subsidies to parties. They fall within the realm of patriotic action. All countries of the world that boast true plurality subsidize their parties in one way or another. Some countries subsidize parties in accordance with the number of their members, others tie the subsidies to the votes won in elections, and still others base their subsidies on the number of party representatives in parliament, etc.

He added: "The majority party is the one responsible for enriching and bolstering democratic action, and even for advancing the democratic experiment. This is the role the National Party has assumed in the manner of all other majority parties in the world."

### Why?

In view of this tragic picture of our partisan life, especially as it relates to our parties-on-paper-only, has anyone ever wondered why belonging and patriotism are absent from our lives? Has anyone made an effort to figure out why a soccer match between al-Ahli and

al-Zamalik can draw 100,000 fans while none of the parties that claim to represent the masses can attract a thousand members to a convention?

Are parties and their leaders responsible for the absence of democracy within them, or is that the responsibility of the ruling majority party and its government, which is accused of restraining other parties and their activities? Or should we lay the blame on the Party Law and on the tender age of this Egyptian experiment?

All those questions are only meant to help develop political plurality and propel it forward, but they do need urgent answers. We are waiting!!

## ISRAEL

### **Egyptian Campaign To Denuclearize Israel Assessed**

94AA0118A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew  
12 Sep 94 p B1

[Article by Ruven Padhatzur]

[FBIS Translated Text] The refusal of Egypt's Foreign Minister, Amre Moussa, to visit Yad Vashem, and the media furor unleashed by it, to no small degree have cast a pall over the substance of his state visit. The Yad Vashem incident may indeed testify to the Egyptian Foreign Minister's obtuseness, but rather than try to understand the reasons for this curious refusal, it would seem more worthwhile to pay attention to an important announcement of his that got lost in the media coverage.

"Israel's refusal to place its nuclear installations under international supervision constitutes an obstacle to a comprehensive peace," Moussa asserted, while peremptorily demanding on Egypt's behalf that Israel sign the international nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Israeli policymakers have utterly rejected Moussa's position, but this does not mean an end has come to what is beginning to look like a well-planned Egyptian tactic designed to exert pressure on Israel's nuclear policy.

Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres answered Moussa, "It would be a mistake to take up the subject before a comprehensive peace agreement in the region has been reached," but it is doubtful that these words will convince the Egyptians to cease their efforts. One week after Moussa's visit to Israel, Egypt announced that she is submitting a UN resolution that will call for "dismantling Israel's nuclear arms and placing her nuclear installations under supervision."

Egypt's initiatives apparently are linked to the timing of preparations for revisions in the NPT. The decision over the future of the treaty is due to be made next year, and Mubarak seems to regard this as a golden opportunity to try to box Israel into a corner. The Egyptian president evidently believes that the talks to be held in the coming months on the treaty's future will enable him to mobilize

the international community in order to put pressure on Israel, which has not become a party to the treaty since it was adopted in 1968.

Mubarak is displaying impressive steadfastness on the subject. As early as 1990, he proposed establishing the Middle East as a zone free of nuclear arms and weapons of mass destruction. In May that same year, he sought approval from the Arab summit conference in Baghdad. The Egyptian president's envoys do not miss an opportunity to introduce the subject of Israel's nuclear potential into any and all discussions. The Egyptians have insisted in the multilateral talks on placing "Israel's nuclear capabilities" at the top of the agenda and demand that every discussion on regional arms control begin with the nuclear weapons that they allege are in Israel's possession.

Israel's official position calls for intentionally ignoring anything relating to her nuclear capabilities. "Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East," goes her official policy, which has not changed since it was fixed at the close of the 1960's. But Moussa's pointed remarks indicate, by all appearances, that Israel will have no choice but to formulate new policy directives, not simply out of concerns regarding Egypt's position or UN initiatives but because of the need to advance the discussion on controlling and eliminating arms in the region and to mark out a clear position on the future of the NPT.

Arab assumptions of Israel's nuclear capabilities will be, at the end of the process of crystallizing political arrangements, a stumblingblock to a comprehensive and stable peace. So long as the subject is not dealt with in a thorough manner and no agreement on it is reached, it will continue to hover like an ominous shadow over the complex of relations between Israel and her neighbors. 'Amr Moussa's pronouncements testify to this with the weight of a thousand witnesses. Thus, there will be no escape from including in the peace settlements to be signed in the future clauses dealing with weapons of mass destruction now possessed by states in the region.

Mubarak's mistake—and other Arab leaders', too—is in assuming that it will be possible to convince Israel to forgo its nuclear weapons and rely on the good will exhibited by her neighbors willing to sign peace agreements with her. Mubarak needs to understand better that international pressure will not be effective. Indeed, in this time of political accords based on territorial compromise, the deterrent component inherent in Israel's nuclear capabilities assumes even greater importance.

Nonetheless, Israel cannot ignore the concerns of the Arab states and must craft an appropriate policy, one which can lead to settlements and agreements that will allay her neighbors' fears. The solution to the dilemma, it seems, is not to be found in Israel's declaration of her intent to join the NPT, or in placing her nuclear facilities under the supervision that Moussa demands.



The correct basis for a settlement might be the proposal made by U.S. President George Bush on 29 May 1991. In short, this proposal called for freezing the existing situation in the Middle East and stopping the continuing accumulation of weapons of mass destruction by states in the region.

Comprehensive and stable peace settlements will be possible only when the Arabs realize that they must accept Israel's nuclear capabilities as a vital component of the process of compromise with Israel.

Moussa's behavior demonstrates that Egypt still does not understand that you can stretch a line straight from Yad Vashem to Israel's nuclear potential. Mubarak of all people, as the representative of those Arab leaders prepared to reconcile themselves to Israel, must grasp that his efforts to create a confrontation between Israel and the international community on this issue will not improve the atmosphere in the region. Sending Moussa to Jerusalem with such a callous message teaches that Egypt's president still has not accepted Israel's nuclear hegemony and regards it as an obstacle.

If Mubarak wants to understand what Israel's position will be concerning participation in the NPT, he should read an article that Yitzhak Rabin wrote for the journal *POLITIKA* one year after the Gulf war. Turning to the nonproliferation treaty, Rabin stated that it had: "proved a failure in the case of Iraq. Iraq signed it and was under its supervision.... Thus, the international controls of the International Atomic Agency were shown to be worthless. They cannot be relied on." As for Israel's future policy on the subject, Mubarak can study the final paragraph in Rabin's article: "I think that Israel must continue her declared policy—her desire for a demilitarized region free of all weapons of mass destruction on the basis of agreements between her and each of the region's states and of mutual supervision arrangements. I have much greater faith in an agreement between states, with mutual and appropriate inspection procedures, than in international vehicles, such as the United Nations, which are utterly useless."

**Peres' Middle East Economic Model, Casablanca**  
94AA0123A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 9 Sep 94 pp 10-11

[Article by Sever Plutzker: "The Vision of Casablanca"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In advance of the Middle East Economic Conference next month, Shim'on Peres has spelled out his new economic vision for the region, to cost \$25 billion, in an elegant book. The United Nations will adopt Gaza as a model project. The financing: Entrance fees to be charged countries like Germany and Japan that want a seat on the Security Council. An intergovernmental fund would provide guarantees for investments in the region, and a consortium of international federations would carry out the projects.

Not at the same time and not in the same place, but it is going to take place. And that is what is important to Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres. The highly touted Middle East Economic Conference was supposed to convene in October 1993 in Amman, but "Hussein got cold feet," says Peres, "and cancelled the event." Now the conference will convene at the end of October in Casablanca and Hussein "is regretful." A bit of Schadenfreude on the part of Peres when he talks about Hussein's petty failures: It seems that heir to the throne Hassan is more to his liking.

The conference will be, says Peres, the jumping off point for the new Middle East. The Middle East that will be woven together in a warp and woof of intergovernmental economic ties. That same economic Middle East that "no one believed in and everyone thought was merely my own private monomania," he adds. "I do not intend to come across as falsely modest," says Peres, "my position in the world today is the best it could possibly be."

The organization of the "Middle East and North Africa Economic Summit" was happily undertaken in Casablanca by two private nonprofit institutions—"The World Economic Forum," headquartered in Geneva, and the "Foreign Affairs Council," headquartered in New York.

The first of these institutions specializes in such world events. Every year, in the snowy Swiss town of Davos, it convenes a meeting of about a thousand administrators, economists, politicians and professors for a series of talks on the future of the world. The meeting provides headlines for newspapers and satisfaction for the participants. A week of skiing in the sunshine is recommended for every administrator. Last year Peres and Arafat also went to Davos and met on a particularly stormy night when the town was cut off from the Swiss plain.

[This paragraph illegible]

Peres talks about many billions: "I am bringing to Casablanca ideas for area development programs to the tune of \$25 billion." Under the Foreign Minister's direction a 170-page book has already been put together entitled: "Plans for Regional Development and Partnership," containing those ideas. An impressive book with lots of documents and lots of maps. It might be termed Peres' new dream book.

Israel is shown on the maps as the central station of the Middle East. It may be that this is the result of the ease with which one can use computerized graphics to create another highway, another canal, another railroad line, pipeline, high tension line. Peres knows that these are games with an enhanced color printer, but they create the impression of open borders and regional integration.

What will the billions be invested in?

"Half of that sum, about \$12.5 billion, is needed to solve the problem of water in the area. Water is a rare

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.



commodity, and the dearth of water is only getting worse. According to forecasts prepared by an Israeli panel of experts, an annual investment of \$500 million will be needed to stop the decline and an equal amount to create new water sources through desalination. These would be joint projects between Israel, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Palestinians."

Our neighbors are not talking with us about joint projects for conserving and creating water. They talk about how we stole their water resources from them and they want them back.

"Those who wish to redivide the expected lack of water will not achieve anything. They will only make things worse and cause additional waste. Even today 50 percent of the existing water is wasted. Antiquated irrigation methods, faulty sewage, inefficient drainage, and purification that only takes place in Israel. Proper management of existing water resources could therefore double the available supply of water even before any search at all is made for new water."

On the eve of the opening ("only on the eve of the opening") Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin will go to Casablanca: That decision was made by his office this week. U.S. President Bill Clinton also announced his intention to attend. Thus some of the show will be stolen from Peres; he himself will fly to Casablanca two days before the opening. Seven more ministers (treasury, industry, economics, energy, tourism, communications, and transportation—almost half the government) will go to Morocco, as well as the governor of the Bank of Israel, general managers, and business people. Two or three planes will take off from Lod for Casablanca. Uri Savir, the general manager of the Foreign Ministry, is already traveling the round-trip Lod line.

At the conclusion of the conference, Shim'on Peres says, there will be a "Casablanca Declaration," that will serve as "a basis for a new era in the Middle East." The conference, it must be remembered, will last less than two days. Will it involve something practical or just words? "Of course, practical," Peres answers, "do you see me as someone impractical?"

These are the practical matters that Peres wants to include in the "Casablanca Declaration":

1. The establishment of an international financial institution for financing the investments in the Middle East. A "Middle East Development Bank" like the existing regional development banks in Asia, Europe, and Latin America. The bank would be able to provide credit to the tune of \$10 billion. The Americans were opposed at first. In their view international economic institutions only double the bureaucracy and increase government involvement in business. This week they softened their opposition, and Dennis Ross, also one of the organizers of Casablanca, hinted that the bank is possible and that the United States would contribute to its foundation capital. Perhaps even \$300 million.

Two economists are at work on the matter: Professor Stanley Fisher, the second in command at the IMF, and Dr. Emanuel Sharon, the chairman of Bank Po'alim.

2. The establishment of an intergovernmental fund for private investments in the Middle East. Today every Western government provides government guarantees to private entrepreneurs, "to conduct business" in troubled and dangerous areas like the Middle East. But the guarantees and insurance are not coordinated, are not focused, and cause lethal competition. Peres suggests "a pact among government insurance funds," that would be a guarantor to business investors in the new Middle East.

3. The establishment of a consortium for carrying out projects in the Middle East that would be composed of leading multinational federations in their country. Peres is thinking of giant corporations like "Siemens" in Germany, "Bechtel" in the United States, "Philips" in Holland, etc. He is already talking with several presidents of those corporations and "they are ready to act."

It seems that Peres' traditional optimism has not been affected by time. "You remember how they all laughed at me," he says, "when I began to surface the idea of the economic conference for the Middle East? Now it has become reality. Casablanca will be host to representatives of about a thousand international corporations, the big players in the Arab world and in Arab business. And we, the Israelis, will be there with them. Not as illegitimate children, not as wayward sons, but as invited guests with all the honors. Can you believe it?"

Then they are preparing the lawn for your meetings with the Arab ministers? From Saudi Arabia, from Abu Dhabi?

"Who needs pictures on the lawn? I do not need more ceremony. Peace for me is building a system of relationships. Living together starts after the wedding is over, the canopy is torn down and all the guests go home."

I asked the Foreign Minister about his extraordinary enlistment in the cause of foreign aid for the Palestinians. What is his interest in it?

"I think that Israel has an enormous interest in making autonomy an economic success story," Peres responds, "because if there is famine in Gaza, nothing will help. But I have to work," he adds, "on tiptoes, to lead without standing out."

A year after you initiated the first conference of contributing countries in Washington, during the course of which obligations were made to give the Palestinians \$2.4 billion in aid, very little money has actually been received. The Palestinians themselves are mainly responsible for the failure of these arrangements. Are you not disappointed in them?

"Not only the Palestinians are responsible, the contributing countries also did not understand the true needs of

the Palestinian authority. They were prepared to contribute only to large projects, and the Palestinians need money to cover regular deficits. For the police, for the administration, for education. At least \$150 million until they manage to collect enough taxes. We Israelis understand that without police there will be no law and order within the authority's territory, but not every foreign ministry in every contributing country understands that."

I have an idea about this matter that I have already talked over with the Americans, the Russians, the Palestinians and with Butrus-Ghali, the U.N. General Secretary."

Obviously you are suggesting an increase in U.N. involvement in Gaza.

"More than that. I am suggesting that the United Nations take a special decision, on the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the organization, to adopt the Gaza Strip as a model project. Two UN agencies are already at work in Gaza today—the UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency] and the Agency for Development. The two of them will spend about \$160 million this year. I am going to say that the United Nations needs to double that amount and use it to put into operation the full public administration structure in Gaza, to help the Palestinians establish a flourishing free economy."

But where will the additional money come from? The United Nations itself is already deep in deficits.

"The first source will be a reduction in the unnecessary presence of the United Nations in the area. Why do we need UN observers in Jerusalem? Why do we need so many of them in southern Lebanon? The second source will be the contributions of states interested in joining the Security Council, Germany and Japan, for example."

You are suggesting that Germany and Japan contribute to the economy of Gaza with their entrance dues to the Security Council?

"That seems very fair to me." All of the UN aid and activity in Gaza will be coordinated by the Norwegian Terje Larsen, who has already been appointed Deputy Secretary General for this particular function. Peres: "It is lucky that there are Norwegians. When I am in New York, at the UN General Assembly, I hope to tie all the loose ends together."

What do the Palestinian leaders say about that? 'Arafat, who wants to control the money?

"I know that 'Arafat is a man who likes to be in charge and that there are things that can only be concluded with him. But I also know that no Palestinian Arab before him ever made an agreement with Israel as he did. And I am not about to go over his head. True, there have been Palestinians who thought they could get aid by posturing

and through pressure. But they are learning. And we have to try to understand them."

According to Peres, "the big problem with observation, supervision, and control over the contributions that the contributing states will give to projects in the territories is already near a solution." An accounting office has been found that will deal with control over accounts and checks. An investment firm has been found that will deal with financial counseling. A contracting firm has been found that will organize the bids, and a club of American businessmen has been found, Jews and Arabs (the "Builders of Peace" Club, another one of Peres' babies) that is prepared to invest millions of dollars. "Very soon invitations will be released for the first big Autonomy projects," says Peres.

Will Israelis be able to participate?

"Of course. I do not see any problem with that. I have even made an agreement with Yasir 'Arafat for a special area to be allotted on the border of the Gaza Strip, south of the 'Erez roadblock, for joint Israeli and Palestinian investments to set up an industrial park. A number of Israeli firms are prepared to bring in production lines appropriate for the Palestinian work force. Every additional job in Gaza, every economic advance reduces Israel's security risk."

You know, Mr. foreign minister, that there will be people who will ridicule this when they read it. They will say: Peres is dreaming again.

"I no longer give an accounting to anyone," Shim'on Peres responds quietly, "I no longer have to be liked by anyone. I do not have to prove myself in debate. I have to do my own thing, the things I believe in."

#### **Palestinian 'Shin Bet' Interrogation Methods**

94AA0119A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 9 Sep 94 pp 4-7, 8

[Article by Roni Shaqed]

[FBIS Translated Text] Hisham Jirbo'a's eyes darkened as he lifted the shirt covering the body of his son Farid. The body bore visible signs of abuse, mistreatment from which his son had suffered an untimely death. Nine days earlier, Jirbo'a, a taxi driver from Khar Yunis, had been arrested on suspicion of collaborating with Israel. At no time during those nine days was his family allowed any contact with him or told what had become of him. On the ninth day, a Palestinian officer appeared at his family's home and announced that Jirbo'a had died from a heart attack. His father, who insisted on seeing the body, learned the truth.

Palestinian human rights organizations were appalled. "We are dismayed. It is difficult to understand how Palestinians could adopt the methods that they complained about under the Israeli occupation," says Halid Batrawi, who works for Alhaq ("Justice"). Dr. Hanan

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Ashrawi, commissioner of human rights for the Palestinian Authority, rushed to Gaza for a meeting with 'Arafat to demand an immediate inquiry.

Pressure led to the detention of Jirbo'a's four interrogators. The Palestinian Authority's attorney general announced this week that charges would be brought against the four. Three of them will be charged with homicide committed while inflicting torture. If convicted, they will face life terms.

In the reality of Jericho and Gaza, the Jirbo'a incident is not unique.

Shahar Jima'at, 36, a resident of Kafr 'Uja in the Jericho autonomy district, married and the father of six children, was held by the Palestinian Shin Bet for 22 days. "I am ashamed," he tells me, lowering his eyes. "They humiliated me, and that was even worse than the physical torture. They made me eat shit. I will never forget that as long as I live. They treated me like an animal."

Like other collaborators, Shahar Jima'at left the Jericho district before the Palestinian forces arrived. On July 13, however, his sister got married and Jima'at, who sorely missed his family, decided to risk attending the village wedding.

"My brother came up to me during the celebration and whispered, 'Run for it! The Palestinian Shin Bet is here!' I managed to get away, but they grabbed my two brothers in retaliation. I saw my brother's car coming towards the house that evening. I was happy, I thought they had been let go, but there were two Palestinian security men inside. They pointed guns at me and led me into a banana field. Five hours later, two cars pulled up, a Mercedes and a Subaru. They tied me up, covered my eyes, gagged me, bound my legs and put my head in a sack. Then they lifted me up and threw me into the trunk of one of the cars. After driving for a quarter of an hour, we came to a building. They picked me up again, took me up the stairs and dumped me on the floor, where they began beating and kicking me—in my legs, back, stomach and head."

The seizure and beatings were the prelude to the investigation and what came afterwards. Grave charges were leveled against the suspect: rape, the murder of three Gaza residents, aiding Israeli undercover agents in liquidating two Hamas men in Hebron, and even service in the Lebanese war as an Israeli soldier. According to Jima'at, all these accusations were utterly false.

"Jibril Rajuv, head of the Shin Bet, showed up during the interrogation. He tried to play the good interrogator, advising me to tell the whole truth. When he left, I stayed with the bad interrogators, who continued beating me. I had no choice but to tell them what I knew about my contacts with the Israeli Shin Bet. After three days, they took me to Palestinian Shin Bet headquarters, made me sign forms they did not let me read and handed me over to the military police. Before I was transferred, Musa

Abu-'Arafat, one of the investigators, told me with a smile, 'You will have the time of your life.'"

Before being cast into prison, he was called into the room of Abu-Sayf, commander of the military police. "He began asking me about women in Jericho, looking for information so he could accuse them of something. He mentioned the names of about 60 women and asked me to tell him about them. While we were talking, two soldiers came in and began beating me, especially on my face. I fainted. When I came to, I was given a clean shirt because mine was soaked with blood, and thrown into jail."

The jail was hell. Beatings all day long, intolerable heat, meager food and humiliating treatment. He was brought into a foul-smelling room empty except for a latrine bucket and a jerry can of water. The windows were covered with black plastic.

"I had a terrible headache, my whole body hurt and swelled up. Some days later, they took me to the military prosecutor, who threw an ashtray and a cup of hot tea at me. He screamed at me to sign a confession spelling out all the charges they had trumped up against me. I refused of course. So he called in an officer and two guards, who beat me within an inch of my life.

"Later, they took me to a room in the abandoned camp. Piles of trash littered the room, it stank horribly. There was a lump of shit in the corner. 'Eat the shit' they screamed at me. I would not do it, so they threw me into a heap of garbage and beat me with the butts of their Kalashnikov's. I was getting dizzy. I lay on the ground too weak to move as they kicked and beat me. There was nothing for me to do but pick up the shit and put in my mouth. Then I turned to the wall and spat it out. One of them grabbed my hair, yanked my head back and screamed, 'Swallow it.' I had to do it.

"I was finished. I did not know what was going to happen to me. I passed out. When I came to, I could not stand on my feet. They lay me on a door and carried me back to jail."

On August 4, Shahar was released from jail following Israel's intercession and turned over to Israeli liaison officers. He now lives in Tel Aviv.

The official name for the Palestinian Shin Bet is the Preventive Intelligence. Established before arrival of the Palestinian forces in the territories, its function is to defend the Palestinian Authority and forestall espionage and acts of sabotage against 'Arafat's regime. 'Arafat personally appointed his commanders: Jibril Rajuv, who received the rank of colonel for the purpose of his assignment in Jericho, and Muhmad Dahlan in Gaza. Both were expelled from the territories at the start of the intifadah and continued to direct it from Tunis. Rajuv, who was called "the dynamo of the intifadah," guided the popular uprising on the West Bank, while Dahlan gave orders to leaders of the territories in the Gaza Strip.



As a practical matter, the Palestinian Shin Bet is an intelligence agency serving the Fatah organization. Its task is to bolster the 'Arafat regime. Most of its staff was recruited from Fatah's cadres, a few are members of Fida, the organization of 'Arafat's ally Yasir Abu-Rabo.

Unlike in Israel, the Palestinian Shin Bet offices are open. Above the doorway hang prominent signs proclaiming "Preventive Intelligence." The Shin Bet's chiefs are known by name and grant interviews to the media. Rajuv usually wears a uniform.

The Palestinian Shin Bet headquarters in Jericho are located across from the Elaqta army camp, formerly the Israeli Hanan camp, in a building that served as offices for the Department of Public Works during the Israeli administration. The building is surrounded by a fence of thick green plastic burlap to prevent passersby on the main street from seeing what is happening inside. There is a large black iron gate at the entrance. Three or four guards, in mufti and armed with Kalashnikov's, usually sit outside.

The office responsible for Jericho is situated on the second floor of a small house on the approaches to town, opposite the new mosque. Before the evacuation, this house was the PLO office for the Jericho region.

Rajuv is supposed to direct the Palestinian Shin Bet only in the Jericho autonomy district. In fact, he now works throughout the West Bank and in eastern Jerusalem. His men track down collaborators, keep an eye on the opposition to 'Arafat, settle local disputes, fight crime and even trace stolen cars.

Dahlan and Rajuv have succeeded in harnessing Fatah's organizational structures to the needs of the Palestinian Shin Bet. A branch of "Preventive Intelligence" has been attached to every local PLO office in the territories. Local agents gather information that is fed to the headquarters in Jericho.

Agents from all over the territories, serving as regional commanders of a sort, work at the Jericho Headquarters. Two networks have been established in every region—one for gathering intelligence data and one for investigating suspects.

It was evident to Israel long before the evacuation that the war against terror in the autonomy territories would require cooperation with the Palestinian Shin Bet. The head of the Israeli Shin Bet and Gen. Amnon Shahaq, who met for more than six months with Rajuv and Dahlan in Geneva, signed a cooperation agreement with them whose primary purpose is a common war on Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement). In preliminary coordination meetings with representatives of the Palestinian Shin Bet, it was agreed that Dahlan and Rajuv would take steps to strip the 'Az a-Din Elqasem cells of their arms, curb the activities of the organization's leaders and prevent them from carrying out attacks.

In practice, almost none of this has been done. Hamas has not been deprived of its weapons; its activists were, indeed, summoned to the Palestinian Shin Bet's offices, but for friendly chats, not investigation. Hamas and the other fundamentalist Muslim organizations openly conduct activities without interference.

The main enemies still facing the Palestinian Shin Bet are the collaborators. More than 300 suspects have been investigated so far in Gaza and Jericho, and some of them speak of torture of the sort described here. In the meantime, the Palestinians are careful to let them go at the end of the investigation so as not to provoke Israel. The pact prohibits the Palestinians from punishing collaborators, and the Palestinians have been warned not to see how far they can make Israel bend; they have been cautioned that Israel will not enter negotiations concerning release of Palestinian prisoners if collaborators are harmed. Israeli security officials believe that many of the collaborators who have undergone interrogation are beginning to cooperate with the Palestinian Shin Bet.

Abu-Tzelah Barham, a 28-year-old bachelor from Jericho, was held for 80 days by the Palestinian Shin Bet and military police. He was set free on 18 August. "Eighty days they held me in a stinking jail cell in Jericho's brutal heat," he relates. "Eighty days, with just three chances to shower. Three beatings a day, every day. And the worst and most degrading of all—they forced me to eat shit."

Abu-Tzelah Barham also was a collaborator. On 2 May 1994, on the advice of Israeli security forces, he fled Jericho. About one month later, he was overcome by longing for his family. He called a friend with connections to the Palestinian Authority, asking him to plead on his behalf. "No problem. You can come to Jericho. No one will lay a hand on you," the friend told him, then immediately reported the conversation to the Palestinian Shin Bet.

On the night of 4 June, Abu-Tzelah Barham passed through the roadblocks at the entrance to Jericho without any delays. "I went to my house. I hugged and kissed my brothers and sisters. I planned to leave Jericho the next morning but when I went out on the porch, I was stunned; the house was surrounded by Palestinian soldiers. One of them put the barrel of a Kalashnikov against my head while a man dressed in civilian clothes jammed a pistol against my temple. I was hustled into a Subaru and taken to the Palestinian Shin Bet headquarters."

The interrogations and the beatings, which began on the second floor of the building, continued for 80 days. "If I stayed sane and healthy, that is only because I am a man sound in mind and body. But to this day, I suffer from headaches, loss of memory and nightmares.

"They accused me of collaborating, which I did not deny. But they were not satisfied with this confession, they wanted to pin the blame on me for things I did not do. 'Tell us the truth, we will not kill you,' one of the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.



investigators, called Abu-'Arafat, told me right after the beatings began. First they tied my hands, then blindfolded me. They threw me on the floor and began kicking and beating me all over my body, in the stomach, ribs and head.

"The beatings never stopped. There were five interrogators in the room, two from the Jericho region, one a wanted man from the Ramalla region called Fiqri, who had taken refuge in the autonomy district, and two others I did not recognize. One used his fists, boxing me around my ears and face. One of my teeth was knocked out by their punches. I lost a lot of blood. The investigators poured hot coffee on my wounds, sat me at the table and read me the charges: collaborating with Israel, having sex with my niece, committing sodomy on Israeli intelligence officers, taking part in undercover operations and blackmailing Palestinian girls into cooperating with Israeli intelligence after photographing them as we supposedly had sex. Actually, I was just a small-time collaborator, but they charged me with extremely serious crimes."

A series of threats followed the beatings. They poked Kalashnikov's into his ears and told him to count, one, two three.... "I was sure they were going to shoot me. The beatings started again after that, with their Kalashnikov's. My entire body was swollen."

The torture did not end there. "They took me to the bathroom, which they used as a cell, and lay me down in the tub. Then one of the investigators came over and peed on me, on my throat and head. The beatings began again. They screamed at me, 'We will execute you!'" And then, one of the soldiers cocked his gun, pointed it at Barham's head, told his comrades to muzzle their ears and put his finger on the trigger. "I began shrieking. I begged. I was sure they were going to kill me. Then they took me out of the bathroom. They extracted a confession from me admitting all the charges, including the rape of my sister. I signed it all."

The investigation resumed the next morning. A tape recorder was brought into the room. "They told me to talk about things that had never happened, and when I told the investigator that it was all a lie, he said, 'That is all right, do not worry about it.'" Next, the investigator directed the suspect to apologize for his actions and seek forgiveness. He was told to send a letter to Chairman 'Arafat begging for mercy. One letter dictated to him was for his niece, with whom he had supposedly had sex. "I wrote the letters and cried."

At that stage of the investigation, Jibril Rajuv arrived. "He asked me in all innocence where I had got the injuries to my face. Had the investigators beaten me? I plucked up my courage and told him, 'I am innocent, all the accusations are a lie.' He smiled at me and said, 'Do not worry, we are your brothers.' After he left, they took me to the Mercedes and drove me to the Palestinian Shin Bet's headquarters."

Abu-Tzelah was placed in a cell without a blanket or a mattress. "They would bring food to the cell once or twice a day, a little rice on a plastic bag, like for a dog. My body was swollen. Worst of all, I had internal injuries in my chest, which hurt terribly. After 13 days, I nearly went mad. I started to shout and cry. I banged my head on the wall, I wanted to kill myself. A doctor was called in, he looked me over, gave me an ointment to spread on my chest and told me not to worry. But the beatings continued. There was a prison guard named Jadira, but called Abu-Hasin, who methodically beat me each day before every meal. I fainted two times. The third time I lost consciousness, they took me to the hospital in Jericho."

He was held in the hospital for only a few days, then returned to prison. The painful assaults went on regularly. "I cried and screamed, but the guards only shouted at me, 'Spy, beat your head on the wall.'"

After 18 days in the cell, Abu-Tzelah Barham was taken for questioning by the military prosecutor. "He demanded that I confess to murder. When I refused, two soldiers came into the room and beat me. I did not want to confess, so the prosecutor ordered me returned to prison."

Abu-Tzelah was forced to crawl on hands and knees from the prosecutor's office to the prison. Every few meters, he was kicked and beaten. He was left at the door to the prison under Jericho's hot, blazing sun.

In the jail cell with Abu-Tzelah were three other prisoners accused of collaborating. Two were from the Hebron region, the third from Kafr 'Uja, outside Jericho. "All three of them were in a bad state. One of them was having trouble breathing and had pain in his stomach, and his legs had swelled up so much it was frightening."

"The ultimate humiliation happened after two months in prison. They took us to clean up the military camp, telling us to clean the latrine. We were barefoot and they told us to do the work with our hands. Suddenly, one of the soldiers ordered me to lick the toilet seat. I looked at him in amazement and got an awful beating in return. There was nothing for me to do except what he had ordered me to do."

People in the territories typically react apathetically to accounts of abuse by the Palestinian Shin Bet and police, particularly since they involve collaborators loathed by the public. Attempts by the Palestinian human rights organizations to raise a voice have not won public support.

Basam 'Eid, an investigator for Betzelem, naively believed that his organization would continue its struggle to advance human rights in the territories even after the establishment of autonomy. He has been disappointed. "The leadership of Betzelem decided not to deal with internal Palestinian matters, and although I did not agree

with the decision, I have no influence with the leadership. The considerations restraining them are political, not personal, they are public officials. Since autonomy began, I have heard many horror stories, both from people who have been tortured and from sources that have heard of the torture. I condemn them just as I condemned the torture inflicted by the Israelis."

[Shaqed] Why are you not starting a Palestinian Betzelem?

[Eid] I am afraid that would endanger my life. The Arab nation is not sufficiently attuned to this, there exists a policy of shutting people up. Even so, the subject is under discussion by a number of international funds and bodies. I might talk with local Palestinians but not with the leadership.

[Shaqed] Have tortured people sought you out?

[Eid] Some Palestinians from Gaza and Jericho have. They told me about torture but I did not gather evidence because there is not point in doing that and keeping the evidence in a drawer. Most of the complaints were about torture during detention and rough treatment of people by the police.

[Shaqed] As a human rights activist, do you fear for your life?

[Eid] What I am afraid of is that I will have to establish the Palestinian human rights organization in Paris or Germany because I will not be allowed to work in the territories. I am afraid that my fate will be that of Syrian human rights workers, who conduct their activities from Paris and do not dare go anywhere near Damascus. I am definitely afraid that my life would be in danger if I opened the Palestinian Betzelem in the territories.

### Interreligious Conflict Over Jerusalem Analyzed

94AA0118C Tel Aviv HATZOFE in Hebrew  
5 Sep 94 p 6

[Article by Pinhas Eli'av]

[FBIS Translated Text] Jerusalem has popped up on our agenda, and this time not in a political context but in the religious context that Christians and Muslims have placed on it. With the establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and the Vatican, Israel has pledged to respect the religious needs of Christians in the city and to grant the Catholic Church special status in these matters. The agreement that Israel signed in Washington with the Kingdom of Jordan also expresses the Israeli Government's declared policy of respecting the Jordanian Government's desire to guard the Islamic holy sites.

As a result of these two agreements, the question of Jerusalem has taken a central place in all talks bearing on advancing the peace process in the region. This is also a worthwhile opportunity to shift attention to the interests

of Christians and Muslims in Jerusalem. For Christianity and Islam, the starting point for any assessment of Jerusalem is recognition that the religious status of the city as they see it is a direct and conscious consequence of its eternal holiness to Judaism.

For Christianity, these matters are linked to its existence as a religion and the earliest days of its history, and to its claim that it constitutes, as it were, a sort of new incarnation of Judaism, including the issue of the city's unique place in its spiritual heritage. Nonetheless, Christians over the years shifted their faith's center of gravity outside the city—to Rome and Byzantium, which even sought to regain their authority over it through a bloody series of Crusades.

For Islam, the issue is more complex. The fact is, although Muhammad commanded from the start that the faithful turn towards Jerusalem when they prayed, the city itself is never mentioned in the Koran. The conquest of the holy city by the Caliph 'Omar in 638 had absolutely no special Islamic religious significance. On the contrary, the city was referred to by its conquerors over the years as "the state of the holy temple," which implied that it was a Jewish site. This name was shortened later to "the holy temple" [el-Miqdas] and eventually just to "El-Quds." In other words, even the Arabic-Islamic name used today is historically anchored in the city's original holiness to Judaism. Likewise, the Muslims preferred to establish their capital in the country at Ramalla, which was built especially for this purpose in the eighth century just as Caesaria had served an identical function the Roman-Byzantine period of occupation.

Even so, an Islamic religious connection to the city began to develop at that time, to a large extent owing to the struggle between the Omayyad caliphs and extremist religious circles that had then rebelled and taken control of Islam's holy cities, Mecca and Medina. These caliphs, therefore, sought to convert Jerusalem into their own Islamic stronghold. By the turn of the eighth century, they built the Dome of the Rock and the Al-Aqsa Mosque (The caliph 'Abdul Malakh, who began this work, did not even flinch from bombarding the Ka'aba with catapults). This connection deepened over the generations in response to the Christian efforts to gain control of Jerusalem, the entire land of Israel and even neighboring countries; in other words, once again as a reaction to political and strategic challenges from abroad. This basic aspect is well-illustrated by the fact that in 1229, the Islamic Sultan of Egypt, El-Kamal, agreed to return Jerusalem, which had been captured by his father Saladin, to Frederick the II, emperor of the Holy Roman Empire.

The universal religious aspect of the city goes back to the international policy in the 16th century, as a consequence of the internal Christian conflict between the Catholics and the Greek Orthodox for the rights to possession and administration of their holy places, particularly the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. This quarrel

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

became the spark that ignited the great power Crimean War of 1854-1856, in which Russia stood against France and Britain, which had come forward to defend the crumbling Ottoman Empire. As a result of this war, the Islamic sultan made an arrangement respecting the seven principal Christian holy places in Jerusalem and Bethlehem, which precisely defined the church's rights to them, right down to permission to drive nails into the beams. Nevertheless, the Christian powers reconciled themselves to continuation of Muslim political control of the city itself even though the Ottoman Empire was disintegrating and yielding territory on all sides, from the Balkans to Aden and from Egypt to the Caucasus.

The reins of religious control in Jerusalem were upset during World War I; a Christian-British power ruled the city once again. The Muslim world reacted with utter apathy to this development. No demand was raised during this period to give the city a special status. All that was done in this context was Britain's pledge to maintain the status quo of the holy places, to which two were added—the Western Wall and the Tomb of Rachel. On the other hand, the British consistently refused to appoint a Jewish mayor in Jerusalem, even though the Jews had constituted a majority in it since the 19th century. Exploiting the governing powers that they granted themselves in administering Palestine, the British throughout the Mandate appointed a Muslim mayor for Jerusalem, perhaps as a way of demonstrating evenhandedness towards the faith whose adherents had ruled the city before them.

The partition plan of 1947 sought, in effect, to partition Palestine not just between Jews and Arabs but also among the three monotheistic religions, and to continue, to the extent possible, Christian control of Jerusalem by internationalizing the city. It was the Vatican that led the charge on this issue, imparting a political-territorial dimension to the religious connection. The internationalization plan, however, like all the provisions of the settlement proposed in the November 29 resolution, was put to naught in 1948 by the Arabs' aggression. An attempt was made in 1949 to breathe new life into it, but it was foiled by the mutual opposition of Israel and Jordan.

The Jewish state was acutely aware of the city's universal religious aspect when it was reunited under her jurisdiction in 1967. At the same time that a legal framework was created for unification of the city, there also was established a legal framework for maintaining the holy places and free access to them, while actual administration of them, and determination of their practical arrangements was granted to the head of the relevant religious communities, including the Muslims. In fact, the status and operation of the Christian communities have greatly improved since 1967 with removal of the restrictions on them, including those on acquiring property and raising new institutions, that were customary during the period of Jordanian rule in the eastern part of the city. At the same time, the status and operation of the

Muslim institutions and bodies, including the Waqf, were preserved. Moreover, Israel cooperated with UNESCO in maintaining the historic and spiritual sites of Jerusalem. This practice partly was in the nature of making the best of a bad situation, for the organization first began dealing with these matters in response to Arab demands for equal treatment made against us regarding infringements on their interests.

This openmindedness has also been expressed in recent developments, in which Israel has stated her readiness for a dialogue on general religious issues related to the city. Even so, putting this into practice hinges on certain difficulties. The Christians primarily are interested in the churches as partners in any such future dialogue; indeed, the Christian nations have no religious policy regarding Jerusalem. The sole nation that so far has stood out in this matter has been Russia, which is seeking to continue the Czarist policy of gaining a position in Jerusalem. It must also be remembered that communist and atheistic Soviet Russia was the Vatican's partner in 1949 in the previously mentioned effort to impose the internationalization plan. France may yet reveal a religious interest in Jerusalem, but she is concentrating for the time being on political support for the Palestinians on the issue of east Jerusalem.

It may also be that the position that Russia has espoused recently through its special envoy to the peace process, Posbolyuk, to a certain extent derives as a reaction to the Vatican's quest to act as the primary Christian player in the matter. The fact is that when Israel formally bound herself for the first time to an international document respecting maintenance of the status quo, she did so with the Vatican in the agreement establishing diplomatic relations between the two states. Every improvement in the status of the Catholic Church evokes envy, to put it mildly, among the various Orthodox churches, for the church's rights to the Christian holy places are inferior to their own because of the "historical delay" in the appearance of catholicism in Jerusalem, which arrived there only during the Crusades.

But there exists a conflict not only between the Catholic Church and the "eastern" churches (as the Orthodox churches are called), but also among these churches. For example, there is a bitter quarrel between the Coptic Churches of Egypt and Ethiopia over possession of the "Dir el-Sultan" site, which can be seen over the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. Here, too, the issue has become political as well as religious, for both Cairo and Addis have intervened in it and both are asking Israel to rule in its favor regarding the disputed site.

The dialogue with the churches is further complicated because of the total absence of power and rights in a key element in the Christian Protestant religious constellation, including the Anglicans. These churches have ritual sites and places in Jerusalem but no "historical rights," for they were the very last to appear in the Christian arena. Accordingly, they lack a formal right of entry to



the principal holy places of their faith in Jerusalem. It will not be simple, therefore, to arrive at a meaningful dialogue with all involved, who at present are divided among themselves.

Difficulties also exist in achieving a religious settlement with the Muslims. True, the problem is not one of a multitude of religious systems as with the Christians, but rivalry does exist among the Islamic states. The leading claimant in this context is Jordan, due to its past historical connection to the city's eastern sector and to Judea and Samaria, while the ruling Hashemite dynasty in Jordan is related to Muhammad's family and, until it was driven from the Hejaz by Ibn S'aud, served as the authority responsible for preserving the Islamic holy places there. Its religious connection to Jerusalem, therefore, serves as a sort of substitute for the historical connection that has been irretrievably lost—in fact, this is a repeat of what happened to the Omayyad caliphs at the end of the seventh century.

In any case, it has suited Israel for Jordan to exercise religious control in Judea and Samaria. In fact, all Muslim religious affairs are directed from Rabat Amon—from payment of 2.5 million dinars in salaries each year to some 2,400 "clerics" and religious teachers to restoration of the Temple Mount by King Hussein at a cost of \$8 million, which the King raised through the sale of property in London. Israel has even give formal expression to this state of affairs in the Washington declaration.

In addition to Jordan, however, there are other Arab states that see themselves as interested parties in Islamic matters relating to Jerusalem. First, there is the King of Morocco, who also is descended from Muhammad's family and serves as chairman of the Jerusalem committee of the Muslim Council, which unites all the world's Islamic states. He even recently sought to stake a claim to the sites on the Temple Mount, donating carpets woven in Europe worth millions of dollars. Israel, for her part, was willing to forgo tax payments. But when the carpets arrived, it turned out that the weavers had inadvertently stitched an image of the cross into the reverse sides. Now the Waqf treats the carpets as though they did not exist.

Saudi Arabia, as the state that oversees Mecca and Medina, has also been making attempts to become involved in the religious aspect of Jerusalem. Saudi Arabia initially wanted to bankroll restoration of the holy sites on the Temple Mount, but Jordan forcefully resisted that. Riad allocated to UNESCO the sum designed for that purpose in order to direct its money to the territories for education and other uses.

Of course, there is also the Palestinian claim to religious possession of east Jerusalem in addition to the territorial claim. It is clear here, however, that a separate arrangement will be made because 'Arafat is going to put the emphasis on the political angle, with which he hopes to stress his religious power.

It is clear that the political system for Jerusalem will be the most important and critical for the city. In fact, it already has begun.

### Plans To Fortify Against Withdrawal From Golan

94AA0118B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew  
12 Sep 94 p B2

[Article by Lili Galili]

[FBIS Translated Text] Next to the holiday village being built on the slopes of Neveh Ativ, there is the usual "Danger! Construction Work" sign. Even this familiar phrase, common at construction sites, takes on a special significance here. The word "danger" is charged with new meaning, such that the visitor sees the sign in his mind's eye switched to the current terminology, "Danger! Demolition Work."

The sense of risk and ruin always adds to a thing's beauty. Like a spoiled film goddess with a flair for the dramatic, Neveh Ativ, which has always been gorgeous, suddenly is even lovelier. Even the nectarines, which are now ready for picking in the orchards, seem bigger and redder, their sweetness mingled with the place's growing sense of drama. Three days after reports of the contents of the arrangement with Syria, and one day before the large protest rally held by the Golan settlements at Qatzrin, Ze'ev Greenfeld guides his guests through the lanes of the new vacation resort set to open in two months. Forty-four triangular, wooden cottages, a swimming pool inlaid with mosaics, three jacuzzis, a posh health club, a huge pub and a restaurant that promises, in this remote nook, to pamper the most refined palate.

The guest units not yet completed have been adorned with verdant gardens blazing with color. Gardens usually are allowed to bloom only after construction finishes. Here, they chose to raise the gardens before the buildings, apparently in order to impart a sense of maturity to the site in advance. Green tomatoes sprout in the gardens, quietly ripening as they await the guests who might come someday.

An exotic atmosphere bathes the site, located on the fringe of the settlement close by the small road leading to the Hermon and the Druze villages of the Golan. Two tattered Israeli flags that no one has bothered to replace embellish the exit gate to the road, which is surprisingly noisy. Greenfeld, 42, is more than a tour guide presenting the glories of the holiday village, over which a palpable sense of danger hovers even before its opening. For four months, Greenfeld also has served as secretary of Neveh Ativ, and he is one of the four founders of and investors in the resort, in which millions have been sunk. Sixty percent of the capital comes from grants and loans backed by the state, 40 percent is private.

Like a man possessed, he hurries his visitors through the alleys of the holiday village. His mood swiftly changes from excitement to expressions of bitter anger towards the government and to genuine tears that he can hardly

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

hold back. His voice trembles during the conversation, and from time to time he puts on sunglasses, perhaps to hide his embarrassment.

Two weeks ago, the 36 families of Neveh Ativ held a discussion late into the night. They reached a unanimous decision—voters for Labor and MERETZ, for Likud and Tzomet, and supporters of Kahane—to launch a resolute struggle separate from that of the Golan settlements council. The Labor and MERETZ voters were among the most militant at the meeting, perhaps because they felt most betrayed by their government. It has been a year now that tension has existed between the Golan settlement council and the people of Neveh Ativ, who are trying to spread their struggle to more combative channels.

Greenfeld made a proposal some months ago to tear down the bridges on the Golan, but the Golan settlements council rejected the idea. "They put their tails between their legs," is how he puts it. He made another proposal not long ago to shut down the schools for the coming year on the Golan. The settlements council turned down that idea on the ground that it probably would cause "trauma to the children," who were sent to school as required on September 1. The same day, the newspapers printed large notices in the name of Neveh Ativ, in which the words "war" and "struggle" occurred again and again. The Hermon became not merely a place to be defended but a weapon in the planned struggle and its primary asset.

Under the banner headline "The War for the Hermon," the residents of Neveh Ativ sought to mobilize the public. "The moment of truth has arrived. We, the members of Moshav Neveh Ativ, have decided to fight for the Hermon and our homes. We shall struggle resolutely against undermining the defense of the state and handing over the Hermon and the moshav to the Syrians.... If you also want to fight beside us for the Hermon—write us." Bordering the notice was a tear-off coupon requesting the reader to fill it out beneath the proclamation: "I will stand by you in your struggle for the Hermon and the defense of the state." The first day after Jewish New Year's, Neveh Ativ's secretariat received 32 letters from all over the country—from professors, physicians, and clerks. One poet included a battle poem, and a former Israeli consul from one of the larger cities in the United States offered his services in consulting and public relations.

Greenfeld, a discreet man, strictly guards his sources. He and three other members of Neveh Ativ hiked to Jerusalem a year ago to meet the prime minister. Rabin talked with them in the prime minister's office, listening quietly, then summed up in a single telling sentence, "I would rather see you in tears than bereaved families; you will be the ones to pay the price." Greenfeld and his companions realized the media potential of this sentence in the hazy situation that existed a year ago. They choose to keep silent, dodged reporters, headed for a waiting car

and drove home. Their silence, says Greenfeld, was a further contribution to the national defense.

Even now, they maintain a tactical silence. They tell less than the full truth, concealing far more than they reveal. "We are laying the foundation for a prolonged struggle," Greenfeld states. "We are preparing to dig in here." When he says "dig in," you have to assume that he does not mean storing up bottles of Coca-Cola. The question is whether he is referring to acquiring arms. "You do not expect me to answer that," Greenfeld replies. "Two of our members are awaiting trial for possession of grenades." Later, he explains that "bloodshed" is not the conventional weapon. "Weapons can be boiling oil and pitchforks, or a stick to the head."

It is difficult to know whether this is just a metaphor or perhaps a tactic, leaving a threat hanging in the air. It also is difficult to imagine Menachem Barukh, who delights in the orchard with each nectarine he picks, or Benny 'Ati'ash, who makes exquisite stained glass windows in his workshop at the foot of Mr. Hermon, pouring boiling oil on the heads of troops who have to come to remove them. But Greenfeld repeats, "If we leave here, we will take a few others with us."

Asked directly whether he sees himself taking up arms against a soldier, he answers, "I suggest that they do not put this issue to the test." He immediately hastens to emphasize that he is speaking only for himself, and from the heart. For 21 years, every stone in this place has spoken to him "in a silent, internal voice no less than the tombs of Rachel and Joseph."

Every Israeli ethos is interwoven in this place: the ethos of settlement, the ethos of the heroism of war in "the interests of the state," and even the ethos of hate. Greenfeld, who appears to be the embodiment of the native Israeli, was born and raised in Sajera, a settlement of stubborn people firm in their positions. But Greenfeld also was born to a family of Auschwitz survivors who arrived here after the war, and the train steaming into the unknown still haunts him. As we sit on the grass of Neveh Ativ, the train returns, imposing itself on the memories of his childhood. Memories of mischievous children stealing a carrot from a neighbor's garden patch, and propping up the leaves to hide the exposed roots, also provide a message on uprooting. Like the story of the battle for the Hermon, in which Greenfeld took part, and the vow he made—that he would come to live in this place, the closest to the Hermon, if he came out of the battle alive. He did that, in 1973, and he has been here ever since, with a group of people who have raised children and grandchildren here.

An ardent Likud supporter still outraged by the return of the Sinai, he asserts that the Syrians are far worse than the Egyptians. He has refused for a full year to radicalize the struggle, to harass the foreign minister personally or be dissatisfied with stickers expressing sympathy. His car, a stylish new Volvo, looks like a political pamphlet

on wheels. Stickers about the Golan, Hebron, the nightmare peace and Rabin cover the rear window. Greenfeld contends that he cannot rely on the nation's sympathy, yet is pinning his hopes on rousing the public, which will rise up when the time comes to dig in and fight with him.

In the dozens and dozens who answered the newspaper notice, he sees his future cadres, refusing to consider that these too are merely expressions of passive sympathy. "I do not need 100,000, I need 2,000 to come here. Do you know what 2,000 people in the mountains would mean?" In his mind's eye, he draws the listener into this surrealist vision, which does not seem very likely just now.

At the Yesud Hama'aleh gas station on the way to Neveh Ativ, local residents cast an indifferent glance at the newspaper's main headline, which refers to the Golan. "A lost cause," they sigh. It is difficult to get the impression that these people, whom Greenfeld intends to guard with his body, yearn for his protection. Perhaps Greenfeld also senses these feelings when he expresses vehement opposition to holding a national referendum at this stage. Similarly, he does not believe his colleagues on the Golan who declare that they will not be an obstacle to peace. "We shall see when the trucks come to load them," he says defiantly.

He is completely unwilling to talk about financial compensation here—at a settlement of prosperous people who have seen agriculture and tourism as the just rewards for their labors and can permit themselves to speak with contempt about material restitution.

There also are some who react with denial. During all the commotion, Menachem Barukh was busy picking his nectarines. He yanked himself out of the suburbs 10 years ago, imbued with a sense of "there is only one place I will go to from here." As we sit on cardboard boxes in which the nectarines will be packed, Barukh says that all this talk about withdrawal and uprooting does not seem to have anything to do with him, as if people are speaking about someone else and some other place. Even our conversation seems to him like a waste of valuable time that he could use for picking.

He utterly rejects any comparison to Yamit. The people there were young by and large and had spent seven years in Yamit at the most. The people of Neveh Ativ are 40- to 50 year-olds who have spent most of their adult lives there; some have even raised grandchildren there. Only when we get to the question of how far into the future he is ready to project the struggle does he stop to think, "I am not willing to sacrifice my children. Me—I am not sure."

The Sabbath slowly falls over Neveh Ativ. The aroma of fresh challah wafts in the air, and the man-made waterfall, merged into the landscape as though nature had meant it to be there, trickles with a monotonous, soothing burble. Druze laborers from Majdal Shams are leaving a place where nearly every house is expanding or

under construction. Greenfeld returns to the conversation he had with Rabin exactly a year ago in which the Prime Minister stacked up their troubles against the grief of bereaved families. "I just looked at him," he says. "I could not stop looking at him. I thought to myself, how do you get out of this conversation?"

### **Jewish Settlement Said To Unify Jerusalem**

94AA0117A Tel Aviv HATZOFE in Hebrew 5 Sep 94  
pp 7-9

[Article by Yafa Goldshtayn: "Jewish East Jerusalem"]

[FBIS Translated Text] When you ask an Israeli, are you ready to discuss the partition of Jerusalem, he will almost certainly jump at you with the immediate response: "Never!"

On the subject of Jerusalem we do not keep quiet, and we certainly do not express a readiness for concessions over parts of it. On Jerusalem there is consensus. Jerusalem will not be divided. That is a fact—even Rabin and Peres say so.

But meanwhile other tunes are heard from the "allies"—'Arafat and his supporters on the one hand and Jordan, on the other. In addition there are troubling noises from all kinds of people looking for concessions over holy sites and all kinds of Christian sects in Jerusalem. Even the Vatican has been disconcertingly friendly of late.... The question is, what are we to do in practice to preserve the integrity of the city that we have yearned for 2,000 years?

In recent years Jerusalem has been divided as it were because Jews have stopped going to some of its neighborhoods. Those who support Jerusalem's integrity maintain that true action is not in words but in deeds. Every house, every neighborhood where Jews come to live will be the deciding factor in how much of a foothold we have in Jerusalem.

Therefore here is an interim up-to-the-minute summary of this activity, after 15 years in which a group of good Jews has struggled to strike roots in all kinds of sites in East Jerusalem. Thus far the 'Ateret Kohanim foundation has purchased and redeemed houses and yards in what is called the Muslim quarter of the Old City. There was also an attempt to break into the Christian quarter, that was stopped in the building called "Ne'ot David", that had been settled by a number of families. In the Sha'ar Prahim neighborhood inside the walls of the Old City, at the junction between the southern wall and the eastern, an empty plot was purchased for which the construction of a neighborhood of 200 housing units has been planned.

Outside the walls, some years ago, Jews went into Kfar Shiloah, a place in which there were houses and land under Jewish ownership even before the riots of 1929. This neighborhood today is called "El David" and is maintained by the 'El'ad foundation. On Mount Scopus just opposite, in an isolated building adjacent to the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.



Mormon university that was purchased by Mosqovitz, a Jewish American contributor, a new seminary opened up, 'Bet 'Orot. Somewhat later a regular Yeshiva was integrated with it. On Succot a year ago the Yeshiva tried unsuccessfully to set up a caravan neighborhood at the site as live-in quarters for its students. Another Jewish neighborhood that was planned to be in East Jerusalem outside the walls, the neighborhood of Ras al 'Amud, was purchased by Jewish groups, and construction plans were submitted some time ago.

The Likud government did not interfere very much with these plans even if it did not offer serious budgetary help for the redemption of homes and land. By contrast the municipality led by Teddy Kollek, which preferred separate quarters for the various ethnic groups in order to maintain peace in the city, fought them. (Even when it turned out that separation did not bring about peace. After all Jews were stabbed even in the western-most neighborhoods such as Qiryat Yovel.)

In this situation, with the government for and the municipality against, they worked for the settlement of East Jerusalem dunam by dunam, house by house with most of them purchased from Jewish contributions, legally, such that appeal against the process was difficult.

On the eve of the last elections, when the surveys assured a Ma'arakh victory, I asked those who were doing this work: What will happen now when the government fights you?

Those asked did not seem worried. The process of redemption is not in the hands of this government or that, they said with surprising assurance; rather, redemption has a dynamic all its own and of course ways would still be found to redeem Jerusalem, one way or another.

Today, when the government is in the hands of the left and the municipality in the hands of Likud and discussions about the partition of Jerusalem are beginning to sound serious, especially against the background of Rabin's exaggerated concessions—we wanted to check back with those who work for the peace of Jerusalem in practice and not just in theory: What is happening with the Jewish settlement activity in the eastern part of the city?

The answers depends upon whom you talk to. There are those whose style is moderate and who have more patience. Others feel that the ground is on fire, that every construction program deliberately delayed, that every house where the High Court of Justice comes out against Jewish settlers will serve in the future as weapons in the hands of those who intend to partition Jerusalem.

Among the latter is Rabbi Beni 'Alon, head of the Bet 'Orot yeshiva. On the day of our meeting, Rabbi 'Alon heard a report on IDF [Israel Defense Forces] radio on the subject of land confiscation in East Jerusalem. The speaker, attorney Zaydman, who is leading the legal effort on the subject of confiscated property in the Old

City, surveyed a High Court of Justice ruling on land stretching over less than a dunam that was confiscated from Arabs. The Nusayba family claims this land, that till this very day has never had anything built on it, which points to the fact that the issue is not private for them but a matter of principle.

And Rabbi 'Alon is boiling mad. According to this High Court of Justice, every piece of confiscated land upon which nothing has been built will be returned to its owners, who have already been financially compensated in the past. This is absurd. The entire Hebrew University on Mt. Scopus and the Mormon university stretching over 17 dunams, are built on lands confiscated by the Israel Land Administration. These, by the way, were lands confiscated by Minister Pinhas Sapir, a Mapai minister.... A policy of the sort suggested by this High Court of Justice, said the rabbi, has a lethal character, such that had it been in effect in 1967, we would be forced to pray today in the narrow confines of the Western Wall alley as it existed in the time of the British.

The Bet 'Orot yeshiva is also busy with purchasing. Every house offered for sale is checked. Meanwhile it is still not possible to reveal the latest purchases. But the problem is not in the purchase of homes; the problem is that the existing policy does not permit those houses purchased to be turned into a Jewish neighborhood that would establish facts in the city. We go out for a scouting tour of the entire area of East Jerusalem beyond the walls. From Mt. Scopus we see a large area that descends through the Valley of Jehoshaphat (Wadi Juz) and surrounds the Old City on the east as far as Siloam. This is the entire area of the eastern city that Jews do not frequent and prefer not to cross. But from our scouting it can be clearly seen that the area is almost devoid of Arab settlers, apart from two small neighborhoods, Wadi Juz and A-Sawana, Faysal al-Husayni's neighborhood. In the other areas there is already Jewish ownership on the ground. It would be sufficient to erect several Jewish neighborhoods on that land to create territorial contiguity from Mt. Scopus and Ramat 'Eshqol to Siloam. Were we to do that, the Arab neighborhoods would become a non-threatening enclave instead of a body marking the line of partition of the city....

On the maps that Rabbi Alon shows me there are about seven plans for Jewish neighborhoods in his eastern Jerusalem that would be built were Jews to stop being afraid of going there. For example, the olive garden from which Mosqovitz purchased the house of the murderer Haj Amin al-Husayni and opposite, on the slope below the Hebrew University, 100 dunams of 'Emeq Tzurim—that the municipality designated to be a national park.

Rabbi Alon says that a national park alone does not solve the problem. Look what happened to the well-tended Tabatchniq Garden with its beautiful vistas, below the Mormon university. We walk along its paths and the only voices to be heard from among the beautiful shrubs are those of Arab children. No Jew dares to hike on it

today. The Bet 'Orot architect claims that 850 housing units could be built on this territory and still leave enough room for large gardens. Rabbi Alon talks about other areas like the car parking lot opposite Shekhem Gate, that belongs to Jews, and the Ras al Amud neighborhood, for which the construction plans for a Jewish neighborhood are stuck in the regional committee, and Abu Dis, which contained empty Jewish plots even before the War of Independence. When they tried to liberate these lands through the administrator for confiscated property—attorney Zaydman shot down the deal and got the administrator fired.

Bet 'Orot also stands on land that was intended for public construction until the city's legal adviser intervened and determined, against the professional judgment of legal advisers, that a yeshiva is not a public structure. This determination, of course, is a far cry from the view of the religious community; after all, why give preference to yeshivas over private individuals if they are all private by definition?

The present mayor of the city 'Ehud 'Olmert suggests changing the zoning of the land from public construction to institutional construction. Rabbi 'Alon fears that such a change would drag the matter on for several more years through all kinds of committees. The other possibility is to approach the High Court of Justice, but meanwhile they hope that 'Olmert will reconsider and instruct his advisors to find a way to enable the yeshiva to get its construction permits without the process taking more than a month.

When we stand in Bet Orot and see this area that could be populated with Jewish settlement that would be a roadblock to any possible partition of Jerusalem, we, too, have the same crazy feeling that Rabbi 'Alon does that time is running out on the hourglass, running out without our doing what needs to be done. Rabbi 'Alon says excitedly, almost breathlessly, like someone at the peak of a struggle: We had opportunities in the past and many of them were missed. We have to be concerned that on the issue of the integrity of Jerusalem there not be any misses. Look, opposite us is the 'Emeq Yehoshaphat where the nations will be judged for their treatment of Israel. I hope that some of us will not be judged along with them for our treatment of Jerusalem...

The people of 'Ateret Kohanim have lots of patience. That patience has stood them in good stead over many years of purchasing house after house until they established the fact of a complete Jewish settlement that proved it was possible to live within the Arab population.

For years they refused to be interviewed because all their work was shrouded in a fog of mystery and secrecy in order to protect the deals that they were conducting with Arabs, who were in fear of their lives. Even when the settlement in the Muslim quarter became an open fact, only some of the amazing stories of those purchases were revealed.

Even now it is impossible to catch Mati Hakohen Dan, the man in charge of all the projects and the person who knows all of their intricacies better than anyone, in a free moment. He is involved with this holy work day and night.

Yosi Boimel, the director of 'Ateret Kohanim, checks for me just what can be revealed to the public. From the continuing secrecy I understand that they are continuing to redeem Jerusalem despite the knife threatening the necks of those who cooperate with the Israelis. The two sides thus avoid discussion of the partition of the city. Boimel releases only the fact that recently there were two purchases of additional homes within the Muslim quarter, the one from Jewish owners and the other from an Arab who, for the time being, is having difficulty vacating the house because of threats on his life. Take into account that there are still others that cannot yet be revealed.

Boimel does not express great fear over the outlook for Jerusalem: "The Arabs talk about Jewish settlement as a stumblingblock for peace. If Jewish life is a stumblingblock, then that stumblingblock exists throughout the country, not only in Jerusalem. We do not believe that a single Jew will be evacuated from any home in Jerusalem. That would be a sight that no one would tolerate. Every Jew should know that a hundred years ago there was no western Jerusalem. The only Jerusalem that our people dreamt about for 2,000 years is the eastern part, the Old City and its environs. Every Jew knows that the future of Jerusalem is bound up with its past. If we reconcile ourselves to places devoid of Jews in this city, that will determine not only the future of Jerusalem but of the entire country."

And what about Jordanian sovereignty over the holy places?

[Boimel] "On the one hand Jews are prohibited from reconciling themselves to a foreign regime over our holy places, but, on the other hand, the people of Israel are apparently not ready to return to their holy places. Therefore, in the meantime we have to leave the situation as it is. Rabbi Shlomo 'Aviner says, and we accept this, that with regard to the holy places in Jerusalem, we are all Neturei Qarta. We sit and wait for redemption. The problem is that along with the demand for Arab sovereignty over the Temple Mount, there arise all sorts of home owners with new claims and various demands for all kinds of autonomy within the city. We cannot accept all this."

Does the new mayoralty support the settlement project in the eastern part of the city more than its predecessor?

[Boimel] "We found a more serious attitude in 'Ehud 'Olmert than in Teddy Kollek. Kollek believed in the territorial division of the city by ethnic groups. 'Olmert believes that Jewish neighborhoods can be built within Arab neighborhoods. We believe that not only is it

possible to live within Arab neighborhoods, but that a Jewish presence is a calming factor and increases security in the environs.

Mayor 'Olmert has already promised to help us gather funds, and he is open to programs for building new small neighborhoods."

But a new neighborhood has still not been built in the eastern part of the city and all construction programs are frozen. Boimel takes me for a tour in the quarter called "Muslim" despite the fact that very many of its houses were in Jewish hands up until the riots. In the first construction adjacent to the opening of the Wall tunnel, the building called the "Wall Gates," there resides today, for the second year now, the premilitary preparatory detail of 'Ateret Kohanim, whose chief is Rabbi Yosi Kohen. Rabbi Kohen, his wife Ra'aya and Mati Dan were the first Jewish settlers of the new Jewish settlement in the Muslim quarter.

Some tens of young men are today studying in the preparatory detail, most of them leaving for full military duty afterward. We entered the windowless vaulted room under repair: Here, Yosi Boimel tells me, rumor has it that Tourism Minister 'Uzi Bar'am was born.

The rate of purchases slackened after the elections, but within the Muslim quarter they talk about the development of the settlement from various and sundry angles: for example, the changing character of the settlement. For many years only young couples came while today three generations live here. Recently some grandfathers and grandmothers have joined their families, like Dr. Ester G., a retired physician, or a pair of grandfathers who came here in the footsteps of a married daughter and went into the "Eternal Life" home. In this house, Jews and Arabs share a yard with the yeshiva.

Education is the central factor in the developing settlement. This includes various and sundry Zionist Talmud Torah kindergartens, founded by "Merkaz Harav" students, and three classes of a school that opened two years ago and attracts the very young children of Bet Raban, even from outside Jerusalem. One of the teachers, Rabbi 'Emanu'el ben Shimul, who, as you will recall, was stabbed by a terrorist in the past, is a resident of the Christian quarter. Another teacher leads me to a first-grade room that looks out over the expanse of the Western Wall and the Temple Mount: "These are the children who are closest in the whole world to the Temple Mount and that is very compelling," he tells me hesitantly, mindful of the little darlings who are listening to him. There are also pretty playgrounds in some of the yards, and the Tourism and Travel Office of the Jewish quarter has opened an extension in the Muslim quarter. Renovations go on all the time; they add rooms, expand, and change the purpose of the apartments. A one-room apartment for a young couple becomes an institute, and the young couple moves to a larger apartment that has just been renovated. There is constant movement in the Muslim quarter, and there is an uncanceled list of

people waiting to move here or to other neighborhoods in the eastern part of the city.

In the dark alleys of the Muslim quarter that stir with hostility, where in the not very distant past you would not see a single Jew apart from local Jewish residents accompanied by a security detail, today you constantly meet groups of Israeli tourists accompanied by 'Ateret Kohanim guides.

The existence of a Jewish settlement in the Muslim quarter undoubtedly changed that feeling: "When Israelis come here and walk among the houses, they understand for the first time the reality that has been created in the field and the importance of our settlement here. Were Jews not living in the Muslim quarter and security people not coming and going incessantly, it would have been impossible for Jews to enter this part of Jerusalem. What is ironic is the fact that many of the homes in the Muslim quarter are Jewish property, and this quarter has a deep-rooted Jewish past," says Bracha Sly, one of the guides.

However, when you walk from the Western Wall tunnel within the Muslim quarter to Bet Danon (the area of the little Wall), you find that over the years there has sprung up here an unbroken sequence of yeshivas, synagogues, seminaries, homes, and Jewish stores. Children from the Jewish quarter, whose parents were once fearful of allowing them to visit their friends in the Muslim quarter, visit today without fear. I met Shulamit in the synagogue and in the "Hazon Yehezq'el" seminary, an ancient synagogue from a hundred years ago deep inside the Muslim quarter. Shulamit's parents were partners in the renovation of the synagogue and took upon themselves its administration, after 60 years where it served as Arab housing. Her mother, the rabbi's wife Fayge Kahane, leads tourist groups here on tours in the Old City. We climb up to the synagogue on particularly high stone steps, and inside we meet a group of women who came to hear Rabbi Shlomo Hakohen 'Aviner's weekly lesson.

Rabbi 'Aviner does not sound at all worried by the political developments and sports a completely optimistic outlook about the future: "True there is a crisis at the moment. But there were always crises, like the Uganda crisis, following which the people of Israel almost gave up on the Land of Israel, but we always prevailed. Often something good even came out of the crisis. There is a well-known article by our Sages, may they rest in peace, that we tend to forget: that redemption comes step by step and sometimes darkness prevails over the dawn. It would be a blow to the Torah, to Zionism and to the security of Israel to divide sovereignty over the city. And we have to struggle. But blowing off steam, abuse, and insults do not add anything. Talking together can greatly reduce the distance that divides the nation. We are certain that within the nation of Israel there are forces that will awaken from this nightmare, and many already feel that the path the government is leading us down today is not the right one."



What has changed in East Jerusalem lately, I ask David'le, who heads the 'El'ad Foundation that settled the City of David in Siloam? "In the previous government the policy was to strengthen the Jewish grip on the eastern part of the city by allocating budget for the purchase of homes. The new government has stopped all that—the purchases, the strengthening of the existing settlement and does not even stand by the obligations of the previous government. It is deliberately trying to remove Jews from the eastern part of the city," says David'le.

"They are trying all kinds of tactics on us to make us leave, like the Qlugman Report, for example, that found flaws in the fact that the lands or homes in the eastern part of the city were handed over precisely to Jewish foundations. Qlugman looked for holes in our contracts, holes that were not found. There are also lawsuits in which the Arabs claim ownership of government property. We found that the government deliberately does not file the appropriate arguments to rebut their claims and there is a response. We received authoritative information about a document submitted to the ministers stating that since it was government policy to stop the growth of Jewish settlements, there was an instruction not to file legal arguments against the claim of Arab ownership of the houses...." In these legal actions, it turns out, the Arabs never won even once "because we intervened and presented ourselves and to this day have won every suit filed against us, and we are still not done. The processes are endless, and they are always followed by appeals," David'le adds.

"Only recently, says David'le, have we found the proper formula by which it is possible to keep our existing property and improve it, to win all the cases and also continue with new purchases—all of it without government assistance. It is also important to stress that we have a large waiting list, and everyday people call up and are disappointed to hear that there still are no vacant homes for them."

Since the establishment of the City of David neighborhood, regular New Moon parties are held in Siloam, including Torah lessons for the women and the men, with music and light refreshments, organized by the 'Atali family. On the intermediate days of every Israeli holiday, the people of the settlement conduct tours to the Pool of Siloam, to the City of David and to the young settlement. The tours are conducted in the area of the First Commonwealth every twenty minutes. Lately, residents of the place have come to the conclusion that for an even better propaganda campaign, they have to conduct the tours all year round and not just on the holidays, and 'El'ad is the address for tourists from abroad who want guided tours of the area every day.

"We will try to bring Israelis, too," they say. "We found out that what people hear from the media is not the same as what happens to them when they walk around the eastern part of the city, learn its history against the actual

backdrop and realize the importance of having Jewish settlement in it at every location. We appeal to schools, to administrators, to teachers in in-service training, to soldiers, and youth from abroad; and we try to get our tours of the City of David included as part of the study program of the Open University, and for everyone who is interested in history and not in politics, because our history is the connection with the future."

Those words contain everything and say everything to anyone who asks about the peace of Jerusalem.

## TUNISIA

### Population Census Statistics Reported

94AF0278A *Tunis CONJONCTURE in French Aug 94 pp 8-12*

[Unattributed article: "1994 Census"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The latest census, which has been tailored to support preparations for the Ninth Development Plan, is employing new methodologies. The population, according to preliminary data, has now reached 8,736,000.

Census taking goes back a long way in Tunisia: The first comprehensive country-wide census was taken in 1921. Censuses before that covered only Tunisia's European population. More recently, censuses have been taken on 3 May 1966, 8 May 1975, and 30 March 1984. Methods have improved, and since 1966 greater attention has been paid to methodology, organization, and cartographic documentation.

This year's general census is the 10th for Tunisia, giving the nation a fresh "photograph" of demographic and socioeconomic conditions. It has been tailored to support preparations for the Ninth Economic and Social Development Plan (1997-2001). Preliminary results already have been released. The population has reached 8,736,000. Urban population levels include the city of Tunis, 881,560; Sfax, 732,471; Nabeul, 577,813; Ariana, 566,247, and Kairouan, 528,899.

The objectives of the 1994 census are to provide data as of the survey reference date on the total population of the country and its distribution among the various administrative units, and to analyze the sociodemographic and occupational structure of the population. The census is also supposed to gather data on fertility and internal migration. In addition, the INS [National Institute of Statistics] is taking advantage of the census operation to conduct an exhaustive survey of housing and housing conditions in the country.

Data drawn from the census will be used to plan construction of road, health, electric power and potable water infrastructure, to decide the geographic boundaries of electoral districts and the number of deputies for each governorate, and to determine the distribution of certain public monies among the different communes.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

At the national and regional level, census data will provide the basis for updating trends in vital statistics and migratory movements.

Population data on each census block will be used as a baseline for all subsequent surveys conducted by INS and other departments and agencies, including studies of employment, household budgets and consumption levels, and demographic, health, and migration surveys.

A complete inventory has been prepared of everyone physically present in Tunisia as of the reference date. For example, everyone's habitual domicile (principal residence) has been recorded. The census will record both de facto and de jure residential status, providing pictures of both the actual and legal populations. The point of collecting data for both population categories is to meet the information needs of different users that may be interested in one or the other category. For example, in a region where tourism is the main industry, data on the actual population may be of more use than data on legal residents, in the context of a development plan.

To ensure the survey is conducted properly, preparations for the census have been divided into two phases—first, cartographic preparation in the bureaus, and second, the preenumeration that was carried out between October 1993 and March 1994. The final phase—the actual census taking—is the most critical part of the entire operation. The operation is of such enormous scope it has required a huge mobilization of personnel and equipment.

To assist INS in conducting the census, an advisory entity, a national commission, and regional commissions

at the level of each governorate have been established. A technical advisory committee has been given responsibility for refining the draft questionnaire to take into account needs of the different users.

Actions to be undertaken in the phase of exploiting and disseminating the results include codification, extraction, processing, and analysis of the information, and publication of the results. Full exploitation of the census information in all its detail is a major undertaking, but to meet the deadlines set for preparing the Ninth Plan, results are needed as quickly as possible. The plan for exploiting the 1994 census therefore gives top priority to generating extrapolations from sample data, so as to provide results in time to meet deadlines and the needs of government agencies and users. This is being accomplished by using data from a sample of households, reinforced by comparison with data from previous censuses, in hopes of obtaining an optimum sample that will provide detailed data that is reasonably accurate at the regional level.

Given the large number of questions asked and the time and resources it takes to exploit the answers exhaustively, it is not only useful but actually essential to resort to sampling, in order to provide various users with the most important data in timely fashion. Exploitation of a sample of the census data allows the agency responsible for the census, INS, to put the most important results in the hands of planners and government agencies at the earliest possible date. There is an increasing need at the regional level for information that is as detailed and accurate as possible, and the census constitutes the principal if not the only source for meeting these regional statistical needs.

#### Projection of Principal Demographic Indicators (1995-2011)

Indicators	1991-1996	1996-2001	2001-2006	2006-2011
Births (thousands per year)	212.9	214.7	212.0	207.0
Deaths (thousands per year)	56.8	57.9	61.0	66.0
Birth rate (per thousand)	24.7	22.9	20.9	18.9
Death rate (per thousand)	6.5	6.1	6.0	6.0
Growth rate (percent)	1.8	1.7	1.5	1.3
Adjusted fertility rate	3.22	2.80	2.47	2.23

#### Total Population Projections (in thousands)

Population	1991	1996	2001	2006	2011
	8,220	9,002.8	9,789.6	10,547.8	11,251.1

Census data serves many purposes at the regional level. The census contributes decisively to the creation of regional information systems (data banks) and elaboration of regional monitoring systems to facilitate definition of development objectives and analysis of social conditions in the region.

We should also mention the study launched by CGDR [General Commissariat for Regional Development] of indicators of regional priorities (map of regional priorities). This study is based on a methodology that combines diverse socioeconomic indicators and classifies administrative units (governorates, delegations) according to degree of development.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

This information is of key importance in calculating allocation of funds and appropriations for development program. The classification is used as the basis for selecting decentralized zones, i.e., zones that could benefit from the decentralization provisions in the investment code. Seven [as published] indicators have been chosen for grading the degree of development achieved by each of the governorate's delegations:

- percentage of rural population;
- unemployment rate;
- rate of potable water coverage;
- electrification rate;
- illiteracy rate;
- death rate.

Now in this kind of situation, it is enormously difficult to provide reliable information—on unemployment, for example—at the fine level of detail needed. And it cannot be done without exhaustively exploiting the census data; but this could entail delays in the planning process, so the work must be carried out in stages, first exploiting sample data and then continuing with exhaustive exploitation of the census. This task may end up being divided between the central and regional offices of the INS.

#### Jobs and Unemployment

Given the complexity of analyzing job and unemployment statistics, and the growing need for information to implement measures to affect either of these variables, tools of analysis, measurement, and intervention must be adequate to the complexity of these needs, to increase the effectiveness of economic analysis in this domain. Employment is by its nature a problem that affects all social strata, but data processing, analysis, and management require fine discrimination in examining all the various conditions. Indisputably, the information most urgently needed by employment analysts and decision makers is a quantified breakdown showing what portion of the total population is in the job market, and within that group what percentage is unemployed.

Unemployment in Tunisia today is described as "structural," in that it results from breakdowns in job market or job search mechanisms. It is important, therefore, to distinguish between long-term, recurrent, and youth unemployment.

#### Urbanization

It is only recently that developing countries have become interested in urbanization and urban development. Given the scale and rapid pace of urbanization seen in many countries, some observers have gone so far as to talk about "urban explosion."

Whereas only 20 percent of the world's population was urbanized in 1920, it is estimated that close to 51 percent of the earth's inhabitants will live in cities or towns by the year 2000.

Statistical data for Tunisia show a slower rate of urbanization. Urbanization is considered a catalyst of development. The definition of towns and urban areas is too complex, depending on so many different variables, for classification to be left to the whim of administrators. Use of a combination of quantitative and qualitative criteria would permit more intelligent appreciations of the real substance and significance of the concepts "rural" and "urban."

Three quantitative distinctions have been established: 10,000 or more inhabitants for urban concentrations; 5,000-10,000 inhabitants for village communes; and fewer than 5,000 for rural communes.

The bureaucratic logic by which new communes are created is based on the need to tailor the urban services with which inhabitants are provided to the population of the given area. Also, rural exodus toward towns and cities, especially the biggest ones, may lead to an accretion of "oukala" or unregulated [literally, "anarchic"] housing. This is why we must have the most detailed possible information on urban realities, in terms of both quantity of housing units and quality of structures. Clearly, growth in years to come will bring with it the need for more housing, jobs, and infrastructure.

Finally, it is important to note that after 40 years of experience, Tunisia's statistical base is well developed, thanks among other things to contributions made by the various population surveys conducted continuously since 1956. What is needed now is to make the most of this base by focusing efforts on the most detailed possible exploitation of the 1994 census to expand the information available on conditions in each region.

Drawing on lessons learned from previous censuses, regarding not only modalities of information gathering but also the content of questionnaires and the concepts employed, the 1994 census represents a major effort by the INS to assure exhaustive coverage of the population and provide users with the highest quality results in the shortest possible time.

#### UNFPA-Tunisia Cooperation

1974-1977: Launching of the first cooperation program between the UNFPA [United Nations Fund for Population Activities] and Tunisia, primarily covering consolidation of family planning activities and the building of Regional Education and Family Planning centers.

1978-1981 and 1982-1986: Continuation of the earlier program, plus consolidation of training, informational, and communications activities, and reinforcement of Family Planning institutions. Integration of demographic concepts into the school system.

1987-1991: This program, which came with a \$5.4 million subvention, focused on:

- Promotion of integrated health and family planning activities in central Tunisia;



- Improvements in INS collection and analysis of demographic data;
- Continuation of demographic research conducted by the Institute for Population Research and Studies (IREP);
- Sensitization of primary and secondary students as well as teachers to population issues, under three projects implemented by the Ministry of Education and Science;
- Introduction of demographic and family health concepts into the training of social workers, agricultural extension agents, and young women in rural areas, in joint projects with the Ministries of Social Affairs, Agriculture, and Vocational Training and Employment.

1992-1996: The objectives of this \$10 million UNFPA-Tunisia program will be:

- Support for actions facilitating further integration of demographic variables into economic and social development planning;
- Promotion of maternal health and family planning activities in the central, western, and southern regions of the country, where coverage rates are relatively low;
- Augmentation of demographic information and education activities targeting young people.
- Strengthening of the system for collecting and processing demographic data;
- Efforts to integrate women into the development process.

## AFGHANISTAN

**Interview With Sebghatollah Mojaddedi Presented  
94LA0238A Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 16 Aug 94 p 5**

[Interview with Sebghatollah Mojaddedi, first Afghan president after the liberation of Afghanistan, by 'Abduh Mubashir in Germany; date not given—first four paragraphs AL-AHRAM introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sebghatollah Mojaddedi, head of the temporary government from 1989-1992 and the first Afghan president since the liberation of Afghanistan from the Soviet occupation, arrived in Germany on a private visit. On that same day, 12 August, the Security Council discussed the turn of events in Afghanistan in order to issue a new declaration that would show that the Council regretted the continuing fighting. The Council also asked all countries to stop sending arms to the warring factions, to end the smuggling of arms, and to put an end to that devastating struggle. I met with the Afghan president the same night of his arrival and again the next morning. We discussed many political, religious, economic, and security issues.

Mojaddedi is no stranger to Egypt. He, together with his brothers, was brought up and educated in Egypt. He speaks Arabic well and is fluent in the Egyptian dialect. He has many Egyptian friends. Mojaddedi's last visit to Egypt was during the month of Ramadan of last year when the Ministry of Awqaf extended him an invitation on the occasion of the religious celebrations marking Laylat al-Qadar [27 Ramadan celebration of the first revelations of the Koran to the Prophet Muhammad]. During the celebrations, Mojaddedi delivered a speech on behalf of all the delegations. Of the many visits he paid to Egypt, Mojaddedi remembers most of all that visit that lasted 21 days during the late Anwar al-Sadat's presidency. During that visit, he was at the head of a 20-man delegation representing five mujahedin organizations. As head of the delegation during that visit, Mojaddedi delivered a speech in the People's Assembly about religious struggle [jihad] and the mujahedin.

**From Respect to Disrespect**

I began the interview by asking Mojaddedi about the fate of the "jihad" and the mujahedin. Though he was expecting this question, since many others have asked it during the last two years, one could sense a feeling of pain in his voice as he recognized the bitter reality Afghanistan was living. However, he quickly controlled his sorrow and pain and responded to my question by saying that he had confronted current President Rabbani with this question: "Is it not time for this bloodbath to end?"

Mojaddedi continued his response by saying: "Before the domestic fighting started, we enjoyed everybody's admiration. Even our enemies respected us. Moreover, the world leaders and the heads of the different states

welcomed the mujahedin leaders from their hearts and proudly cherished meeting with them. This great response was due to the fact that those leaders and heads of states admired the people of Afghanistan because, though they were small in number and had little wealth and potential, they could confront a big world power courageously and were very well prepared to sacrifice and be giving in order to be liberated and regain sovereignty over their land. Now we are no longer respected. In fact, the world looks upon us with a great deal of disenchantment. It is unfortunate that we are the ones responsible for these events." Mojaddedi further added that he had relayed this fact to Rabbani, to the leaders of the organizations, and to a large number of tribal chiefs, field commanders, and Afghan intelligentsia.

[Mubashir] What about ideas proposed to get out of this dilemma?

**"Loya Jergah" [Assembly of Elders]**

[Mojaddedi] We are in agreement that we should convene a meeting of the Loya Jergah. Representatives of three organizations are to meet with President Rabbani, Ahmad Shah Mas'ud, and 'Abdul Rasul Sayyaf in order to invite them to this conference. It is therefore clear that all organizations and powers have declared that the only solution and way out of this dilemma is the Loya Jergah. We are just awaiting the positive response from these three leaders.

[Mubashir] I asked Mojaddedi about the coming Loya Jergah.

[Mojaddedi] The organizations have agreed to invite between 1,000 and 1,500 people representing the different powers and factions of the Afghan people. Previously, three factions: religious mullahs, tribal chiefs, and the intelligentsia represented the Afghan people. However, during the last two decades, a new power, that of the field commanders, has emerged. Therefore the invitation will be extended to men representing these major powers. Historical events in Afghanistan have highlighted this assembly. The Loya Jergah has been the solution to all the crises and calamities that the nation has passed through.

The Loya Jergah represents a conference of the people's domestic and outside representatives and leaders. The conference discusses the presented issue until it either reaches a consensus or the majority agrees to a solution.

The Loya Jergah's coming meeting, which is expected to be either in the middle or at the end of September, will meet under the auspices and supervision of both the United Nations and the Islamic Conference Organization. Taking into consideration that the United Nations supports this proposal, it is possible that the meeting might take place before that date if the delegates manage to convince Rabbani, Mas'ud, and Sayyaf to join the Afghan assembly. Meanwhile, regardless of the response

of these three leaders, when those emissaries return, arrangements for convening the Loya Jergah will start.

[Mubashir] Why did you not consider convening this meeting earlier?

[Mojaddedi] We have previously requested that this meeting be convened, and we have continued to recommend that it be convened and to present it as an Afghan means to a solution. This solution is realistic because of the difficulty of holding elections now, due to the years of struggle and civil war and the impact of these years. Of course, we realize that elections should be held so that the people can elect their representatives. However, one year or a little more than a year should elapse before thinking of taking this step.

[Mubashir] What is the expected response of the three leaders?

[Mojaddedi] Within the framework of the support these three leaders are getting from abroad and the conviction of some regional powers that their remaining in power would serve these regional powers' interests best, these three leaders would like to remain in power for good, if they can.

[Mubashir] Are you optimistic about the results?

[Mojaddedi] I am truly optimistic. The people are tired. All organizations have reached exhaustion, and everybody is convinced that this catastrophe should come to an end.

#### **Dostam and Rabbani**

[Mubashir] What is the position of the former leader from the north, 'Abdol Rashid Dostam, who was also commander in the army of the communist ruler Najibollah?

[Mojaddedi] Dostam controls seven northern states. Since he succeeded in getting hold of most of the arms of the Afghan army, he controls strong armed forces that are composed of air force and artillery. Most of the forces of the Uzbek, Turkmen, Tajik, and Pashtun are under his control.

[Mubashir] What about the position of President Rabbani, Mas'ud, and Sayyaf?

[Mojaddedi] From among the 26 states of Afghanistan, they control the whole of only two states, Herat and Baghlan, and a part of Badakhshan. Even with regard to the capital Kabul, they control only three out of 29 precincts.

[Mubashir] However, you previously supported Rabbani!

[Mojaddedi] Yes. I supported both Rabbani and Mas'ud for 14 years. Yet, since Rabbani has come to power, new facts have come to light, of which the most important is

the murder of more than 30,000 people during the last two years. Since they seized power, they have become tyrants.

In fact, I supported them earlier because I sensed that their support was in Afghanistan's interest. At the present time, it is also in Afghanistan's interest that I do not support them.

[Mubashir] Is Hekmatyar different from Rabbani?

[Mojaddedi] Hekmatyar has changed so much during the last two years to the extent that he has declared his complete renunciation of power. He now consults his aids and responds to their advice. Though we presently support him, we keep both him and his activities under our surveillance.

[Mubashir] However, is Hekmatyar not accused of helping and supporting the extremists?

[Mojaddedi] He has stopped his support and the Egyptian Government is aware of this fact.

We had long discussions with Hekmatyar telling him about President al-Sadat's honorable stand vis-a-vis the Afghan issue. We further asked him if Egypt should be rewarded with activities and stands such as these.

[Mubashir] Then, who is doing that now?

[Mojaddedi] Sayyaf has camps for the training of Afghan Arabs. These camps were previously located in Pakistan and have presently been moved inside Afghanistan.

#### **Drugs**

[Mubashir] Are drug-producing plants grown to provide financing?

[Mojaddedi] The war years have led to the complete destruction of cultivation. This made all cultivators turn to drug-producing plants. In the case of drug-producing plants, it is found that small areas of land yield a large revenue. Stability and providing alternative means to generate income would be the only means to stop the cultivation of drug-producing plants. During the time that I was president, I met with delegations from the United Nations. When this issue was discussed, I asked them to help Afghanistan provide the means to generate alternative income in order to make it possible for me to stop immediately the cultivation of drug-producing plants.

Naturally, many individuals exploit this kind of cultivation in order to get financial resources for their activities and increasing their assets. As for fighters' salaries, we can take for example those of frontline fighters in the forces of Rabbani, Mas'ud, and Sayyaf which amounts to the equivalent of 1,000 Pakistani rupees per fighter. However, as we discussed matters with those fighters, they said that they could only afford to quit fighting if we provided them with food.



### The United States and the Extremists

As we discussed the United States' role, I presented my opinion that the United States' administration would not object to Islamic political powers taking authority: the United States could even help the Islamic powers reach that goal—in spite of the example in Iran. This opinion exists, since it is viewed that once these powers take authority, their true goals will be exposed because they will not be able to carry out any of their promises. Consequently, there will be more resentment, which will lead to more oppression, which in its turn would make those powers lose all popular support and become completely isolated.

These extremists cannot carry out their promises because their potential is limited. This is because such countries depend on imports to provide for their needs of food and arms. These countries also depend on the import of machinery, spare parts, and technology for all industrialization and agricultural development programs; they are therefore, in more than one way, caught in the grip of the outside world.

Mojaddedi interrupts the discussion by saying that they are really not against the handing over of power to the extremists, yet, they have a different stand vis-a-vis the moderates. Their concern about the extremists lies in the fact that those will make mistakes that will eventually tarnish the image of Islam and Moslems.

We end our discussion as Mojaddedi has some appointments in Bonn, the seat of the German Government. As Mojaddedi departs on his journey, in addition to carrying his suitcases, as a moderate Afghan leader he carries his worries, views the catastrophe and the calamity, and does not stop trying to either end this calamity or at least limit it, which is the least that can be done.

## INDIA

### Signing of GATT Seen Unconstitutional

94AS0500C Varanasi AJ in Hindi 2 Sep 94 p 6

[Editorial: "Dunkel and Our Constitution"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The preamble to the Indian constitution says that we the people of India implement and dedicate this constitution to ourselves with a sacred objective of building a sovereign, socialist, secular, and democratic republic, with all of its citizens to equally share social, economic and political justice.

The constitution sanctified by us, the citizens of India, is an promissory constitution. The Indian constitution represents the hopes of those millions who have suffered at the hands of foreign rulers and have endured untold miseries, exploitation, and unjust social and economic deprivation for ages. They were financially bankrupt, socially dissolute and politically desperate. They were ill fed, ill educated, unclothed, and were deprived of basic

human rights. But the constitution has assured them of a new social, economic and political order. An order where people can experience an honest political, social, and economic atmosphere.

The preamble to the constitution declares India to be a sovereign republic. Sovereignty is enshrined in us, the people of India. The Indian sovereignty means that we the people of India are the master of our destiny. The way to direct our course is contained in the directive principles of the political process, so fundamental to the administration of the nation, is described in the fourth chapter of the constitution. What has happened to us, the people of India, 47 years after dedicating the Constitution and 44 years after implementing it? Several times has the government changed but not one ever implemented the directive principles. As a result, 50

percent of the Indian population is illiterate and the other 40

is surviving under the poverty line. Those who are educated are engaged in a mad race to acquire riches.

During the last few years, in spite of thwarted implementation of wrong policies and directive principles, India still has the unfathomed ability to restore self dependency. We have an abundance of raw materials and natural wealth. Possibly, India is the only country to have such skilled workers by birth as potters, weavers, shoe makers, carpenters, candle makers etc. The irony is, they also happen to be the most untrained resource. By following the fundamental principles of the political process, we can still transform our country into a well to do nation, and for doing it we do not need to look for either the economic or political sovereignty.

In 1950, after three years of debate Dr. Ambedkar's proposal was accepted as the Indian Constitution. On December 20, 1991 Dunkel submitted a consolidated proposal inclusive of the results of the extensive diversified trade talks. This proposal was accepted [by the Indian Government] on December 15, 1993 and on April 15, 1994 during the conference held in Marrakesh, Morocco, it was approved at the ministerial level. This is the tale of the long 47 years from the date of Ambedkar's proposal for the constitution to Dunkel's anti-constitutional proposition. In reality, the Indian government has decided to destroy the Indian constitution in a mere moment.

### The Supreme Court's Decision on the Authority To Enter Into a Treaty

In the case of *Magambhai vs the Indian Union* (AIR 1969 S.C. 783) the supreme court has decided that any treaty impacts more on the political state of a country than its judicial process. After approval a treaty has to be implemented and it can only be implemented if any one of the three branches of the government, legislative, executive and judiciary has the authority to implement it. If the constitutional process is deficient in any aspect,

it should be corrected and the state will have to equip itself with the necessary authority. The treaty then in itself will attain full legality. It means that our parliament will have to abort many laws, many will have to be amended, and some new laws may be required to make the treaty effective. To achieve this, certain actions against the directive principles will have to be taken.

Under the Dunkel agreement a World Trade Organization (WTO) will be established with a legal status, recognized by every member state with powers granted to enforce its mandates. The WTO will form a dispute resolutory to monitor enforcement of organization's actions and its policies. This body will also have the authority to suspend the amenities of the reporting member. It is called cross retaliation. The organization will have wide powers to decide member amenities for suspension.

The Indian Patent Law of 1970 does not recognize any intellectual property rights. This law does not allow any patent on any agricultural or fruit growing techniques. It also includes restrictions on medicine, surgery, or any type of curative procedures, and similarly a patent cannot be granted on any system to cure animals or plants. The Dunkel proposal does not contain any such exclusions. This treaty deprives the farmer of his right to produce the seeds or to modify it, given to him by the Indian law on patents.

Our parliament will have to undo the Indian patent law and will be required to enact new regulations consistent with the treaty. Cross retaliation against India can be enforced if such is not done. It is not only that the laws pertaining to patents will have to be changed but to enforce the treaty many other laws in other areas will have to be added or amended. Many distinguished Indian citizens including Justice Krishna Iyer, Justice Venkatramaya, P. N. Haksar, Vasant Sathe, K. R. Narayan, Atalbihari Bajpai, Lal Krishna Advani, Yashvant Sinha, E. M. S. Nambudripad, P. Upendra, Dr. Rajani Kothari and others presented the following appeal in January 1993, to the government of India.

Every Indian concerned with the economic sovereignty of India is depressed with the prospect of increased national insecurity on this front. And we all who have signed this petition unitedly appeal to you Mr. President as the head of the republic and to you Mr. Prime Minister and your colleagues as the head of the Federal government to safeguard the socio-economic values, the necessity of self sufficiency, industrial development and prosperous agricultural liberties provided in the Constitution. To achieve this objective we pray that the government should not surrender to external pressures.

#### **The Law of Withdrawal**

The country is seriously opposed to the Dunkel agreement signed on April 15, 1994. Some political parties, volunteer organizations, dedicated workers, distinguished economists, educationalists, process specialists,

scientists and others are active in developing negative public opinion on this agreement. But the provision for withdrawal in the agreement under Section 15 of the GATT which provides for the withdrawal from membership is not given due consideration. This section is applicable to the Dunkel agreement and multi-party trade agreement, and provides for withdrawal by any member. The withdrawal will be effective six months after giving written notice to the executive director of the WTO. It should be, however, noted that the agreement will be effective July 1, 1995. The condition to wait for a period of six months before withdrawal is applicable only if a member wishes to resign effective July 1, 1995 or after.

In conclusion, a nation wide public demonstration should be organized to show that the government of India should set itself free of this agreement before July 1, 1995. It is because, this agreement is not a simple trade agreement but is a scheme for international slavery that will destroy our constitution, our sovereignty and our hard won liberties.

#### **Hindu Nationalist Movement Direction, Vigor Analyzed**

[Article by Pabitra Kumar Ghosh : "The Movement on Hinduism"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The fighters are silent, yet the construction of the Ram Janambhumi [birth place of Ram] Temple in Ayodhya has been confirmed. The temple movement has now lost excitement because the government itself is interested in its construction. Instead of creating impediments, it is now providing cooperation.

With the cooperation of the government an the Ayodhya Ram Janmabhumi Trust is being formed. It will be constituted with different religious teachers under the leadership of Swami Bharati Tirtha, the Shankaracharya [top religious leader] of Shringeri. It will be a non-political religious trust and no political party will be connected with it. The responsibility to construct the temple in Ayodhya will rest on the trust.

However, the proposed trust under the leadership of Shankaracharya is not yet free from obstacles. But those obstacles have not come from outside. Swami Swaroopananda, the Shankaracharya of Daraka, is showing his reluctance and the leaders of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad [VHP]—world Hindu religious council—are raising lame excuses and objections. It is the nature of Swami Swaroopananda to always say something different. He is committed to the construction of the temple, but opposes the movement. Although he is still holding his own stand, in the long run it won't be possible for him to be an impediment to other three Shankaracharyas.

It won't be also possible for the VHP to deny the leadership of the Shankaracharyas. The fear that has

cropped up in their mind is only on the role of the federal government. When the struggle started over the Babri 'Mosque' in Ayodhya, the federal government opposed it. The leaders of the movement were imprisoned after the demolition of the Babri Mosque and their cases are still pending in the courts. Issuing an ordinance, the government banned the VHP, the Bharatiya Janta Party [BJP] and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh [RSS] and also sacked the four BJP administered state governments in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and Rajasthan. The federal government's attack was only on the Hindu movement.

Narasimha Rao was also the prime minister at that time. But now the same Narasimha Rao is willing to extend full cooperation to the construction of the temple. In his speech from the Red Fort on 15 August he mentioned the constitution of the trust for the purpose of constructing the temple in Ayodhya and did not say anything on the mosque. That made clear to which side his government was leaning.

The report on the constitution of the trust named 'Ayodhya Ramjanambhumi Institution' was made public the very next day. The principal document of the trust said that the Ram's temple in Ayodhya will be built on the present inner chamber. The total land, which the federal government has legally brought under its possession there, will be returned to the above mentioned institution. The 2.77 acres of land, which still remained under litigation, will also go to it.

"The temple would be built at that very spot" was the war cry of the VHP and the government has responded positively to it. Its condition was that no mosque would be built within the radius of 15 kilometer. The government has also accepted this and so the fighting has stopped for the time being. At present the waiting is for the dispelling of the remnants of fear.

The trust deed of the proposed Ayodhya Ram Janambhumi Institution was sent to all religious leaders connected with the Hindu movement. Gouri Shankar, Secretary of the Shankaracharya of Shringeri; Prasad, officer in the prime minister's office; and Kishor Kunal, Deputy Inspector General of police; are maintaining communication with the Hindu religious leaders throughout the country. The government has kept a special aircraft ready for their use. In this aircraft they went to Varanasi to persuade the Shankaracharya of Dwarka Swami Swaroopananda—who was observing a vow 4 months religious vow—and Ramanreshacharya, chief of the Ram monastery, to join the trust. They also flew from Varanasi to Southern India to meet Jayendra Saraswati, the Shankaracharya of Kanchi; and Acharya Vishesh Tirthaswami, chief of the Madhya sect at Udippi.

As the sponsor of the trust, Gouri Shankar, Prasad and Kishor Kunal first visited Ayodhya. There Swami Purushottamacharya, chief monk of a religious center called Sugrib Killa; Swami Hariharacharya, chief of the

Ramananda group; Baba Jayan Das, religious leader of the Hanuman Gari; and Sitaram Sharan Das, chief of the Lakshman Kiladhi; signed the trust. The religious leaders of Chitrakut, Hardwar, Bihar and Gujarat have also joined the Ayodhya Ram Janambhumi Institution.

Among the four Shankaracharyas in the country Swami Bharati Tirtha is considered to be the foremost Shankaracharya. He is also in Delhi observing his 4 month vow. He is now busy with the formation of the trust and finalization of the construction of the temple. He said that he has formed the institution by co-opting Hindu spiritual leaders from all regions of India North, South, East and West. This establishment or the trust will be representing all Hindu religious leaders from the whole country.

The temple-mosque case is now subject to the Supreme Court. When a question was asked—how can a temple be constructed in the inner chamber—the Jagatguru Shankaracharya said he hopes that the case would be settled. When asked what will happen if the court gives a reserve verdict, he replied that Ram will find a way out.

It was pointed out to the Jagatguru that as the federal government is extending aid to the Ayodhya Ram Janambhumi Institution, it will be a government trust. Refuting this, he said that all the spiritual and religious leaders closely connected with the VHP are also joining his institution. All sects and partners to the movement on Hinduism are unifying in the name of Ram. He said that the VHP leaders have intimated to him that they also will cooperate if the temple is built on the inner chamber.

Vishesh Tirthaswami of the Pejayar monastery in Karnataka, who is one of the founder-members of the VHP, has already joined the Shankaracharya's institution. But he still remained a member of the VHP board of trustees. Purusottamacharya of the Sugrib Killa, another member of the same board of trustees, have also joined the Ayodhya Ram Janambhumi Institution. Have they resigned from the VHP? In reply to this question, Vishesh Tirthaswami said that they are building a link bridge between the VHP and the Ayodhya Ram Janambhumi Institution. In his opinion the Ram Janambhumi Trust of the VHP will construct the temple and its control will rest in the hands of the Shankaracharya trust.

Following the tune VHP President V.H. Dalmia and general secretary Ashok Singhal met Jagatguru Shankaracharya of Shingeri in New Delhi. They proposed that the institution under the leadership of the Jagatguru will be the highest trust and that will advise and direct in the matter related to the construction of the temple. But the construction work will be done by the VHP Ram Janambhumi trust. As Ram will be the owner of the temple as well as all the land adjacent to it, there will be no contradiction or conflict on the ownership issue.

Swami Dharmendraji Maharaj, a member of the VHP pioneer council and also an influential leader to the



movement on Hinduism, staged an indefinite hunger strike with the objective of putting pressure on the government. He is the chief monk of the only religious center of the Ramdasia Vaishnav sect in Northern India. His hunger strike was in protest against the allegation of the VHP Ram Janmabhumi Trust being a political trust and the Ayodhya Ram Janmabhumi Institution of Shankaracharya a non-political trust. Dharmendraji Maharaj's protest was against the characterization of the two trusts in such a different manner. He has now withdrawn his hunger strike and said that if the present prime minister Narasimha Rao helps in the construction of the temple with the same spirit as was done by President Rajendra Prasad and Home Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel in reconstruction of the Somnath temple after independence, then the VHP Ram Janmabhumi trust will support him.

BJP president Lal Kishan Advani has gone a step further and said that there is no need to see who has constructed the temple. The BJP will be happy if the temple is built where the image of Ram is now being worshipped. It is obvious from Advani's statement that BJP will not enter into any conflict or a movement, on the issue of Ayodhya. Advani said that they won't make the temple an issue during the election and [instead] will seek votes from the public as an opposition party speaking on the corruption and failures of the government.

Advani has said these things as a responsible leader of his party. After the demolition of the Babri Mosque four BJP state governments were sacked. Challenging such an act of the federal government a case was filed in the court. Delivering its verdict on the case in March last, the Supreme Court said that if any political party asserts any thing during the election which jeopardizes the secular principles of the constitution, then that party will be declared as a guilty party. Justice S.C. Aggarwal and Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy had given their verdicts separately, but they said the same thing that under the constitution the states should be secular and the political parties will also have to do the same. If a feeling is created from talks, printed matters or otherwise that some political parties are doing politics and religion at the same time, then they will be declared mischievous for their unconstitutional acts and lose rights to act as political parties. The judges further said that in accordance with the definition of the verdict given on the case of Kesabhananda Bharati, the basic structure of the constitution cannot be changed. It is not possible to separate secularism from the basic framework. That is why under no circumstances the constitution could be amended in this regard. The idea of discarding the present constitution does not also arise. Heretofore, if a candidate uses religious symbols or seeks vote in the name of religion, caste, class or community, then his candidature will be cancelled.

As this verdict of the Supreme Court is hanging like a sword over the head, Advani is not going to take any risk. Therefore, BJP will keep the temple issue outside the

sphere of election. Ashok Singhal has threatened to hold a mass nonviolent movement on the temple issue. Acharya Giriraj Kishor said that the government will have to constitute the trust on his dead body. Benoy Katiar, the leader of the Bajrang Party, said that if the pro-government trust builds the temple, then he will demolish it. But the BJP has not given its response to such a threat. The RSS—the principal force in the Sangh family—is also not supporting such kind of attitude.

Raju Bhaiya of the RSS spoke on working unitedly. According to him everyone should jointly build the temple. The strength of unity that will be generated from it will enable [RSS-VHP] to contest the temple-mosque disputes in Varanasi and Mathura, he said.

In the afternoon of 6 December 1992, Babri Mosque was demolished. A frenzied destruction started on the same evening all over the subcontinent. There was bloodshed, arson and destruction of property. Several thousand Hindu temples were destroyed in Bangladesh, Pakistan and India in retaliation to the demolition of only one Babri mosque.

But the scenario has changed now, less than two years from that time. The government of India has itself come forward to extend cooperation in the construction of the temple where the Babri mosque was existing. Ram will be worshipped at the same spot where his image was offered homage since 1950 and the trace of mosque will never be found there.

The temple movement is reaching its cherished goal, having passed through lots of difficulties and opposition. The Hindu religion with diverse views and avenues is now finding a common platform and both the government and the major opposition party will stay closer to it. There were disturbances before and after the demolition of the Babri mosque. But the temple will be built in the climate of peace and cooperation and so without any impediments.

It is not the question which party or organization has gained or which leader has earned his popularity because of this achievement. The biggest people's movement in independent India centered on the temple in Ayodhya and that has now reached the beam of its success. That will reveal on which side the wave of history is flowing.

#### **Mulayam Singh Said Making U.P. 'Another Bihar'**

94AS0500B New Delhi JANSATTA in Hindi 8 Sep 94  
pp 1,10

[Article by Pradip Singh: "Mulayam is Leading U.P. On Bihar's Road"]

[FBIS Translated Text] New Delhi, Sep 7—Does Mulayam Singh intend to make Uttar Pradesh [U.P.] another Bihar? The noticeable uneasiness, his actions and statements on the issue of reservations in Utrakhnad amply confirms this. Being the chief minister it was

expected of him that he would play down this issue. On the contrary, he and his party members are fueling the controversy. The Samajwadi Party's [SP] call to strike on Sept 13 clearly depicts the stand Mulayam Singh Yadav has taken. By calling both the backward and advanced Yadavs face to face, he intends to strengthen the past foundation. And now, he does not want to conceal this fact.

He is ready to go to any extent to achieve this end. Ever since Mr. Yadav came to power he is ambitious in unifying the backward non-Yadavs with him. After being constantly humiliated at the hands of the Bahujan Samaj Party [BSP] leader Kanshi Ram he was in search of an opportunity of advancing his cause. The agitation in Uttarkhand provided him the right background. A solution to this issue was within easy reach of Mulayam Singh Yadav. In the entire country Uttarkhand is the only location where an overriding majority identify with caste. What occasion could have presented a better opportunity to instigate them against each other?

Most of the ethnic disputes, after Mulayam Singh came to power, ensued between the backward classes themselves or between Yadavs and the members of the scheduled class. In the beginning, Mr. Yadav tried to create a political alliance between Yadav muslims and a faction of Swarna's specially thakores. But due to Kanshi Ram's influence he did not succeed. That is why he saw a ray of hope in the Utrarkhand agitation. He did not try to resolve the issue but instead at sensing the issue's demise, he exploded it. He asserted that if he arouses the flat landers against the hillbillies, then there will be no hillbillies left in the flat lands. It will be a terrible mistake to assume that a seasoned politician like Mulayam Singh was ignorant of the results of his assertion.

He had expected a confrontation between the flat landers and the hillbillies after he made the statement. But his hope was in vain. Subsequently, his closest advisor, the number two man in his government, Mr. Beni Prasad threatened the hillbillies with the use of batons on the streets. This threat also did not bring any results. Meanwhile, he was pressured from the prime minister's office to subside the agitation peacefully. He felt it was proper for him now to openly face the challenge. So to resolve the issue he, on one hand, convened an all party meeting and on the other, on behalf of the ruling party he declared a state wide general strike for November 13.

His opponents in the Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP] and the Congress are maneuvering against the reservation issue from behind the scene. Both these parties are using the demand for creating Uttarkhand as a separate state as their shield. They wonder if the Congress is so serious on the issue of creating a separate state when it could obtain presidential consent on the legislative assembly's proposal? This problem has reached a stage where both the Congress and the SP consider it impossible to work in harmony. Therefore, a seasoned and soft spoken

politician like Narayan Dutt Tiwari had to throw a hint at the media that the Mulayam government is not here to stay for long.

The BJP is a victim of indecision. On the hills, it wants to fight the dispute as its own. To avoid any political loss on the plains, it is using the issue of creating a separate state as a shield to disguise its actions as not opposing the backward classes. The party has a good following amongst the non-Yadav backwards specially the Lodhs, Kachi, and Kurmies. The BJP cannot even think of coming to power without their support. Because of this indecisiveness, it is not able to initiate any provocation against Mulayam Singh Yadav. Instead it is trying to bring public pressure on the Congress in the hope that the Congress withdraws its support for the SP-BSP government thus enabling the BJP to appear a winner even without waging a war.

After constant political setbacks at the hands of Kanshi Ram, Mulayam had no alternate but to go on offensive. This is an issue where Kanshi Ram cannot dare to oppose him. In fact Mulayam has now adopted Kanshi Ram's strategy. Seemingly there may be a difference in the language used by him and Mayavati, in their public addresses, but the substance is same. Mulayam now intends to engage in a decisive confrontation. He calculates that if he comes out as a champion of the backward classes, chances are that the non-Yadav backwards will join his camp. In this dispute the BJP has to walk on a double sided sword. It wants to be an all round winner.

In a single jolt Mulayam Singh wants to get rid of the psychological pressure exerted on him by the BSP and the combined political muscles of the BJP and the Congress. In this tug of war nobody is concerned for either the uplift of the backward class or for the development of the advanced Yadavs. This is not a struggle for the social justice, it is purely a war of politics. This is the jugglery in the art of the political expertise. The winner will control the political destiny of Uttar Pradesh for sometime to come. The issue of the formation of Utrarkhand is secondary to all concerned.

#### Readers Continue Comments on Taslima Nasreen

94AS0501B Calcutta ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA  
in Bengali 2 Sep 94 p 4

[Letters to the Editor: "Taslima and Women's Freedom"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Letter No. 1] This letter is in reference to the editorial (12 August) entitled 'Taslima and Bangladesh'. I am forced to say something after reading this comment of the editor: "By personifying Taslima Nasreen, the success and failure of the fight that symbolizes her can be determined."

The fundamentalists who proclaimed decrees for the extermination of Taslima certainly deserve condemnation. But does it make Taslima worthy of getting unblemished accolades? The main theme of Taslima's statement was to extirpate religion and abolish the system of marriage because in her opinion religion and marriage

have made women the object of earthly pleasure for men. Therefore, both of them are the main impediments to the progress and emancipation of women.

But does it mean that with the extirpation of religion and marriage, women's progress will gain momentum and the beastly character of the male that persecutes women would be changed? Moreover, do the men torture women after reading the Veda, Gita, Upanishads [Hindu religious books] Bible, Koran and so forth? Or do they do it at the pressure of their bestiality? If the religious books are the cause for persecution of women, then those should be destroyed. But before that we have to be absolutely sure that with the introduction of Taslimaism [as printed] the persecution of women and men's supremacy will disappear forever. But if that does not take place, then what do we gain in the fight by creating a symbol of Taslima?

Taslma said that humanity should be the name of religion. No doubt, that is the best thing. But does religion oppose humanity? Hasn't each and every religion directly or indirectly hailed humanity? If religion has failed in the manifestation of humanity, then what is that object which could largely increase the output of humanity in man's brain? Is it irreligiousness or atheism? Then will the ignorance of irreligious people and atheists be the alternative to the ignorance of religious fundamentalists?

Secondly, the system of marriage once came into being in order to save the society from disorder and various uncertainties created due to an unrestrained and irresponsible sex life lived during the raucous prehistoric era. Has that system completely failed to bring benefits to the society? Will the future society be built on Taslimaism or deviationism? At the end let me ask will it be unreasonable to question the intelligence and secular outlook of the persons who are showing excessive interest in Taslima? Narendranath Mahato, Sujaganj, Medinipur.

[Letter No. 2] I have something to say regarding Swapna Ghosh's (9 Aug) letter. To the utter discomfiture of her enemies, Swapna married a man to her liking and lives happily with him. We also wish her happiness. But is she aware of the fact that such 'likable' men, married to scores of women, within a couple of years expose themselves as the most hated persons wrapped in deceit, dishonesty and greed for wealth? Hasn't she come across the incidents where women committed suicide after being a victim to dowrees or torture of the in-law's family?

Taslma Nasreen's book *NIRBACHITA KALAM* is for those few selected women. How could the persons, who lead happy family lives, understand the meaning of tears of these deprived women? Has Taslima made a big mistake by advising these deprived helpless women to come out of that house of torture, known as the in-law's place, and to survive alone with dignity?

To Swapna the path to women's freedom lies in a happy family by correcting the mistakes of menfolk and, if required, reprimanding them. Please state kindly, would any woman leave her happy family unless things become absolutely intolerable? She knows pretty well that life outside is very hard both economically and socially? Swapna's formula is not applicable in their case.

The most regrettable thing is that quite a number of women accustomed to leading a happy conjugal life, never miss a chance in finding fault publicly with these unfortunate women and prove them bad. Taslima called those women opportunists. They possess luxurious house, car and bank balances built by their men of liking and their only topic of discussion is the status of their husbands. Being herself a woman, has Taslima pushed the other women—who have stepped out on the hard soil of reality making tears their only support—on the path of disaster by enlightening them with the mantras of surviving alone? Bishakha Dasgupta, Howrah

[Letter No. 3] I liked the letter of Swapna Ghosh (in the backdrop of Susmita Bhattacharya's letter 'Wish to kick'). The need for Taslima Nasreen's writings could exist in Bangladesh but not in this country because the women of our educated middle and upper-middle class families are quite independent and they have the authority to express their personal views on any topic. The unreasonable stupid bellowing contributes nothing but it only disrupts peace in the family. It is also possible to establish one's authority with the means of peaceful stable wisdom.

The women have themselves turned into a strange creature by shouting too much about women's liberation. It was as if that they were so long confined into a cage and were not considered human beings in the society. Some men do apply their authority over their wives, but many women also do the same to their husbands. In majority of the cases authority derives from love and no comparison of torture can be made with that authority. It is essential for women, who are really being tortured in the family, to build self-confidence and courage in order to get proper respect and honor. Each and every woman should be sympathetic to them. It should not be forgotten that the women are deprived not only by men, but in many cases also by women. On several occasions all arrangements—starting from murdering a bride to shifting a helpless aged mother-in-law to an old persons home—are made by the women.

The women in our country who have established themselves in politics and other fields did not achieve prosperity in their life by belittling menfolk or spurning the family. Mutual cooperation and trust between men and women are essential for women's emancipation and their progress in society. Aditi Datta, Calcutta

[Letter No. 4] I have read the letter of Swapna Ghosh. She is anti-Taslma. She did not like Nasreen's *NIRBACHITA KALAM* and that is O.K. But I consider her comment "the book contains as much craftiness in writing



*as lack of logic and intelligence" as very flimsy because one cannot write anything by being crafty. Taslima's writings were not published for ridiculing the male society or exhibiting her craftiness.*

I can say without being a stark devotee of Taslima that Nasreen did not take into account any particular section of women. She has mental anguish for all women, "Like an inanimate object our society marks some women as 'unchaste'. The educated sophisticated women of this country remain very careful in the matter of separating themselves from these 'unchaste women'." Where all the women are being persecuted in one form or the other, the question of division of classes does not arise there.

Taslima has proved through instances, comparisons and analysis, the causes that inflict insults, torture and humiliation on womanhood. They do not misguide us, but rather bring firmness to our character by inspiring us to the concept of our humanity.

Swapna wrote: "For God's sake, being a woman, please don't push other women to such a great disaster". In my opinion the characteristics of women is to hide their defective side. To discuss their shortcomings or bring them to the forefront does not mean 'push toward disaster'. That is done for finding a path of reform. Dipali Dey Sarkar. Haripal, Hoogly.

[Letter No. 5] I have read some of the writings of Taslima Nasreen and recently also read *NIRBACHITA KALAM*. Undoubtedly she is brave and a frank speaker. Her writings are quite strong against the things in society, especially Muslim society and religion, which she considers trivial and false. She naturally deserves praise. But I feel that her protest would be more vibrant if she could take all those issues a little bit more seriously.

There is discrimination, of course unreasonable, between men and women. But there are some special responsibilities of the women. For instance, the responsibility of a mother. It is not possible for a man to be pregnant, raise the baby or to bring beauty to the life surrounding the love and affection of the child. But as women's role is slightly different, the question of slavery does not arise in relation to her making the household full of affection.

In all walks of life and work, freedom is essential for everyone, including women. Like self-indulgent women, there are also self-indulgent men. Because of his more physical strength a self-indulgent male can express more of his intemperance. But hasn't Taslima come across like any whimsical woman? Hasn't she witnessed a tormented man? An oppressed man is incapable of shedding tears or lamenting loudly, that is why his condition becomes more miserable.

There are many undesirable things in the Vedas, but we are concerned with the things that exist at our time in our society and constitution. We are not standing on mistakes.

Are the women confined only inside the house? If that was the case, then how could they be successful in earning fame in Himalaya expeditions, scientific research, in the world of literature, art and music?

I have one more request—which could be wrong or superfluous. But I am stating as a 67 year old independent-minded woman that freedom will not be marred if a little bit more modesty could be maintained in our speech. Kamala Chowdhury, Allahabad.

### Newspapers Seen One of Nation's Healthy Industries

94AS0500A Jalandhar PUNJAB KESARI in Hindi  
2 Sep 94 p 4

[Article by Prem Bhatiya: "Newspapers Will Continue To Increase in Importance in India"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Newspaper readers were treated to yet another pleasant surprise after viewing the photograph of the prime minister hugging the leader of the opposition in the parliament. This time the surprise was the statement given by the president of the English daily PIONEER Mr. L.M. Thapar at the occasion of chief editor Mr. Vinod Mehta's retirement to welcome the acting executive editor. The paper had published this news with prominence on the front page.

Of more significance was the fact that the chairman of the firm as the owner of the newspaper took an extraordinary step, announcing the retirement of the chief editor but also complimenting him for a job well done. In our world of news media, and specially in our country, such incidents of transferral of the editors are as common as the passing of migrant birds, and are not recognized. Generally, on such occasions, whispers are order of the day, and the owners of the publishing companies usually remain silent, although the send off may be very friendly.

Although Mr. L.M. Thapar's announcement was an unprecedented incident of goodwill and recognition, one specific segment of his announcement merits special attention which should not remain limited to the relatively low circulation of PIONEER. Here I would like to quote certain portions from the chairman's speech. "It is with regret that I announce the resignation of Mr. Vinod Mehta. We will always be grateful to his journalism that secured an exalted status for our paper in Delhi. I offer my best wishes to Mr. Mehta's in his future career as a journalist."

In my experience of half a century as a journalist, the expression of such personal appreciation and sincere wishes are unique, specially in the world of journalism where offer or firing from a job is routine.

In this context I recall two examples. In the recent past, the editor of THE TIMES OF INDIA Mr. Dilip Padgaonkar, and the editor of "The Hindustan Times" Mr. H. K. Dua had to tender their resignations. They had their

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

own reasons of accepting new positions at other locations. Mr. Dua, in his new position, got the oversight of 16 different editions. In both these instances neither of the two owners, the Jains and the Birlas, expressed their regrets or appreciation for the editors' respective accomplishments.

Irrespective of the reason for the resignation at the PIONEER, it may be the difference of opinion on policy or conflict in personality, Mr. L.M. Thapar's action and the manner of his expression have set an example. In addition, in the departure of Mr. Vinod Mehta from the PIONEER, a new chapter has been added to the upheavals so common in our world of news media, specially so in Delhi where the multi edition newspapers in English account for about three fourths of the total published in the country. The single edition regional English papers have an importance of their own but the ones published from Delhi influence the public opinion most.

Like other institutions, newspapers also take birth, they grow, and then they fall and perish. Some newspapers not only improve with the time but they add new dimensions to their personality and display a reflection of immortality. Both these types of newspapers are published from Delhi, and from other megalopolises like Calcutta, Bombay and Madras. In their downfall and demise lack of finances is not the only reason. The art of management serves as the driving force to keep these newspapers alive as public institutions. The editor is only but one part of the management team. In principle the determination and the resources of the owner and his managers provide the basis to keep it alive.

Where do these resources come from? The revenue from sales and the advertisements are a major part of these resources. Most of the newspapers survive on this income and also do make a sizeable profit. But most of the people unrelated to the field of journalism are ignorant of the fact that some of the folks in this business survive on their earnings from money lending operations. The newspaper PIONEER which has made its presence known in the affluent Delhi market is not privy to this kind of income. The other business resources of the owner have kept it alive. How long can the "House of the Thapars" carry this weight depends on their will.

It is really remarkable that the PIONEER has earned a respectable place in the world of newspapers in a huge city like Delhi where newspapers abound. This fact carries a message both for the people engaged in commerce and journalism in this region. The PIONEER which claims to have a circulation of over 40,000 is basically subscribed to by its readers for its wide coverage, for a more humanitarian analysis of foreign news, and presentation of its material in a manner that is relatively new in the Indian world of journalism. It also, however, has a few deficiencies especially in its section on commerce and business. Since it is only one of the

numerous newspapers published from Delhi, and because of its limited circulation, it has certain limitations.

Doesn't a cursory look at the English dailies of our country surprise us when we see that all efforts of our patriots to discourage the usage of the language of our previous oppressive rulers have been in vain. Not only have the English dailies survived but they also have strengthened their stronghold. Respective regional language papers have also gained significant popularity. This clearly demonstrates that in spite of an increase in the popularity of the television and radio, readership of these newspapers will keep on the rise. The English-language papers have enhanced their size, coverage of subject matter, and diversity without causing any decrease in the regional language readership.

Therefore, any such complaints are not justifiable. In fact, during the last two decades the papers published in regional languages have profited from the technical advances made by the English language papers. English-language papers, by publishing editions in regional languages have in fact accepted the importance of these languages. They have also tried to match the expectations of their readers.

In our country people often talk about the mediocre production of newspapers. It has some truth to it. In order to present facts and to win over their competitors, our young journalists have a tendency to take risks. Previously unknown investigative journalism gets the benefit of this risk taking. Today's reporters take more risks than their counterparts of ten years ago.

The recent entry of female reporters in journalism, in large numbers, is a welcome sign. They have brought with them a new outlook and endeavour in the world of journalism. The interests of these lady journalists are no more limited to cooking, fashions, and rearing children. I am eagerly waiting for the day when some lady journalist will be named as the editor of a prominent English daily.

## IRAN

### Judicial Power Appointments Announced

94LA0259E Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian  
5 Sep 94 pp 1, 2

[FBIS Translated Text] In separate orders issued Sunday by Ayatollah Yazdi, chief of the judicial power, the following judicial appointments were made:

1. Hojjat ol-Eslam Safdari was appointed police prosecutor of judges.
2. Hojjat ol-Eslam Niri was appointed as judicial court deputy, to act in the Article 49 religious court positions and as a member of the five-person council mentioned in Article 2 of the Iran Industrial Preservation Law.

3. Hojjat ol-Eslam Razini was appointed chief prosecutor of the province of Tehran.

4. Hojjat ol-Eslam Shahrokhi was appointed chief of Branch 3 of the supreme police judicial courts.

5. Based on this report, the order appointing Hojjat ol-Eslam Safdari as police prosecutor of judges states: In view of your complete familiarity with the previous system and with the General and Revolutionary Courts Law, in view of the special role and importance that the police prosecutors of judges have in the proper performance of judges and in the supervision of the proper implementation of laws in the courts, we appoint you to this position.

The order appointing Hojjat ol-Eslam Niri also states: As requested by the respected chief justice of the National Supreme Court, with emphasis by the relevant judicial bodies and the Islamic revolutionary courts on continuing the necessary cooperation with you in responsibilities arising from the orders and commands of the exalted leader of the Islamic revolution, and with agreement to your transfer from the chief of Branch 1 of the Tehran Revolutionary Courts to the Supreme Court, you are appointed as deputy justice of that court.

Another order by the chief of the judiciary to Hojjat ol-Eslam Razini states: In view of your period of responsibility in the Armed Forces Judicial Organization and your complete familiarity with the fundamentals and legal issues in the General and Revolutionary Courts Law, you are hereby appointed chief prosecutor of the Province of Tehran.

In another order Hojjat ol-Eslam Shahrokhi was also appointed chief of Branch 3 of the Supreme Police Judicial Court.

#### Four New Governors Named

94LA0259D Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian  
4 Sep 94 p 2

[FBIS Translated Text] Based on a report from the public relations office of the Ministry of the Interior, the following appointments were made in separate orders by 'Ali Mohammad Besharati, minister of the interior:

Hoseyn Karimi as governor of the municipality of Fasa  
Mohammad Reza Sa'idi-Nezhad as governor of the municipality of Lar

Morad 'Abdollahian as governor of Bijar

Esma'il Mas'udi-Harvan as governor of Sanandaj.

#### Incomplete Economic Projects, Implications Discussed

94LA0244A Tehran KEYHAN in Persian  
9, 10, 11, 13, 14 Aug

[9 Aug p 5]

[FBIS Translated Text]

#### Report by 'Ali Reza Mohammad 'Ali

The growth in developmental projects to eliminate the voids existing in the country after the victory of the revolution, the new administration felt, was imperative.

Under those conditions, numerous studies began, and developmental funds were projected, especially for projects in the oppressed regions of the country, and there was no doubt about the need for their implementation.

After the passage of not too long a time, the number of first-rate plans and second and third [as published] projects became important, so that by the end of the First Developmental Plan, about 30,000 incomplete plans and projects along with 4,000 national plans and projects that have not reached operation were before us, for the completion of which nearly 12 years and 27,000 billion rials[R] are needed.

It is said that under these conditions, the administration of the society is searching for a solution to control such projects and the implementation of incomplete developmental projects, and priority will be given to those plans of which at least 50 percent are complete. What factors provided the grounds for the creation of such conditions, and what were the factors that gave rise to the designing of such a system that caused the increased volume and number of such plans? What are the necessary projections for clarifying the situation of the incomplete plans in the Second Developmental Plan, and what are the priorities in this regard?

The present incomplete plans and projects were formed in the First Developmental Plan, and it seems that many of the plans that even in the First Plan should have been completed according to the projections have stopped. This issue has made some people believe that the First Plan was not able to come close to the projected goals, because this plan, even though it created a new movement in the program and the economy of the country and was able to change the average rate of growth, in any case, in regards to completing the projects that are now incomplete, was weak. Some also consider this issue related to the rate of economic growth and investments prior to the First Plan in 1367 [21 March 1988-20 March 1989] and mention it as a very bitter fact. In their opinion, the rate of annual economic growth of about 8.1 percent in 1368 [21 March 1989-20 March 1990] and later is praiseworthy, and in this phase, that is, the phase of the start of the First Economic, Social, and Cultural Developmental Plan, many of the major and important incomplete projects, such as steel and petrochemicals, have reached fruition.

Certainly, among the 30,000 incomplete projects, the number of major and strategic projects that are allocated a large portion of the resources will be relatively insignificant. According to Majdara the deputy from Babol-sar, "These 34,000 projects were considered among the current and developmental policies of the country, and, if eliminated, some of the work will close down. For

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.



instance, the project for maintenance of roads, according to which the existing roads in the country must be equipped for traffic, continues unceasingly and its completion is meaningless." In his opinion, the real incomplete projects are those projects that mainly concern the fundamental affairs of the country, such as the building of dams, ports, airports, railroads, hospitals, and the like.

For this reason, the high figure of 30,000 incomplete projects includes some of the very ordinary projects, which cannot be compared to major projects. In any case, it is necessary to mention the point that even in the area of the completion of fundamental projects in the First Developmental Plan, there were good foreign currency resources, which significantly helped the implementation of the fundamental projects. But in connection with the completion and continuation of the projects that are to reach results in the Second Plan, one essential problem exists, which relates to the foreign currency resources in the Second Plan. Dari-Najafabadi, the head of the Planning and Budget Committee of the Majles, says in this regard: Of course, achieving the goals of the plan in a coordinated manner is somewhat questionable, because the necessary coordination among the various sectors was not created in such a way as to fully indicate a clear curve of indices of the First Plan. The foreign currency resources of the First Plan were very good. But our problems in terms of foreign currency resources in the Second Plan will be significant.

#### **Attention to the Incomplete Projects in the Second Plan**

Among the problems of the Second Plan to which attention is paid and projected in government bills is the question of the incomplete developmental projects of the country which started in 1372 [21 March 1993-20 March 1994] and 1373 [21 March 1994-20 March 1995]. According to many experts, discussion and opinions regarding the incomplete projects is a necessary issue before the Majles these days. According to the chairman of the Planning and Budget Committee, "This is very important and necessary, because as the time is extended for the projects to reach results, opportunities are lost, which more than anything else will be followed with the attrition of resources and the waste of capital."

**It is said that the total number of developmental projects in the country, according to estimates, will take more time than the First and Second Plans, and this issue will call attention to the logical and rapid use of the existing resources.**

Mr. Qanavati, a member of the Combining Committee, says in regards to the incomplete projects in the First Plan and government actions in this regard: The section on projects and policies mentions that the government must move in such a way as to choose the incomplete projects that have relevant economic advantages and prevent scattering the resources in the implementation of numerous projects in order for the resources of the country to be spent on projects that will become operational rapidly.

And in response to the question of: On the basis of what factors will you determine the priorities in choosing the incomplete projects? he said that economic justification has been intended.

Of course, another area that can call the attention of the government to the incomplete projects is the area of productive employment and strengthening the production capability that will be created as a result of the implementation and operation of the incomplete projects.

Mobayyeni-Dehkordi, a member of the board of directors of the [Planning and] Budget Committee, in the area of attention to incomplete projects and the emergency that exists in choosing the priority of the projects, says: One of the issues in the Second Economic, Social, and Cultural Developmental Plan that must be noted and certainly is not overlooked by the policymakers and planners of the country is the issue of how to implement the developmental and production projects in the country. In his opinion, in the First Plan, in all the economic and social sections, it was necessary to take steps to implement proper projects and in that way provide the grounds for strengthening production. Certainly this issue compared to all other sectors is a priority.

He explains: At the present in the country, we are facing the fact, that the precise time for the implementation of projects must be clear. Also, how soon they can become operational, the adherence to technical standards, and the economic justification of each one of these projects is taken into consideration. Special attention must be paid to the project being productive, generating jobs, and eliminating deprivation.

#### **Incomplete Projects and Sensitivities**

These problems are before us as a result of the delay in the implementation of incomplete projects. The irreparable loss that the growth in the rate of inflation creates for the completion of the projects that have not been completed and the sensitivities that are created as a result of the pause in a significant number of these projects are among the situations that must be seriously prevented.

Perhaps because of such an outcome the deputy from Shahr-e Kord announced: If we are to start a project today and this project will require a great deal of financial resources and manpower, and because of the implementation of this project other projects will be in disrepute, it would be better not to start such a project under the present conditions.

He added: "Because of the existing limitations of resources, the ratified projects of the First Plan, both those that have been started and have made some degree of progress and those that have not started, must be evaluated along with the new projects that are proposed, and it has become necessary to implement them

according to indices such as the project being productive, eliminating deprivation, and creating jobs.

In his opinion, considering the above-mentioned instances, "One can judge the priority of the projects; and what is important is that for the developmental projects of the country, we must benefit from a strong technical, economic, productive, social, and cultural logic."

It seems that the projects that remain incomplete in the previously calculated time have established the grounds for many problems, and this sensitivity has been manifested more than anything else in the areas that are most deprived.

Beytollah Ja'fari the deputy from Urmia says about the damage caused by the incomplete projects and the sensitivity that it has created: Annually, at least 150,000 tons of agricultural products of the western Azerbaijan region are either sold at cost or are wasted and not sold at all; whereas, if the 14-km road project, which is a bridge between western and eastern Azerbaijan had not remained incomplete, the people would never have faced such a problem. I asked him about the characteristics of this road and the period that the project has been left incomplete. Ja'fari said: This road, which connects western and eastern Azerbaijan, has tourist, commercial, strategic, and military uses.

This road that goes by the sea is the closest road between these two provinces and is extremely attractive for tourism.

The deputy from Urmia added: western Azerbaijan is an agricultural center and has as much good agricultural soil and land as Holland. Nevertheless, products such as fruits in this province, because of lack of roads to centers that convert them to powder, beverages, and concentrates, often are wasted, and it is this road that can bring the province out of a deadlock. According to him, the 14-km road project has been left incomplete since 1359 [21 March 1980-20 March 1981], and one interpellation of the former minister of roads was due to this road.

[10 Aug p 5]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The Mobarakeh Steel Project" did not reach operation in the eight years that were projected and is today, after the passage of 17 years, at a stage that, according to experts, has still not reached 100-percent capacity.

The point of the extension of the schedule of the operation of projects having many consequences is one of the important issues that has made those involved and the managers think seriously, so that now one of the important goals of the Second Developmental Plan is to clarify the status of the incomplete projects and plans of the country.

There are many incomplete projects. "While the average of the life of projects is three to five years, sometimes the

implementation of the projects is between 10 and 15 years, and even longer." Dari-Najafabadi, the chairman of the [Planning and] Budget Committee of the Majles, considers the loss of opportunity and time in the implementation of the incomplete projects irreparable and by raising the above issues tries to show the importance of paying attention to the situation of the incomplete projects, especially in the Second Developmental Plan. He says: "One very important issue is that our developmental projects are justifiable projects and have appropriate time to enter the operational phase, particularly since today it is necessary for all the national resources to be mobilized to bring the incomplete projects to the desired results."

#### **Slowdown in the Implementation of Projects, Waste of National Capital**

Slowdowns in the implementation of plans and projects wastes the national capital, and under the conditions of the high rate of inflation being the essential obstacle to completing the incomplete projects of the country, any sort of delay or postponement of the projects will not only decrease our profit margin but will cause essential problems and disruptions regarding the return of the capital.

Majdara, the deputy from Babolsar and a member of the Budget and Combining Committees, says in this regard: "In the First Developmental Plan and in the annual budgets, the Majles in ratifying laws has always tried to complete the incomplete projects, because the damage that is caused by the closure or slowdown of the projects underway is more than not starting the projects initially or closing them down." In regards to the importance of investment in incomplete projects in the larger goal of the Second Plan: "In this kind of project, we believe that in specific scheduling, many of the projects will be completed, as much as possible, in the Second Plan, because for them to remain incomplete means the waste of the national capital."

Certainly the stopping of the implementation of each project means that larger expenditures must be allocated in the following years to complete it than projected in the preliminary and study phases of the implementation of the project.

The reconstruction and continuation of stopped operations in a course in which the general rate and implementation expenditures climb higher and higher every year will reduce the economic return and profit of such projects.

Dari-Najafabadi, in the areas of completing the incomplete projects in the best possible way, said: "Today, a very important factor in the implementation of developmental, national, and provincial projects is the factor of time and speed in completing the projects.

"Because, the faster the speed, the sooner operation and return will be, and as a result the capital will be retrieved

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

sooner. Otherwise, the cost will increase in the conditions of modification." He considers these conditions the main factor in the decrease of return on the incomplete projects and the decrease in the gross national product. Note the example he provides in this connection: "In a project of a complex, 2.4 million tons of sheet [metal] were supposed to be produced, but its secondary services did not start at all, and this itself was a problem in significantly increasing the cost. On the other hand, the decrease in the production line from 2.4 million tons to 1 million tons caused the cost on 2.4 million tons to be spent on the production of 1 million tons of sheet [metal] alone. Hence, this cost increased severalfold, and the people must necessarily suffer the pressures resulting from the project taking a long time and the increased cost."

He adds: "Perhaps one of the factors involved in expanding the incomplete projects and their taking a long time is that, unfortunately, despite the fact that we have many incomplete projects, still we start new projects."

#### **Mass of Incomplete Projects, Why?**

There is a mass of incomplete projects, and this fact is undeniable, that officials now believe that even if in the Second Plan we do not start any new projects, still we do not have the necessary resources and capital to complete the incomplete projects of the First Plan.

Qanavati, deputy of the Majles and member of the Steel Inquiry and Investigation Committee and also a member of the Combining Committee, expresses the reason for the increase in the number of projects in the country as follows: "In the course of the two and some-odd years that I have been in the Majles, and with my understanding of the previous Majleses, I have found two major reasons for the abundance of incomplete projects. Many of these projects in a sense have caused the waste of the national resources and remain before the people.

"What are these reasons?

"First, we have not had precise and clear planning and have not identified the priorities, and if we have had a plan, we have not acted accordingly. For example, in the First Plan, we had goals. On many issues we did not advance according to the First Plan, in the sense that sometimes we were ahead of the Plan and sometimes we were behind. But the other point concerns individuals who have had greater prestige in the Majles and had more control over economical and political issues. This group mainly, without paying attention to the needs, only in order to advance their own regions, have tried to divert the projects to their own regions."

In his opinion, such projects will probably not reach operation very soon.

He refers to this common saying, "Start and put in place," and says this issue has usually been followed with the idea that in some parts of the country many projects

are implemented even if they do not have the initial conditions and potential for the implementation of the project. I ask him to give us an example. He says: There are projects that must necessarily be next to water regions, projects that must have access to water resources and ports for the export of goods. But, unfortunately, such projects have started in regions that either have no water or are not close to transportation centers. For example, regarding some of the projects that have been implemented in the Yazd region, at present, in order to advance their objectives, water must be brought from Kuhrang, which imposes a great deal of expenditure on the government for water outreach.

The Mobarakeh Steel project, also, in his opinion, is one of the projects that costs a great deal, because access of the project to the domestic mines, such as "Golgohar" and "Chadormalu," on the one hand, and bringing the needed raw materials to the Mobarakeh region from abroad, on the other hand, result in heavy expenditures, and the export of its products will also be expensive, for the same reasons. Qanavati who has been a member of the Steel Inquiry and Investigation Committee as well explains further about the Mobarakeh Steel project: "Due to the high expenditures imposed on the government as a result of the improper selection, necessarily the cost of production is high, and accounts show that steel imports are more costly than is normal on the world level."

#### **The First Plan and the Excitement Concerning the Implementation of Various Projects**

Experts believe that in the First Plan it was necessary to implement suitable projects in all economic and social sectors. As a result of this method, in the developmental projects sector, we face a large number of developmental, production, educational, service, and cultural projects. The point as to whether or not this method was correct mostly depends on the time in which these decisions were made.

One of the Majles deputies says in this regard: "Certainly, the argument over solving the numerous problems of the people in the society and the social system has caused us to have an increase in the number of projects in one period, but not always do the projections conform to the realities. When there is fluctuation in the price of oil, it will affect the budget of these projects, because 70 percent of the revenue resources of the country are obtained from the sale of oil."

Dehkordi, a Majles deputy, says in regards to the role of oil revenues in the implementation of projects in the country in the First Plan: "In the course of the First Plan, we faced a decrease in the oil revenues. This problem caused many of the projects that should have reached operation in that plan not to reach operation on schedule due to limited resources.

"Even though a variety of reasons exist why some projects stopped and as a result the number of incomplete projects increased, the most important reason is eight years of imposed war."



An economic expert says in this regard: "The war on the one hand faced the implementation of the projects that were in some of the war-stricken provinces with the threat of bombing and delay, and on the other hand because of its centrality to the programs, a great portion of the national budget and revenues was spent on the front and the war."

"This issue was among the factors that caused the delay in the completion of many of the economic and industrial projects."

In the course of the First Developmental, Economic, Social, and Cultural Plan, the completion of incomplete projects of the war years, especially strategic projects, was given attention in the First Plan. In the course of those years, the implementors of the First Plan were able to bring some of the incomplete projects to production.

In the meantime, as has been said, the strategic projects that were higher in priority were pursued rapidly. Nevertheless, many of the industrial projects that were also noted and emphasized in the First Plan have not been yet implemented, and this is one of the shortcomings of the First Plan. While enthusiasm for the improvement and reform of the country in a short period was so great, no projections were made in regards to the stopping of many of the present incomplete projects, and many projects were ratified without having the necessary course and conditions to reach the operational phase on schedule.

[11 Aug p 5]

[FBIS Translated Text] Weakness in preliminary and expert studies has caused some of the projects in the country to allocate for themselves huge figures that were not projected and each phase of the project to reach results later than anticipated.

In such a situation, certainly projects will reach the operational orbit after a long time has passed, burying much capital in itself, capital that every day compared to the past becomes smaller and smaller, raising the question in a more serious form: If the number of projects in the country the time of completion of which is not precisely clear to us is significant, how can we control them more rapidly in the period of reconstruction?

The stop in the implemental phases of each project causes damage. Every phase of a project that falls behind the projected schedule can affect the general fate of the project and change it to a project that mercilessly swallows significant amounts of capital.

The inflationary conditions are one of the clear reasons that necessitate the expediting of the completion of some of the incomplete projects, and the halt of the project means that in the following years larger expenditures than those projected must be poured into the project.

When a project is out of control, perhaps one of the clear reasons for it is weakness in the preliminary studies and

the appraisal of its potential. It appears that this problem is one of the most essential problems that we now face in the sector of projects.

#### **Weakness in the Management of Projects**

In the Third Majles, the decision was made that nearly 100 hospitals would be built in the deprived regions of the country. The funds that were allocated for this project were insignificant, and in order to advance the project, a number of the deputies in whose regions the hospitals were being built in some way deducted funds from another sector in the annual budget and added to the funds for the projected hospitals. Such a situation certainly prevented the progress of other projects, and the budget was spent on a project in which, due to lack of preliminary studies, access to results was in the distant future and was certainly not feasible. Often when these projects take longer, they manifest future losses.

Explaining such a situation, the deputy from Behbahan refers to the lack of careful attention to the initial projects and says: "The problems of this project of the hospitals are every bit as bad as what is said. If this project implementation trend continues, the average time for their completion will be 15 years, and for some of the projects that are farther behind, 20 years.

"The project of the 129 hospitals that we are facing in various cities shows the weak face of the management of the projects. Weakness in the management of the project is a point that Majdara, a member of the Combining Committee, considers the basic reason for the projects taking longer to become operational. He says: The mechanical management of a project means that the time projected for the completion of various phases of each project must be appropriate to the purchased goods. But in practice, since proper management is not implemented in the projects and the necessary precautions are not taken to prepare the workshops, a halt in projects is certain."

Majdara gives an example in this connection: "Not starting the operation of the industrial township in the south and north of the country, considering the agreements in principle issued by the Ministry of Industries, indicates the weakness in the management of the projects. Agreements in principle were placed at the disposal of the people in order to start industrial units. At the same time, the government, specifically the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Construction Jihad (natural resources), should have implemented the necessary preparations in specifying the limits and boundaries of the industrial township."

#### **Projects Without Studies**

Preliminary studies regarding projects, at least if they do not effect their completion, may reduce probable losses.

Some believe that the variables of one project, usually in the conditions in which economic fluctuations are significant, cannot be controlled, and this problem strongly affects the results of the projects.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Despite such a view, perhaps it can be said: Having expert opinions and preliminary studies prior to the implementation of the projects, and even likely estimates of inflation levels and taking into consideration the conditions of modification, can reduce the level of damage.

At the present, it seems that projects that have not become operational, and even under all the projects of over 50 percent of total projects of the country, have lacked a sound foundation based on studies.

According to the deputy from Shahr-e Kord, regarding many projects of the production units of the industrial sector especially, mainly the buildings for them have been created, but its machinery has not been provided, and the credit to purchase the machinery by the related sectors has not been secured.

He adds: In my area, regarding the project of Zagres Rubber/Tire Factory, which was one of the four important projects of the country, now that we are at the end of the First Plan and the start of the Second Plan, except for some of the buildings that have not been roofed, no implemental actions have taken place to start operation and production, and its major problem relates to foreign obligations and the foreign currency needs of the country. The cement factories, which are among the priority projects of the Ministry of Industries, especially the Shahr-e Kord Cement project, are not making much progress, and their operations have not even been completed.

This deputy, referring to the incomplete projects in his region, says: The Foundation for the Self-Sacrificers has the responsibility of investing in deprived areas, and such projects are among the incomplete projects. An example is the Hejab Factory for the production of black veils. This project, which is under construction on 30,000 square meters of land, is nothing more than a useless building in which no production activities have taken place since the First Plan; not even the machinery for it has been purchased.

In regards to developmental projects in the region, he says: "In developmental projects, we have the strategic and important Esfahan-Shahr-e Kord-Khuzestan road, which connects the center of the country to the south and shortens the distance. This project has been under way for about 20 years and has not reached operation. Also, the large projects that we have started in agriculture, like the agriculture and industry project of Karun for the production of sugarcane, the irrigation network, and the water transfer tunnels or water transfer pipes, are mainly projects that take time, and the limited resources can lengthen the time of the implementation of projects in a way that after the completion of such projects they do not have a long life left. More clearly put, if in appropriately scheduled planning, we determine a certain period for the implementation of plans and projects and a specific timetable to expect reasonable and economic

benefits, if the time for implementation takes longer, there will be no opportunity for economic benefits."

In the course of the report, an expert told us: Smaller projects often are implemented without planning, because officials travel to a region and offer projects that have, in any case, become sensitive issues for the people of the region, and later studies show that the implementation of such projects is not economical.

#### **The Villagers Insurance and General Insurance Plan**

Among the projects being pursued that have had preliminary studies is a plan that, according to experts, is followed up by the Supreme Institute of Research of the Social Security Organization.

One of those involved says: "While researchers of this institute were studying rural insurance, research groups were dissolved, and the plan was offered to the Majles without the research background. In order to keep up appearances, new research groups in the institute started working on the rural insurance project."

One claim is that even after the publication of this report, the group of participating individuals in the institute and the rural insurance group will certainly not have expert answers if questions are raised about the issue of social security and welfare.

I ask this expert: Were you aware of the project; did you know about it? He emphasizes the fate of the plan: This plan will either not be implemented or will be abandoned, like other projects, incomplete. In his opinion, the rural insurance plan will cause economic confusion and chaos in the rural system, because the plan for it has been presented to the Majles without systematic research and careful scientific study.

#### **Lack of Grounds for Study**

The lack of grounds for study in many developmental projects of the First Plan, especially that group of projects that had gone through the initial phases prior to the revolution, resulted in a note in the Second Developmental Plan that the implementation of any project and plan would be dependent on the agreements in principle related to full and comprehensive studies, which will be discussed in the later issues in detail.

In any case, the issue of the necessity of preliminary studies on the implementation of projects has so far been most damaging, and because the projects have not relied on accurate research, the result has been the creation of incomplete and unsettled projects.

Mohammad Hasan Hasani, who has a masters degree in sociology, believes that the decision phase does not rely on research in a sense that, for the implementation of the projects, the standards and studies of the economic projects usually ensue under the heading of technical and economic justification.

The social projects also are studied on the basis of the goal that they pursue and their costs and results. But, unfortunately, in our country this part, that is, the study part of every project, is only superficial.

This expert regards the weakness in studies as due to shortage of expert manpower in many areas, especially in certain areas, the improper distribution of manpower, and the replacement of expertise with regard to jobs that are not in the expertise of these forces; and in this connection, some manpower is wasted.

[13 Aug p 5]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the designing of projects, have we evaluated the implemental capability of the country?

The chairman of the [Planning and] Budget Committee says very seriously and firmly: In regards to many projects in the country, we did not think about our capability, and the simultaneous start of many of the present projects is clear evidence of this issue. He gives an example and shows the necessity of raising such an issue.

His example is this: The simultaneous start of dozens of cement projects or several tire or sugar cane projects in the country, considering the limitations of foreign currency resources, is not within the implemental capability of the country, and advisors must not start dozens of similar projects in these areas, considering the existing limitations.

Expert evaluation of the implemental capability of the country and spending the budget for the developmental projects on the basis of existing priorities is a logical way for the projects to reach operation in a shorter period of time.

#### **Disregard for the Capabilities of the Country and the Increase in the Volume of Incomplete Projects**

At the present time, it seems that in designing the projects, little attention is paid to the implemental capability of the country. It is clear that this capability in dealing with various projects is divided proportionate to the importance of the project, and determining the share of the capability of the funds, budget, and energy for each project is important.

According to one of the experts, in the initial planning of the projects, need must necessarily be evaluated on the basis of priority and the capability of the country to implement the project. This expert adds: The projects that are being pursued in the government organizations are usually not suitable to the resources, especially at times when there does not seem to be any need for entering a project and designing it.

He does not first give an example for his claim, and only points out that in some cases a decision is made to carry out a project for mostly noneconomical reasons, when its profitability is doubtful and the only reason for it might be to enlarge an organization in which politics or private

interests prevail. But he then says: The transfer of the steel project from Bandar 'Abbas, which has access to the sea, mines, and expert resources, to Esfahan is a good example of this claim.

At the present time, many similar projects can be seen in which, unfortunately, there is a tendency to implement them simultaneously.

Such projects delay access to the results of the projects and often also add to the volume of incomplete projects in the country. Despite the fact that the first numbers of the report we announced as about 34,000, some experts and officials regard such a figure as incredible, even though this figure was announced by the [Planning and] Budget Committee. When the chairman of this committee was contacted again, it was shown that the number of incomplete projects is much greater, so that to the 30,000 incomplete projects, 17,000 projects in the deprived regions in the First Plan must be added.

In any case, the main point is that sometimes the designs of projects are beyond the implemental capability of the country, and the starting of similar projects simultaneously is a clear sign of lack of attention to the above-mentioned implemental potential.

For example, we can mention several large projects in the country in the area of cement production.

#### **Incomplete Projects, Similar Projects With Simultaneous Implementation**

On the basis of statistics announced by the Ministry of Industries in Esfand [20 February-20 March] last year, the projects under way in regards to cement approach 20, while another 30 cement projects were announced to be under study.

In recent days, when the statistics on progress regarding the cement projects was announced in Ordibehesht 1373 [21 April-21 May 1994] by the Ministry of Industries, we faced about 19 cement projects, of which 11 in their implemental phases have generally shown less than 50-percent progress. This ministry has projected that by the end of next year 16 projects will be operational, and the projects of Karun, Bojnord, and Asgarabad are projected to be operational by late in the second quarter of 1375 [21 March 1996-20 March 1997].

Obviously, this projection, given the limitation of resources, inflationary conditions, and the allocation of a part of the national resources to such similar projects, will not meet its timetable.

On this issue, one talks to the chairman of the Majles [Planning and] Budget Committee.

He says: "The dozens of cement projects started simultaneously, several tire projects in the industries sector, and the sugarcane project in the agricultural sector, considering the limitations of foreign currency resources, are not within the capability of the country, and advisors



in this area must not design projects with very high standards. In his opinion, the start of dozens of similar projects, considering the limitations, is also not in our best interests, and their operation delays will decrease their economic return."

Dari-Najafabadi gives an example: "Although cement was scheduled to reach operation in phases within three to four years, given the present conditions with dozens of projects starting simultaneously and no attention paid to the existing resources of the country, such a projection will not reach results, because a project such as 'Khash Cement' has taken more than 10 years, and other projects too do not reach operation on time."

He adds: "And more bitterly, the industrial and technical potential of the country is not fully used in this connection."

Based on announced statistics and according to the chairman of the [Planning and] Budget Committee of the Majles, in the industry sector, there is domestic potential of 60 to 70 percent for building cement factories. Naturally, the potential of this domestic force and the job-generating potential of projects such as cement must not make the implementation of such projects obligatory and final, because other extenuating factors also exist which will adversely affect the rate of return if there is more insistence on the implementation of the project.

Note this statement: "We have the necessary capability for building the foundations of the cement projects in the country, but the capacity for manufacturing furnaces, rollers, and other necessities is very limited in the country. Obviously, if there is more demand than capacity, we have to go to foreign countries and spend a significant part of the developmental budget for this purpose, especially under the present conditions, with foreign currency expenditures and the shape of foreign trade having played an important role in the stagnation of the projects."

Obviously, if we gradually do not use the domestic industrial potential for the completion of the cement projects and neglect the growth of domestic technology, we would ignore the economic feasibility of the projects.

**Note 6 of the Second Plan: Exchange of Any Agreement in Regards to Plans Depends on Full and Comprehensive Studies**

The volume of incomplete projects of the First Plan required prioritizing the projects, and then the issue of paying attention to those projects at a higher percentage of completion became an issue.

At the present time, some projects we are forced to complete, the economic feasibility of a large number of which is doubtful. Unfortunately, in the meantime, there are long-term projects, the economic advantage of which does not paint a bright future.

Certainly, these projects have created sufficient sensitivity in the people of the region that stopping them at the present time does not seem rational.

Obviously, a significant number of these projects have been designed on the basis of previous conditions, and in regards to them, facing the new economic situation has not been anticipated.

Undoubtedly, the lack of a clear perspective has caused a significant number of the projects to remain vague, and gradually the incomplete projects increase in number.

In the Second Developmental Plan, considering such a situation, efforts are made to implement any project and plan with very solid preliminary studies.

Technical, economic, and social studies in regards to the implementation of every project are among the first projections.

Implemental studies and scheduling the phases of the projects on the basis of clear standards and criteria is another feature that has been anticipated in the Second Plan.

Also, studies concerning the location of the projects with consideration for the potential of the region in order to reduce cost is another issue that is necessary to implementation regarding every developmental project from now on. Also, transportation, manpower, the domestic nature of the technology of some projects, support services, the use of natural resources and raw materials in fundamental investment sectors, and the relocation of manpower will be taken into consideration fully in future projects in order to increase the implementation of more feasible projects.

A member of the [Planning and] Budget Committee says in this regard: In Note 6 of the Second Plan, the points made are worthy of attention, and the rate of exchange of agreements after going through certain stages is high. In his opinion, experience in regards to past projects has forced the Majles to issue permits for the start of projects essentially after sufficient studies in the preliminary stages of the project.

**I ask about the role of Note 6 and its effects on controlling incomplete developmental projects.**

He says: Certainly, this note can help prevent the ratification of projects merely because they have been started or because of social pressures or as the result of visits of various officials and deputies who also make promises.

On the other hand, since the general resources of the government are limited and incomplete projects are beyond the limited resources of the government, it is not possible to allocate resources to all projects and plans at the present time, with the government forced to follow an eyedropper policy, allocating to each project not as much funding as it needs, but as much as the country can afford.

In his opinion, one of the constructive issues addressed in the Second Plan is serious emphasis on and prioritizing the allocation of funds for incomplete projects for their ultimate completion and operation.

According to those involved, these priorities are first given to those projects over 70 percent complete and then to lower percentage ones. In any case, in the ratification of projects, attention to this point is necessary to give first priority to vital and strategic projects.

[14 Aug p 5]

[FBIS Translated Text] A large industrial project involving dozens of experts, researchers, technicians, workers, etc. is delayed for many years.

A building and a road that must be built as soon as possible face dozens of bureaucratic, financial, budgetary, funding, and other problems and stop midway.

A project with designers and planners who have worked on it for months faces a slowdown.

Incomplete and halted projects cause dozens of funding, administrative, implemental, and other problems, and some of the capital of this society is threatened with waste and destruction.

Indeed, what must be done at a time when the incomplete projects before the eyes of the managers, officials, experts, and all the people indicate some of the implemental, economic, administrative, funding, and other disorders?

In one word, it must be said that we must roll up our sleeves, reevaluate the incomplete projects, and complete these projects with the implementation of proper management.

The most critical problem at the present time in the implementation of the projects in the country is lack of financial ability and funds for developmental and natural projects. At the present time, the ratio of the total rials remaining of the project contracts, by calculating the coefficients of modification to the time remaining in the contracts that have been signed between the executive organizations and contractors, does not seem logical.

It is said that if with proper and timely planning a balance is not created, its harmful results will increase every year and will reach a point that a major part of the developmental funds will be spent only on the payment of the salaries of the permanent personnel of the workshops.

The studies by the Plan and Budget Organization in regards to the status of the projects of the First Developmental Plan show that the ratio of the rial funds remaining in the projects and the projected schedule for the completion of these projects is not an encouraging one, and considering the rate of inflation and decrease in the value of rial funds, the gap between the physical progress and the rial progress is gradually increasing.

#### **Inflationary Conditions, the Essential Problem in the Completion of Projects**

Every year, proportionate with the actual inflation figure, the projected expenditures for the implementation of the projects will increase. In today's world, managers and planners make a great deal of effort to prevent the halt in the implementation of economic and industrial projects.

Essentially, viewing the project economically and evaluating the actual profit is the most important goal of managers in the implementation of economic and industrial projects. The smaller the total profit in proportion to the expenditures usually means the less welcome they are to the administrators of the industrial and developed regions.

Many of the industrial companies and centers of the world often think about the return, profit, and investment within the time period of three to four years, at the most. Otherwise, essentially, they consider the implementation of any project uneconomical and of low profit. In fact, this motive of rapid return on capital in a short two- or three-year period provides the grounds for the transfer of capital to the building of industrial centers and the expansion of industrial facilities. Under such conditions, the question is, will the implementation of economic projects that have been delayed for several years still be profitable?

Majdara, the deputy from Babolsar and a member of the [Planning and] Budget and Combining Committees, believes that one of the reasons for the projects not being completed is the mistaken cost estimates without calculating the rate of inflation. Explaining this issue, he says: "As you know, projects that have cost estimates based on the price list published by the Plan and Budget Organization go to contract at a percentage of increase or decrease from the allocated figure. At the same time, considering the existing inflation in the society and the increase in the price of goods, the estimates are usually more than 70 percent off the realities of the total cost. For example, a project that begins with an estimate of 50 million tumans in practice costs more than 100 million tumans, and this is one of the important reasons for incomplete projects increasing, due to the inaccuracy of the rial estimates."

#### **Lack of Balance Between the Budget and the Volume of Developmental Projects**

Dr. 'Ali Naqi Mashayekhi, in the area of the operation of developmental projects and the responsibility of the government and the Majles, believes that in Iran the cost of developmental projects and the period for the completion of these projects are often over the initial estimates.

He explains that generally, inflation is the main reason for the increase in the cost of the projects compared to the initial estimates. But even without inflation, an

imbalance between the developmental budget and the mass of developmental projects under way causes the increase in the cost of projects and their time for completion. If in the structure of developmental projects we take into consideration two kinds of expenditures of the project, basic expenditures and progress expenditures, the basic expenditures are those spent on maintaining the status of the project and the progress expenditures are for the physical progress of the project.

Dr. Mashayekhi, a member of the Supreme Institute for Planning and Development, shows in a model that when the developmental budget is not large enough to pay all the annual basic and progress expenditures of the developmental projects, even at fixed prices, the time for the completion of developmental projects and their costs will increase significantly.

In the opinion of this expert, the insufficiency of the developmental budget occurs either through a decrease in the budget at the initial fixed price or is the result of starting so many projects. For this reason, in the case of an insufficient budget, there is a strong, vital need not to start new projects, in order to prevent the increase in cost of the development projects and excessive time for their completion.

#### **Incomplete Projects and the Gap Between the Budget and Actual Needs**

In the opinion of experts, one of the important external factors that effects the operation of the developmental projects is the level of inflation between the total developmental government budget and the actual developmental project needs of the country. This financial imbalance is well illustrated in the following example.

Dr. Mashayekh, a member of the Supreme Research Institute for Planning said: Based on data obtained from the Health and Treatment Administration and the Plan and Budget Organization in 1370 [21 March 1991-20 March 1992], 19,800 hospital beds were under construction from the general resources of the country at 1370 prices. The cost of completion and equipment of each hospital bed is R47.5 million. Hence, the completion and equipping of hospital beds under way from the start of the building of those beds to their completion costs about R940,000 million. If every hospital project is completed in the reasonable period of four years, the ratified budget for building the hospital projects underway would have to be about R235,125 million, whereas the developmental funds for hospitals in the ratified budget of 1370 were only R72,721 million, or about 30 percent of the funds necessary.

Referring to another report concerning the management of water resources of the Plan and Budget Organization in 1366 [21 March 1987-20 March 1988], the physical progress of the above-mentioned projects is only the percent or equivalent of one year of the five years of reasonable time for implementation, in which case, for the completion of the remaining work of the projects

under way in the water sector, in four years, about R196,000 million in developmental funds annually was necessary at the 1366 price.

However, the developmental funds ratified for the water sector in 1366 were about R43,732 million, or merely 22 percent of the funds necessary.

The above lack of financial balance outside the control of the managers of the developmental projects compromises the output of the implementation of developmental projects. In other words, if the management systems are established well on the level of developmental projects, the lack of balance between the developmental funds and the necessary financial resources for the implementation of the developmental projects of the country alone will have important unpleasant effects on the operation of such projects in terms of the cost of the projects and the time for their implementation. In addition to the lack of financial balance, we can point out the failure to allocate funds for the projects on time as well and consider it one of the major reasons for the increase in the volume of incomplete projects.

Majdara, the Majles deputy, explains in this connection: For a project that needs 100-percent allocation of funds for completion, because of the shortage of revenue resources and the decrease in the projections of the general treasury, there is no capability to pay the funds on time, and this itself is the cause of the project being inactive or stagnant.

For example, the Imam Khomeini Airport was supposed to be completed with 7 billion tumans from the banking system and the general government budget, whereas the needed figure amounts to 15 billion tumans without calculating equipment.

The level of much of the modification, which results from the inactivity of the projects as presented by the contractors, is another reason pointed to by Majdara. He believes that based on estimates, something approaching 30 percent of the ratified funds of every project must be increased for this reason. For example, a bridge for which in road building sometimes an estimated 15 million tumans is allocated is modified up to 35 million tumans in order to compensate for the expected loss of contracts from inflationary fluctuations and changes in the monetary and financial policies of the country. This itself is a burden that imposes pressure on the general treasury of the country and is in fact the price that is paid for such projects.

#### **Nation's Largest Oil Tank Built by Domestic Experts**

94LA0259C Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian  
3 Sep 94 p 3

[FBIS Translated Text] The Esfahan 1.33-million-barrel storage facility, to be used for storing oil and gas, has gone into operation.



The Public Relations Office of the National Refining and Oil Products Distribution Company, announced the above. It added:

Arrangements to build this storage facility and install it on Khark Island were made prior to the Islamic revolution in a contract with the CBI Company. However, after the purchase and shipment of the parts to Khark Island, its installation on Khark Island was halted because this was at the peak of the struggles by the Muslim nation of Iran.

After the triumph of the revolution and based on the decisions made by the Iran National Oil Company's Board of Directors, arrangements were made for this storage facility to be shipped to Esfahan, in view of Khark island's sensitivity and strategic position. After installation it will be given to the Office of Pipeline Affairs for operation.

Based on this report, after the completion of all the planning, the procurement of the storage facility's missing parts, the completion of the bidding formalities and the selection of the Arak Machinery Manufacturing Company as the contractor, the storage tank's installation operations effectively began on 11/1/1370 [21 January 1992].

At the same time provisions were made to spend 945 million rials in foreign exchange on the services of foreign experts for supervision and help with the storage facility's installation. In practice, however, through the use of the services of the experts from the Office of Engineering and Construction Affairs, all the operations to install the storage facility were carried out without the use of foreign experts, and the aforementioned storage facility was prepared for operation.

#### **Darabad Laser Therapy Unit Begins Operations**

94LA0259G Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian  
3 Sep 94 p 2

[FBIS Translated Text] The best-equipped laser treatment unit was opened at the Center for Tuberculosis and Lung Disease Research at Masih Daneshvari Hospital in Darabad in Tehran in the presence of Dr. Velayati, minister of foreign affairs; 'Asgarowladi, the vice regent's representative; Niri, supervisor of the Imam Khomeyni (peace be upon him) Aid Committee; and members of this body's Supreme Medical Council.

The equipment for the laser treatment unit in this hospital was procured with credits from the Imam Khomeyni (peace be upon him) Aid Committee.

Niri, supervisor of the Imam Khomeyni (peace be upon him) Aid Committee, said during the ceremonies opening this unit: This year the universal health insurance project was implemented by this body, and more than 3 million people needing universal health insurance were given coverage.

He discussed services to be rendered in the future by this body in the Second Five-Year Plan. He said: If the needed credits are approved in the Second Five-Year Plan, 8 million more people will be covered by universal health insurance.

#### **New Sistan va Baluchestan Communications Centers Open**

94LA0259F Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian  
31 Aug 94 p 5

[FBIS Translated Text] On Tuesday, 18 communications centers and offices went into operation in the province of Sistan va Baluchestan.

These communications offices are located in the villages of Sarjangal-e Gurin, Chah-e Zard, Alabad, 'Azizabad, Shah Karam, Deh Kul, Qal'eh Kohnah, Dah Bozi, Gol Mohammad Beg Cherk and Golkhani, from the municipalities of Zahedan, Zabol and Iranshahr.

Henceforth the inhabitants of these villages will be able to establish telephone contact with other cities in the country via FX [as published] lines.

Likewise the 256-number center in the village of Adimi and the 'Ali Akbar Zabol Complex opened today and went into operation.

Implementation of this project cost more than 1.521 billion rials, which was procured and paid from the credits for the General Office of Communications of the province of Sistan va Baluchestan.

#### **Kordestan Province Budget Detailed**

94LA0259B Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian  
4 Sep 94 p 5

[FBIS Translated Text] The governor-general of Kordestan said: This year's development budget for the province of Kordestan is considered historic compared to previous years.

In an interview with the press on Friday, Mohammad Reza Rahimi said the amount of this budget is 180 billion rials [R]. He said: Out of this budget this year more than 2,000 projects are under way in the province of Kordestan in the urban and rural sectors.

He discussed the fact that the 1373 [21 March 1994-20 March 1995] development budget for the province of Kordestan will gradually increase in the remaining months of the year. He said: Of the province's total budget, 30 percent has been allocated to the rural areas and 38 percent has also been allocated to projects, and it is being used jointly by the urban and rural societies.

He noted that credits for the educational sector from Note 3 are at R4 billion. He said: To procure the needed educational art space, the preliminary materials procurement has been completed for the construction of a large educational art complex, and construction will begin this

year. The preliminary credit for this project is R300 million, which has been allocated by the office of the president of the republic.

The governor-general of Kordestan said the work done in the last 10 months in this province is unprecedented. He discussed the tourist appeal of Lake Zarivar in Marivan. He said: Measures are already under way to create the installations needed for the tourist industry, and in this area R500 million will be spent on projects for Lake Zarivar.

The governor-general of Kordestan also discussed the measures that have been taken to develop higher education and to create Payam-e Nur Universities in several cities in the province of Kordestan. He said the recent changes in this product have arisen from the complete stability and security in the most remote parts of Kordestan.

### **Bushehr Provincial Credits Increase 30 Percent**

94LA0259A Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian  
3 Sep 94 p 5

[FBIS Translated Text] The chief of the Plan and Budget Organization for the province of Bushehr said: The credits for this province this year [21 March 1994-20 March 1995] are 35 billion rials [R], a 30-percent increase compared to the previous year.

Mohammad Qasem-Hoseyni, noting that by the end of the current year the province's credits will reach R65 billion, added: These credits will be spent building and completing 1,000 development projects.

He said: The credits for the province in the physical training and culture and art sector have grown more than 80 percent.

The chief of the Plan and Budget Organization said that last year's credits were R56 billion. He said: This amount was spent on 833 construction and completion projects.

He said: Bushehr's national and province credits during the government's First Five-Year Plan were R325 billion, which was spent building and completing more than 3,500 projects.

## **PAKISTAN**

### **Failure To Obtain F-16s Seen Final**

94AS0493C Karachi AMN in Urdu 11 Aug 94 p 3

[Editorial: "F 16 Planes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The U.S. ambassador to India, Frank Wisner, has said that the program to give F-16 planes to Pakistan has been terminated. In its news broadcast, the BBC quoted the American ambassador in Delhi to the effect that as a result of this termination, the Indian government, which had threatened to strengthen its air force if the F-16 deal with Pakistan was carried

out, would now heave a sigh of relief. Mr. Wisner has said that it was not possible for Washington to complete the F-16 deal because, under the terms [of purchase], Pakistan had to agree to stop the production of nuclear material used to construct nuclear weapons. It should be noted here that Pakistan has already paid for the F-16 planes. The U. S. ambassador in Delhi expressed the wish that India would stop the production of nuclear weapons; he said that the U. S. would continue to pressure India and Pakistan to solve the Kashmir problem and that the U.S. wished to include India among the countries which had signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] but which India had so far refused to join. India maintains that the great powers are imposing this discriminatory [agreement] on the small countries.

Recently, president Farouq Leghari said in a speech that if the U.S. did not intend to sell F-16 planes, it should refund Pakistan's money so that Pakistan could buy other planes. The U.S. ambassador's speech in Delhi makes the situation clear and shows that the decision to terminate the the F-16 purchase was made some time ago; it is also clear that silent diplomacy is being employed to settle matters. Issues relating to defense and foreign relations are of a sensitive nature and cannot be discussed publicly; however, it is the government's responsibility not to retreat on matters of national interest and to refuse any restrictions. If American influence can persuade India to sign the NPT, then Pakistan should not refuse to do so; the government should always follow a reciprocal and fool-proof course in international affairs. By cancelling the F-16 sale, the U.S. has satisfied the Indian government and has tried to bring India closer to the U.S. position. However, the success of U.S. diplomacy depends on India signing the NPT agreement. Pakistan's position on this issue is one of principle, namely, that any restrictions in the region should be imposed without discrimination on everyone at the same time. The U.S. should not worry about Pakistan but should concentrate its attention on India which is dreaming of becoming a super power.

### **UN Claimed Biased Against Islam**

94AS0492A Peshawar MASHRIQ in Urdu 18 Aug 94  
p 6

[Editorial: "UN's Partiality Toward the U.S."]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Security Council of the United Nations has announced that it would continue its economic, air and military sanctions against Libya. The manner in which the U.S. has repeatedly changed its position in placing responsibility for the destruction of the Pan American plane and the doubts it has created have not been dispelled; unfortunately, however, the majority of the Security Council members particularly the permanent members have always seized every opportunity to decide against Muslim countries.

The decision to continue sanctions against Libya results from this same long-held hatred. In our view, if the

United Nations and its Security Council do not change their policy of acting as the domestic institutions of powerful countries, Islamic countries would have no choice in the future except to form their own United Nations.

### **UN Said Spreading Satanic Plot of Sexual Deviance**

94AS0492C Karachi TAKBEER in Urdu 28 Aug 94  
pp 9-10

[Article by Mohammad Salahuddin: "The UN's Satanic Plot To Give Legal Protection in the Islamic World to Sexual Deviation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Thursday, 4 August, I started a tour of 5 countries of Western Europe. My first stop was in London and by the time this article is published, I will have travelled to Denmark and from there to Oslo, the capital of Norway. My next analysis may be sent from that city.

My original intention was to attend the international conference to be held in the hall of the largest mosque of London's Regent's Park. The conference was being held under the auspices of the World Islamic Forum [WIF]. Next, I intended to attend the various meetings and receptions to be held in Birmingham, Leicester and London, tour a number of important organizations, meet prominent personalities, give interviews to the BBC and prepare and send a report of all these activities. I also planned to inform the readers of the activities of my two companions, Dr. Salman Nadvi (Durban) and Dr. Mahmood Ahmad Ghazi who is the director of the Dawa Academy, Islamabad. However, certain circumstances forced me to postpone these reports. I may be able to prepare my reports when I return to Karachi.

The readers may remember that in TAKBEER's issue number 31, in this same analysis column, a brief commentary was included on the senseless population welfare plan when seen from the point of view of Islamic teachings and economic factors. The ulemas and all intelligent people were asked to play a part in damping this deluge and stopping the pressures of the condom culture. Upon reaching London, I discovered that a major plan had been concocted by the disciples of the devil which had sent a wave of great anxiety through all Muslims here, both Arab and non-Arab, and belonging to all schools of religious thought. Everyone is demanding that I postpone or cancel other plans and pay attention to this problem first.

The satanic plot's objective is to use the UN and its branch organization; the World Bank to destroy the family system all over the world and in particular the Islamic countries; this plot is deceptively called population control. It would give a woman the right to decide the number of children she should bear; give her the right to use contraceptive devices and drugs and even the legal right to have an abortion. Women would also be free to

choose any profession or activity outside the home. In addition to all the other programs aimed at population control, this plan would give not only men and women but school children as well, the legal right to sexual welfare or the freedom to indulge their lust (sex outside marriage). To achieve this objective, sex education would be taught in primary schools and condoms would be made available in schools as well as in every organization, office or factory where men and women are employed. Homosexuality would be included in sexual welfare.

In order to inflict this horror upon the world, a conference will be held in Cairo, Egypt's capital, under the auspices of the UN starting on 5 September and ending on the 13 September. The conference is called "Matters Relating to Population and Progress." A program for the conference has been prepared consisting of 113 pages of text which will be officially made public on 17 August. But the main points have already appeared in the press and strong reactions are emerging.

The plan will be approved in the shape of an international agreement by all the member countries of the United Nations which would then be responsible for putting the plan into effect. Any future aid would depend on whether the plan has been carried out. One view is that Cairo was deliberately chosen as the site of the conference because the real danger of resistance is expected to come from the Muslim world. In the same way that the opposition of Muslim society to leadership by women was broken by appointing women to the post of premier in Bangladesh, Pakistan and Turkey, now by means of the Cairo conference the Muslim world would be forced to submit to the satanic plot of recognizing the freedom to have illicit sex and educating and encouraging people to indulge in it. These are the main points of the plan:

1. Compulsory education in sex activity which has been given the name of reproductive health and under which methods of contraception and mingling of the sexes will be taught; moreover, the freedom of the sexes to mingle freely and without restriction after sexual feelings are awakened is also included. This right to mingle would extend to homes, educational institutions, places of entertainment and various youth organizations. Schools would be encouraged to include a separate chapter on "C" or condoms in texts for primary schools.
2. The sex act would be freed from the traditional family restrictions, namely marriage, and every provision would be made to let women come out of their homes and join the general social life; women would be encouraged to enter the professions and become able to earn their own living and they would be relieved of the responsibility of children and housework.
3. Condoms would be available everywhere and included among necessary drugs; local production of condoms would be encouraged and technology to produce high quality condoms would be made available to all countries.



4. Every child would be a "wanted" one and women would have the right to abort unwanted children; suitable abortion clinics would be established and their services would be available at all times.

5. All countries would make contraceptive devices and drugs available under the Primary Health Care System and would arrange for education and training in the use of these contraceptives. The report states that the population control program launched under the title of family planning had caused a fivefold increase in the use of contraceptives and that under the new plan, all restrictions on contraception should be removed.

The plan has a budget of 3 billion, 400 million rupees and covers six years, that is, until the end of this century. What "new measures" are envisaged can be deduced from the demonstration held in front of the UN headquarters on 26 June and from the American attorney general Janet Reno's decision 10 days ago. The demonstrators demanded that homosexual men and women be given the same freedom of sexual association enjoyed by heterosexuals and that this right be included in the charter of human rights. Janet Reno then announced that any man or woman persecuted for his or her sexual preference in any country could seek refuge in the U.S. In an article published in the LOS ANGELES TIMES, she stated that she had recommended making these changes in the U.S. Immigration laws.

This summary of the plan which will be discussed in Cairo on 5 September was sent from the U.S. by Khaled Beg and appeared in the August issue of IMPACT INTERNATIONAL. It raised quite a storm in Britain and other countries. The first strong reaction to the plan came from the Pope who condemned it especially the proposed right of abortion which the Pope regards as murder and therefore not permissible. The United Kingdom's Islamic Mission and other organizations have appealed to the rulers of Islamic countries; the Organization of Islamic Conference [OIC]; Rabitaye Alame Islami; Motimer Alame Islami and ulemas and political leaders to protest against this satanic plot to destroy the purity of the family system and encourage illicit sex and have asked that this plan not be enforced in their countries. The first effective voice raised was from Al Azhar university. ALSHARQ UL AUSAT, in its August issue, published a statement from Majma Al Bahus Al Islamia (Institute for Islamic Research) signed by the Sheikh of Al Azhar, Dr. Javal Haq Ali Javal Haq, which calls the plan un-Islamic and says that the loose interpretations, statements and new phrases included in the approved agenda showed that the clear objective was to adopt a behaviour opposed to the basic family system established by Islam; that the inescapable conditions under which religious law allowed abortion were exceeded and abortion was advocated in ordinary circumstances; that homosexuality and heterosexual relations contrary to religious law were encouraged; that the recommendations trampled upon and destroyed all the values and limits imposed by heaven-inspired religions

and that the result would be the spread of prostitution and sexually transmitted diseases.

[The statement further states that] the plan's article ten was contrary to Islamic principles because it told parents not to object to consenting secret relations which were against religious law and said that the parents would not have the right to interfere; that the result would be that the young would take every opportunity to satisfy their sexual appetites and thus the door to appalling social corruption would be opened.

The [Al Azhar] statement goes on to say that Islam forbade any sexual relationship outside of marriage and punished severely those who indulged in corrupt and illicit acts even if these acts were by mutual consent; that it was contrary to Islam to have sexual relations outside marriage whereas section 5 of article 5 of the plan allowed freedom of sexual relations; that contrary to sections 1 and 2 of article 7 of the plan, Islam did not allow sexual relationship between unmarried individuals; that subsections 3, 4, 6 and 8 accepted family life without marriage which Islam did not allow.

The statement [from Al Azhar] states in regard to abortion that it was totally forbidden even if due to illicit acts or rape; the only exception was when the health of the mother was in danger and abortion was not allowed under any other circumstances whether the woman was married, had a certain number of children or if the health or sexual health of the woman was at risk; that other recommendations in the plan were also against Islamic law such as the proposal in section 17 of article 4 that men and women should inherit equally; that subsection 22 recommended to government and nongovernment institutions that a minimum age for marriage be abolished and that an alternative to early marriage be offered, or in other words, that prostitution and sinful acts be made easier. In conclusion, the statement asks the countries taking part in the conference to cleanse the plan of all anti-Islamic recommendations and not leave any equivocation which could be interpreted as being against Islamic law.

According to press reports, Indonesian ulemas and the government have opposed abortion rights and some other sections [of the plan].

The London newspaper INDEPENDENT which represents the views of Israeli Jews expressed great perturbation over this initial reaction in its editorial of 11 August and showed surprise that Christians and Muslims had reacted in the same way. The editorial headline reads: "A Rather Unholy Religious Pact." The editorial states that an unpleasant unity seemed to be emerging between the Vatican and Muslim Fundamentalists over the issue of population control; that the Pope had even sent a delegation to Tehran and the deputy foreign minister of Iran, Mohammad Hashemi Rafsanjani, had remarked after the arrival of the delegation that future wars would be between religious forces and materialists. The newspaper comments in an ironic tone that the future would be safe

only if the UN plan was acted upon; the editorial further states that both the Vatican and Islam were opposed to family planning but whereas the Vatican's stand was based on religion, Islam attached importance to social and political factors. The editorial writer remarks in regard to the Quran that it was "flexible" and laid down no clear law in regard to abortion and contraception. The tone of the editorial shows that the UN plan is the product of Jewish minds and that the editorial has been written to support them.

The fact is that of all the attacks made on the culture, moral values and religious beliefs of the Muslim world from the colonial times to the present, this new plan takes the prize. The UN has exceeded the limits of its powers and, under the new world order, has now taken upon itself the task of preparing and forcibly imposing "fiqh" or religious laws on countries holding different beliefs. The UN will now determine and enforce what is allowed and what is disallowed under religious laws. This organization is now in the process of abrogating the freedom of religion and belief proclaimed in the UN manifesto and the human rights charter and is trying to bring to fruition the Zionist protocol and the dream of a world Jewish state.

Two news items appeared in the INDEPENDENT of 10 August; one was about the rape of a three year old girl by a ten year old boy and the other about two young boys who murdered their parents in order to gain sexual freedom for themselves. Are we being pushed toward this kind of society?

Pakistani Muslims residing in Great Britain ask their ulemas, politicians, journalists and intellectuals to try their utmost to prevent the government of Pakistan from accepting this plan otherwise, as the verse says, even our history will vanish from the earth.

The reason why Pakistanis and Muslims in general living in Britain and other Western countries are so deeply agitated is that they have seen at first hand the destructive consequences of the condom culture and its effect on their own families. Here only 20 to 40 per cent of families are composed of married couples and 50 per cent of the children born are illegitimate. Even primary school children are sexually promiscuous and the respectable and cultured section of the population is helpless to do anything because adultery, homosexuality, promiscuity, prostitution and exhibitionism in all forms are protected by law. Now this same legal and international protection is being offered to the world and especially to Muslim countries through the UN and that is why a wave of intense sorrow, anger and anxiety is sweeping the Islamic world. The question is being asked everywhere whether the Muslims of Pakistan, the ulema, intellectuals, journalists and politicians will allow this satanic plan to be carried out in their country?

### **Conspiracy To Assassinate Altaf Hussain Uncovered**

*94AS0493Z Karachi AMN in Urdu 16 Aug 94 p 1*

[News Report: "Plot To Assassinate the Leader of the Movement Uncovered in Libya; Two Individuals Arrested; Twelve photographs of Altaf Hussain and the names and addresses of MQM Leaders Were Found in the Possession of the Culprits Who Wanted to Gain Access to the Leader of the Movement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Karachi 15 August (AMN News): An international plot has been hatched to assassinate Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) leader Altaf Hussain who lives in London and an international terrorist, Yafut, the leader of a band of international assassins in Libya, has been hired to carry out the plot. According to details received, an influential source in Libya uncovered the plot; according to this source, Libyan police arrested 2 dangerous individuals carrying weapons and poison needles at the Tripoli airport; these individuals were found to be carrying 12 different photographs of MQM leader Altaf Hussain who lives in London, the names, addresses, telephone numbers and business addresses of Altaf Hussain's close friends and other MQM leaders living in London. The photographs had circles drawn around them. Upon interrogation, the culprits revealed that the members of this dangerous band intended to strike up acquaintance with Altaf Hussain's close friends and thus gain access to him. The source disclosed that while uncovering the conspiracy, it was discovered that Yafut was an international terrorist and the leader of a band of professional assassins and was wanted for crimes committed in several countries. Yafut's agents are active from the Middle East to Europe. The source stated that when Libyan high officials were informed of the conspiracy to kill the MQM leader, they surprisingly ordered the information to be kept secret. Later, on receiving a special message from Pakistan, Libyan officials ordered the dangerous criminals released. It has been learned that certain important forces want Altaf Hussain killed and have paid heavy sums of money to certain international terrorist bands to assassinate him.

### **Formation of New Provinces Supported**

*94AS0492B Karachi TAKBEER in Urdu 25 Aug 94 p 6*

[Editorial: "New Provinces Should Be Formed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Speaking at a reception in Liaqatabad, Karachi, Nawabzadah Nasrullah Khan told press representatives that the people should have total powers on the local levels and provincial autonomy; that after the decentralization of power, there should be no objection to the creation of more administrative provinces in the country.

We are happy to see that a responsible political leader from Punjab confirms the need for creating more administrative provinces and regards the idea as acceptable.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Up to now, the prevailing impression was that Punjab was obstructing the implementation of this positive proposal even though it was recommended by the Ansari commission. In view of the fact that in the last 47 years, new Tahsils, Zilas and Divisions have been created to fulfill administrative needs, it is logical to expect that the same needs should bring about the creation of new provinces. The population of Punjab today is one and a half times the total population of Pakistan at the time of its creation. If there were four provinces in the West Pakistan of 1947, why should not there be four provinces today in Punjab whose population is greater than the population of the whole of West Pakistan at that time? Increase in population creates greater administrative needs; the population of each of the provinces has increased many fold. Since the rise in population has created administrative needs and growth and progress have not been equally shared everywhere, all provinces are facing complicated problems. Dangerous linguistic tensions which now exist in all provinces are not only destroying law and order in those areas but are also creating greater dangers for the security of the country. Provinces with uncontrolled population growth sometimes demand autonomy equal to that of independent countries and these demands create fearful thoughts regarding national unity and territorial integrity. Within such provinces, deprivations among classes brought about by inefficient government administration create conditions resembling civil wars. Such conditions exist everywhere, in Balochistan, Punjab, Sindh and the Frontier province, and in all these provinces the various classes of people want the establishment of new provinces. In view of the situation, the proposal for new provinces should be actively considered and acted upon.

Our suggestion which we have stated repeatedly in these columns is that the constitutional division of provinces should be undertaken on the basis of administrative needs and not on linguistic, tribal or ethnic lines. Each province is already divided into administrative units; in our view, the easiest solution of the problem would be to raise the status of these divisions to that of provinces. Each divisional council would become a provincial assembly; the high court of each division's circuit bench would become the provincial high court. The entire administrative structure already exists and the divisional

commissioner would become the provincial governor. The sole new problem would be the formation of the provincial cabinet which, however, can easily be put together from divisional councils. The upgrading of divisions into provinces does not appear to create any new expenditure and the implementation of the proposal would decrease tension in the provinces and create a more equitable distribution of growth and progress. In our view, since Nasrullah Khan has already supported this positive proposal, he should also take the lead in campaigning for it.

#### **Documents Reveal Impact of Narcotics on Economy**

94WD0578Z Peshawar MASHRIQ in Urdu 10 Aug 94  
p 3

[News Report: "Drug Mafia's Hold on the Economy; These Merchants of Death Are Being Protected by Certain High Officials and Influential Politicians Who Cannot Be Easily Brought To Account; Drug Mafia and Heroin Smugglers Make 450 Billion Dollars a Year of Which 100 Billion Dollars Is Sent Outside the Country"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Lahore (Special Correspondent): Pakistan's economy is controlled by the Drug Mafia and heroin smugglers who make 500 billion dollars annually from the sale of heroin; of this amount 100 billion dollars is sent to foreign countries. This fact is revealed in a secret report by the former narcotics control board of Pakistan. According to the report, 150 factories are busy day and night preparing the "white poison" in the Northern territories and Gadoun Amazai; outside and inside the country the number of small and large scale heroin dealers is nearly 3,000. The report further states that the price of heroin had increased dramatically in the last two years, from 130,000 rupees per kilogram in 1992 to 430,000 rupees per kilogram in 1994. At present in Lahore, heroin is selling for 500,000 rupees per kilogram and in Karachi 800,000 rupees per kilogram. The report says that certain high government officials and politicians were protecting the drug dealers and it was very difficult for any government to apprehend these individuals who pocketed 30 per cent of the smugglers income; these individuals used their influence to shield the heroin dealers in every way.



This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal names and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

#### SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Central Eurasia, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.

**END OF**

**FICHE**

**DATE FILMED**

29 NOV 1994